The delimitation of electoral constituencies in India is crucial to address the underrepresentation of urban areas
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This essay is part of a larger compendium “Policy and Institutional Imperatives for India’s Urban Renaissance”.
A pillar of elections in India—and of democracy, overall—is the concept of ‘electoral constituencies’ and how they are carved out. Carving the boundaries (i.e., delimitation) of constituencies—regions whose populations vote for certain political party nominees or independents to represent them in the legislature—is a technical exercise. How India defines and allocates constituencies across territories and groups decides who they will elect and in what way.
The Government of India (GoI) has indicated that the next census and the subsequent delimitation will happen soon after the 2024 Lok Sabha polls. The next comprehensive delimitation and reallocation of parliamentary constituencies, irrespective of when exactly it takes place, will occur after a gap of more than four decades. A thorough delimitation exercise would encompass addressing critical concerns about underrepresentation in certain parts of the country, especially those urban agglomerations where populations have increased rapidly.
A thorough delimitation exercise would encompass addressing critical concerns about underrepresentation in certain parts of the country, especially those urban agglomerations where populations have increased rapidly.
The Constitution of India lays down the basic principles that undergird delimitation. Article 81 mandates that each state get seats in the Lok Sabha in proportion to its population and that constituencies in a state should roughly have the same population. The fundamental principle endorsed by the Constitution is one of parity between constituencies within the limits of practicability. This parity ensures adherence to the principle of ‘one person, one vote, one value’—i.e. the value of one person’s vote should be the same as any other person’s. When constituencies have different population levels, societal hierarchies decide how some voters effectively have more say than others in how legislatures (such as Parliament and state assemblies) are formed.
To account for population changes, the Constitution also mandates redrawing the boundaries of electoral constituencies and readjusting the allocation of seats in the Lok Sabha and state assemblies after every decennial census. In 1976, however, the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution froze the delimitation of Lok Sabha as well as state assembly constituencies as per the 1971 census up to the census of 2001. Given the uneven population growth across different parts of India, this freeze was effected to allay the concerns of those states that took the lead in population control and thus faced the prospect of a reduction in their Lok Sabha seats. In 2001, the boundaries of constituencies were redrawn only to account for the population changes. The total number of seats in the Lok Sabha and state legislative assemblies remained the same. The timeline for revisiting the allocation of seats was pushed further to 2026 in the hope that the country would be able to achieve uniform population growth by then.
The reality today is that the value of a vote in North India is, in effect, much lower than in South India. For example, while each Member of Parliament from Uttar Pradesh represents 18.3 lakh voters, the corresponding number for Kerala is 13.1 lakh. This means that Kerala is overrepresented in the Lok Sabha, while Uttar Pradesh is underrepresented. The delimitation and the accompanying redrawing of India’s electoral constituencies intends to equalise this vote value.
To account for population changes, the Constitution also mandates redrawing the boundaries of electoral constituencies and readjusting the allocation of seats in the Lok Sabha and state assemblies after every decennial census.
The challenge is that based on current population levels, delimitation will significantly increase the number of constituencies in the northern states, disproportionately increasing their presence in Parliament. Southern states fear that this would come at the cost of their own visibility in Parliament. Earlier this year, the Tamil Nadu legislative assembly adopted a resolution highlighting concerns about the impending delimitation, because it could reduce the state’s representation, as well as those of others in the South. In that regard, this much-delayed exercise will have to balance two competing constitutional values: formal equality in voting, and federalism.
At the same time, the upcoming delimitation will have to contend with specific intra-state disparities in representation—those that exist between rural and urban areas within a state. Owing to trends in migration (from rural to urban) as well as natural growth, the urban population in India has increased much faster than in rural areas. Owing to the freeze on delimitation, the size of the electorate in some urban constituencies has become disproportionately high, which means that the value of an individual’s vote in such a constituency is not on a par with that of a citizen voting elsewhere.
To be sure, such disparity is hardly a recent phenomenon and exists even between urban constituencies. The number of extra- large constituencies, with sizeable current electorate size and a high population growth rate, increased substantially after 1991. For instance, in 1999, the Outer Delhi constituency was home to 31,01,838 voters, eight times larger than the Chandni Chowk constituency (of 3,76,603 voters). The Outer Delhi constituency (abolished as of 2008) was the largest during the 1999 general election.
Considering the country’s population growth over the years, the unequal sizes of constituency electorates would have magnified further. While the population in several urban constituencies has substantially increased, their representation in legislatures has not. For instance, as per the 2011 census, the city of Bengaluru had 13.82 percent of Karnataka’s population. However, it has about 10-12 percent of seats in Karnataka’s Lok Sabha and state legislative assembly. These distortions are visible in other urban agglomerations as well.
The Tamil Nadu legislative assembly adopted a resolution highlighting concerns about the impending delimitation, because it could reduce the state’s representation, as well as those of others in the South.
The 2011 census pegged Pune’s urban population at 57,51,182, which is over 5 percent of Maharashtra’s total population of 1,12,37,433. Ironically, Pune has only one Lok Sabha seat out of Maharashtra’s 48. Further, Pune’s urban areas have been allotted eight constituencies, which make up a mere 2.7 percent of the 288 legislative assembly seats in Maharashtra.
Similarly, Surat’s urban population of 48,49,213 in 2011 was 8.02 percent of Gujarat’s total population of 6,04,39,692. Nearly 92 percent of this population reside in Surat City, classified as an urban agglomeration in the 2011 census. Parts of Surat City are spread across nine assembly constituencies of Surat East, Surat North, Varachha Road, Karanj, Limbayat, Udhna, Majura, Katargam, and Surat West. Surat district has 16 assembly constituencies in a 182-member Gujarat legislative assembly. The remaining seven assembly constituencies of Surat district have a mixed rural and urban population, except Mahuva, which is entirely rural.21 This author’s analysis of the census data and Surat district’s delimitation matrix found that despite comprising 90 percent of Surat district’s urban population, Surat City, with nine assembly constituencies, accounts for only five percent of the total strength of the Gujarat Legislative Assembly.
Source: Author’s own, using data from Census 2011; relevant orders issued by the Chief Electoral Officer, Maharashtra and the Delimitation Commission of India; and official websites of the Surat Municipal Corporation and District Election Office, Surat.
These figures mirror trends from the early 2000s, when states such as Maharashtra recorded an urban population of nearly 40 percent, with representation from just about 25 percent of the Members of Legislative Assembly. Owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, India’s plans for a census in 2021 have been stalled. The population changes that have occurred since then would have widened the disparity in representation even further. Given the current population levels and the distribution of seats in Parliament and state assemblies, voters in urban areas have less of a say in elections than those in rural areas, and the comparative value of their vote is lower.
The distortion in representation belies the expectations of the Constitution, which requires formal equality in voting and expects each legislator to represent roughly the same number of citizens. The increasing urban population demands efficient and prompt upkeep of cities. Cities such as Pune and Surat are characterised by rapid urbanisation and expansion of city limits, emphasising the need for better representation in legislative bodies. Despite being constitutionally recognised since 1992 following the 74th Amendment to the Constitution, urban local bodies are not equipped to address all urban concerns independently. Not only do they remain financially dependent on state and central transfers for their revenues, but their development as a self-governing third tier of governance has been uneven across states.
The distortion in representation belies the expectations of the Constitution, which requires formal equality in voting and expects each legislator to represent roughly the same number of citizens.
Unless readjusted and given the number of legislators they numerically deserve, oversized urban constituencies will eventually disenfranchise many urban voters. Especially considering lower voter turnouts in urban areas, this disenfranchisement stands to impact what urban issues are prioritised for discussion before legislatures, particularly the state legislative assemblies. Given the importance of cities and urban areas in the economic performance of the country, the need for robust representation of the urban regions before legislatures cannot be overstated.
In the absence of updated population figures, the magnitude of the urban representational crisis is hard to ascertain. The population census must be top-of-mind for the new government. The subject area of delimitation is staring at a research and knowledge gap of more than four decades since the constitutional freeze. It is imperative to immediately start deliberating over the impending delimitation.
It is also worth arguing that the more credible forum for better representation of state-specific urban areas is less the Parliament, and more the legislative assemblies. The upcoming delimitation must, therefore, give equal importance and thought to state legislative assemblies, given the constitutional freeze applied to them as well. Eventually, delimitation has severe implications for both representative democracy and federalism, making it too critical an exercise as a sole preserve of political leaders. Delimitation must be meaningfully collaborative, with inputs from experts in varied fields including political science, urban governance, constitutional law, and psephology, to name a few.
Ritwika Sharma is a Lead with the Constitutional Law team at the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy
The author is thankful to Rohan Mishra, a 5th year student at the Delhi Metropolitan Education, GGS Indraprastha University, for his research assistance.
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Ritwika Sharma is a Lead with the Constitutional Law team at the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy. ...
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