Normalising India-Maldives ties to whatever extent possible now depends on the ability of the political leadership in the two countries
Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu’s anticipated yet fast-tracked replacement of India with China as the preferred partner; his simultaneous new partnership with distant Türkiye in civil and military trade; and his open communication with the United States (US) that has a ‘China-containment’ strategy have all created a new strategic conundrum for the region to grapple with. In particular, his government joining China’s Global Strategic Initiative (GSI) and also importing essential staples like rice and flour from Türkiye, so as ‘not to rely on one country’ have evoked curiosity and concern.
The presence of Chinese research/spy vessel Xiang Yang Hong 03 docking in Malé, soon after Muizzu’s decision on the non-extension of the joint hydrographical survey with India indicates Muizzu’s pro-China tilt.
While the general focus is on his recent state visit to China, Muizzu’s US$ 37-million deal to procure ‘military drones’ from Türkiye, as if to replace the Indian aerial surveillance of the 900,000-sq km Maldivian exclusive economic zone (EEZ), may introduce a new player into the already crowded Indian Ocean Region (IOR) strategic space. Yet, his decision to ‘elevate’ bilateral relations with China to ‘strategic cooperation’ too has triggered regional concerns. The presence of Chinese research/spy vessel Xiang Yang Hong 03 docking in Malé, soon after Muizzu’s decision on the non-extension of the joint hydrographical survey with India indicates Muizzu’s pro-China tilt. Maldives’ explanation that the vessel visit was only to replenish stocks sounds hollow after Sri Lanka had suspended such calibrated Chinese operations culminating in actual ‘research’ (?) in the third of three visits in two years. Similarly, Muizzu’s decision to extend Aasandha public health insurance coverage to hospitals in Dubai and Thailand, beyond those in India and Sri Lanka, is also a calculated bid to hijack the ‘India Out’ agenda of former President Abdulla Yameen (2013-18).
Türkiye became Muizzu’s first presidential destination for an official visit, but only after Saudi Arabia, the traditional ally and supporter of Maldives, had last minute, without explanations. Subsequently, Muizzu’s visit to China implied that there was much to expect from it as if a lot of preparatory work had been done at short notice.
In China, Muizzu signed 20 agreements in the presence of President Xi Jinping in Beijing and more at Fujian, en route. Apart from the GSI, Maldives has joined China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI) and also revived the Belt and Road Initiative and Free Trade Agreement (FTA) from the Yameen era, both of which successor Solih had sidelined. Muizzu’s ambitious China-funded projects also include an ambitious transhipment port and the expansion of the Malé International Airport, which was at the centre of the ‘GMR row’ with India in 2011-12.
Muizzu’s visit to China implied that there was much to expect from it as if a lot of preparatory work had been done at short notice.
For Muizzu, the 1,153-hectare ‘Ras Male’ reclamation and construction project in Fushi Dhiggaru lagoon is the signature dream project. China has agreed to build 30,000 ‘community housing’ units in Ras Male, once the Sri Lankan contractor completes the US$ 700-million reclamation work in eight months, taking 70 hectares of land in the place of cash. Though housing is a vote-catcher, Solih’s defeat has proved otherwise. Job creation is the way out but in the traditional Chinese way, Muizzu’s projects do not promise any.
Deep in debt, both internal and external, like the Sri Lankan neighbour, Maldives also need cash loans, or budgetary support, but China has only promised US$ 130 million in developmental funding. Given the state of the inherited economy, the Muizzu government recently offered MVR 4.2 billion in treasury bills. His poll promise to not print currency, if kept, would pressure the highly-stressed banking sector even more or lead to more borrowing or both.
It also remains to be seen if Muizzu will keep the other poll promise to obtain parliamentary approval for all his overseas agreements. He can now hope to do so after 13 MPs crossed over from Solih’s Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP), in the run-up to the parliamentary elections, fixed for 17 March. Reflecting the evolving voter mood, the defections and the new India approach are behind, that too, to fill the vacancy caused by his own elevation.
Deep in debt, both internal and external, like the Sri Lankan neighbour, Maldives also need cash loans, or budgetary support, but China has only promised US$ 130 million in developmental funding.
The MDP also has moved a bill to bar elections and electioneering during the Islamic fasting month of Ramadan, and in whose name, Muizzu has promised 10 kg each of rice and flour free from Türkiye, for every family. In between, friends and adversaries, both inside the country and outside, are awaiting the President’s maiden parliamentary address, scheduled post-recess on 5 February, for substantiation of his policy orientation.
From time immemorial, India, along with Sri Lanka, has been the main supplier of essentials to the archipelago nation. On unforeseen occasions like the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown, India as part of the ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy, chose the Maldives as the first beneficiary of food and medicines, including locally manufactured vaccine, all as a gift to the Maldivian people. In context, Muizzu’s reiteration of the poll-time demand for India to pull out the troops engaged in medical and emergency evacuations and the consequent death of a teenager have left a bad taste.
Likewise, the ‘India Military Out’ call falls flat against past instances when Indian troops sent in on specific requests stuck to the mission mode and withdrew immediately. ‘Operation Cactus’ (1988), followed by post-tsunami rescue and relief operations (2004), and the Malé drinking water crisis (2014), all are instances where the Indian troops left once the task was done.
The ‘India Military Out’ call falls flat against past instances when Indian troops sent in on specific requests stuck to the mission mode and withdrew immediately.
Yet, in a veiled but caustic remark targeting India on his return from China, Muizzu declared that Maldives was ‘not in anybody’s backyard, but an independent and sovereign State and no one has a licence to bully us’. That was after President Xi had told Muizzu in Beijing that China ‘firmly opposes external interference in Maldives. It was a repeat of the Chinese official position when India criticised Yameen after the Maldivian Supreme Court ordered freedom for a jailed predecessor, Mohammed Nasheed, who then in self-exile, on 1 February 2018.
Amid multiple developments and to ensure continued trust and confidence, the ‘high-level core group’ of the two governments, proposed by President Muizzu and PM Modi at their first meeting, met in Malé and held ‘discussions on finding a mutually workable solution to enable continued operation of Indian aviation platforms that provide humanitarian and medevac services to the people of Maldives. The officials also discussed ‘steps to enhance the partnership, including expediting ongoing India-funded projects’, as sought by Muizzu, both before and after his election. Following up on the Malé meeting, the two Foreign Ministers, S Jaishankar of India and Moosa Zameer of Maldives met in Uganda, on the sidelines of the NAM ministerial meeting, again in a third-nation venue. The Maldivian Foreign Ministry has since echoed the Indian sentiment on the core group discussions, however, punctuating it with an understanding on the troops’ withdrawal.
In between, social media calls in India to ‘Boycott Maldives’ as a tourism destination after their Maldivian counterparts had posted derogatory and defamatory remarks. The Maldivian government’s quick action of promptly distancing itself from the social media remarks of three deputy ministers and suspending them did not stop Indian celebrities, including Bollywood actors and cricketing greats, from joining what essentially became a neo-nationalist chorus.
The officials also discussed ‘steps to enhance the partnership, including expediting ongoing India-funded projects’, as sought by Muizzu, both before and after his election.
Following the rushed restoration of the Yameen-era China ties, which resembles a yo-yo in the Maldives foreign policy with every government, India and Indians need to adjust to the new normal. From a Maldivian perspective, such predictability is absent in Türkiye’s overnight entry and its impact on the nation’s historic ties with viz Saudi Arabia and other Gulf partners.
Amidst all this, Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, Adm John Aquilino’s meeting with President Muizzu, a few days after the latter’s return from China, evoked interest in India and the region as a whole. Ahead of Muizzu’s China visit, the US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken initiated a telephonic discussion with Maldivian Foreign Minister Moosa Zameer, and the two discussed bilateral cooperation.
As if in continuation of the agreement signed under the previous regime, Adm. Aquilino ‘reiterated his commitment to full assistance in strengthening capacity-building in the defence force’ and ‘additionally affirmed their support for the Maldives in maintaining peace and security while preserving its sovereignty’. Though Muizzu’s approach to the US in the context of his China ties is unclear, his coalition then under jailed Yameen welcomed the October 2020 visit of US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, amid his ‘India Out’ campaign.
Flowing from the ‘Boycott Maldives’ calls in India, the pressure on Muizzu was so great that during his China visit, he asked China to reclaim (from India) the pre-COVID top-spot source-nation for Maldivian tourism.
There is a history to the US-Maldives defence cooperation. The US’ bid for the Maldives to sign the ‘Status of Forces Agreement’(SOFA) on military matters and set up a base in the archipelago-nation failed under the short presidency of Mohamed Waheed (2012-13) after the two sides had reportedly signed a 10-year ‘Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement’ (ACSA)under predecessor President Mohammed Nasheed (2008-12). At the time, Maldives was also known to have offered a military base for the US, but the proposal did not move further.
Be it as it may, normalising India-Maldives ties to whatever extent possible now depends also on the ability of the political leadership in the two countries to silence their neo-nationalist cadres. Following the ‘Boycott Maldives’ calls in India, the pressure on Muizzu was so great that during his China visit, he asked China to reclaim (from India) the pre-COVID top-spot source-nation for Maldivian tourism. This was unlike any other agreement or commitment during the visit, which was seemingly being worked out over a long period.
N Sathiya Moorthy is a Chennai-based Policy Analyst & Political Commentator
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N. Sathiya Moorthy is a policy analyst and commentator based in Chennai.
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