Delimitation Exercises in Assam and Jammu & Kashmir: Rethinking Political Equality

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Federalism requires that the parliamentary composition safeguard the interests of all states equally. Political equality, on the other hand, mandates that every citizen be represented equally, such that the value of every vote is the same. One way to measure this is to determine whether every vote has the same ability to influence electoral outcomes. For example, suppose one constituency in Tamil Nadu has a population of 100, while another in Uttar Pradesh has a population of 1000. In that case, the voters of the constituency in Tamil Nadu have a greater ability to determine electoral outcomes compared to those from the constituency in Uttar Pradesh. To ensure that the value of votes is equal, Article 81 of the Constitution entrenches the principle of political equality by requiring that the population of electoral constituencies be uniform. Article 81 also entrenches the principle of political equality in reapportionment by mandating that the ratio between the population of a state and the seats allotted to that state in Parliament is uniform. For example, if Uttar Pradesh is twice as populous as Tamil Nadu, then to maintain political equality for all citizens, Uttar Pradesh must have twice as many seats as Tamil Nadu in Parliament.

The recent delimitation of electoral constituencies in Assam and Jammu & Kashmir shows that while population is relevant, it is not the only factor in achieving political equality.

However, is population equality the only means to achieve political equality? The recent delimitation of electoral constituencies in Assam and Jammu & Kashmir shows that while population is relevant, it is not the only factor in achieving political equality. Data from these exercises suggest that political equality is a multi-dimensional principle, in which several factors are considered to ensure the effective representation of every citizen.

In both Assam and Jammu and Kashmir, the Delimiting Authority undertook a two-step process for delimitation. In the first stage, a specific number of assembly seats were allotted to each district. During this stage, the Delimiting Authority apportioned the total number of seats in the legislative assembly across the administrative districts of the state. In the second stage, each district was subdivided into as many constituencies as the number of seats allotted to it. If political equality were to be defined purely based on population equality, then the population of each electoral constituency in the state would have been uniform. However, this was not the case, indicating that political equality is not defined purely in terms of population.

In the delimitation exercise in Jammu and Kashmir, the Delimiting Authority allowed a +/-10 percent deviation from population equality when allocating seats to districts. For example, if the principle of strict population equality had been applied, Srinagar would have been allocated nine seats in the Legislative Assembly. However, the Delimiting Authority allocated only eight seats to the district, citing it as a 'predominantly flat area'. Similarly, Kathua would have been allocated five seats if strict population equality had been followed. However, it was allocated six seats since it is a 'predominantly hilly area'. The Delimiting Authority also allowed a population deviation of +/-20 percent during the second stage of drawing electoral constituencies. For example, if the ideal population for each constituency was 1000 people, the Delimiting Authority considered it acceptable for it to have anywhere from 800 to 1,200 people. The cumulative effect of these deviations, both in the allocation of seats to districts and in the drawing of electoral boundaries, resulted in a significant disparity in population distribution. Every constituency in Jammu and Kashmir would have had a population of 1,36,204 if apportionment and delimitation were undertaken purely based on population. However, in 34 of the 90 constituencies, the population exceeded the ideal by 10 percent or more, and in another 21 constituencies, the population fell short of the ideal by 10 percent or more. For example, Gurez, a constituency allocated to the Scheduled Castes, has a population of 37,992—a 72 per cent deviation from the ideal population. Figure 1 captures the constituencies in Jammu and Kashmir where the population exceeds the ideal by 10 percent or more. Figure 2 reflects constituencies where the population falls short of the ideal by 10 percent or more.

Every constituency in Jammu and Kashmir would have had a population of 1,36,204 if apportionment and delimitation were undertaken purely based on population. However, in 34 of the 90 constituencies, the population exceeded the ideal by 10 percent or more, and in another 21 constituencies, the population fell short of the ideal by 10 percent or more.

Figure 1: Constituencies in Jammu and Kashmir where the population exceeds the ideal by 10 percent or more   

Source: Delimitation Commission

Figure 2: Constituencies in Jammu and Kashmir where the population falls short of the ideal by 10 percent or more.

Source: Delimitation Commission

Similarly, in Assam as well, the population equality principle was not strictly followed. In the first stage, districts with a population density of less than 304 persons per sq. km were allocated more seats than they would have otherwise been entitled to if the population equality principle had been strictly adhered to. Conversely, districts with a population density of more than 372 persons per sq. km were allotted fewer seats than they would have otherwise received. The rationale—similar to the categorisation in Jammu and Kashmir—was that more representatives are required in terrains with lower population density and difficult geographical access. For example, Nagaon should ideally have been allotted 11 seats if the population equality principle had been strictly followed. However, it was only allotted 10 seats since it has a higher population density. Lakhimpur, on the other hand, was allotted 5 seats—as opposed to the ideal 4—due to its lower population density. Similar to the Jammu and Kashmir delimitation exercise, electoral constituencies in Assam did not have a uniform population. If strict population equality were followed, every constituency in Assam would have had a population of 211,552. However, the population of 27 of the 126 assembly constituencies was higher than the ideal by 10 percent or more, and in 32 constituencies, it was lower than the ideal by 10 percent or more. For example, the constituency of Gauripur has a population of 306,315, which is 45 percent higher than the ideal, while the population of the Amri constituency stands at 1,04,727, which is 50 percent lower than the ideal.

If strict population equality were followed, every constituency in Assam would have had a population of 211,552. However, the population of 27 of the 126 assembly constituencies was higher than the ideal by 10 percent or more, and in 32 constituencies, it was lower than the ideal by 10 percent or more.

Figure 3: Constituencies in Assam where the population falls short of the ideal by 10 percent or more.

Source: Election Commission of India

Figure 4: Constituencies in Assam where the population exceeds the ideal by 10 percent or more                                                                       

Source: Election Commission of India

Understandings of political equality must go beyond the notion of 'one person, one vote' to reflect 'one person, one vote, one value.' To achieve ‘equal value,’ other considerations—such as population density (rather than merely population size), the nature of the terrain, and the population of marginalised communities—must be factored in. The same principle must be applied to the apportionment of seats amongst states in Parliament. If we are comfortable with population disparities between constituencies such as Gossaigaon and Gauripur in Assam, why the urgency to ensure that the apportionment of parliamentary seats across states strictly adheres to population equality? If Parliamentary seats are allotted solely based on population,  the ability of voters from less populous states to influence national policymaking will be diminished, thereby reducing the ‘value’ of their votes. Thus, the apportionment debate has been wrongly framed as a conflict between the ideals of political equality and federalism. In reality, our constitutional vision of political equality accommodates federal concerns by recognising states as political units. To honour this vision, we must move beyond a purely numerical interpretation of political equality and embrace a more holistic framework—one that reflects the plural and federal spirit of our Constitution. 

Nivedhitha. K is a Project Fellow at the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy.

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• India
• delimitation commission in india
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• delimitation in assam
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• political equality
• political equality in india

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