Last Wednesday, the world was greeted with the news of a military takeover in Niger. Expectedly, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sanctioned and suspended Niger from the bloc. The grouping went further and threatened a
military intervention if President Mohamed Bazoum is not reinstated within a week. Similarly, the United States (US), France, and the European Union (EU) wasted no time in condemning the coup. The reaction to the coup from within and outside the region is strongest compared to other recent coups, and the reasons are not far-fetched. Niger is a cornerstone of the Sahel Strategies of the US, France, and the European Union. Exports of uranium from Niger are vital for French and European nuclear energy operations. So, it came as no surprise when France also
threatened action against the Junta if they harm “French interests” in the country. While there is precedent for ECOWAS threat and use of military intervention, the equation changed when in solidarity with Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali released a joint statement condemning the possibility of military intervention,
stating plainly that “all military intervention against Niger will be considered equivalent to a declaration of war against Burkina Faso and Mali”. This game-changing declaration means the use of force against the putschists in Niger would push West Africa into a conventional war, one that will quickly become a new flashpoint in great power competition with devasting consequences for the region.
Just as in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, the reasons Junta in Niger cited for their actions included chronic insecurity, poor economic conditions, and misrule.
Russia, France, and the wave of populist coups
The
overthrow of President Mohamed Bazoum was the sixth successful coup in West Africa since 2020. General Abdourahamane Tiani who headed the presidential guard was later declared as head of state. On the surface, these coups are ambitious power grabs by disgruntled officers interrupting Africa’s democratisation process. Just as in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea, the reasons Junta in Niger cited for their actions included chronic insecurity, poor economic conditions, and misrule. These reasons are not without merit. Maybe except for Guinea, there is a strong anti–neocolonial sentiment held by both citizens and the populations of these countries.
Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world, and like Mali and Burkina Faso, is consistently at the bottom of the Human Development Index. Citizens of these countries blame neocolonial economic policies and structures for their economic woes, while experts blame the chronic underdevelopment in this region for the security challenges such as terrorism, human trafficking, and other security problems.
According to the World Bank, Niger has been faced with an influx of displaced persons from Nigeria and Mali, and as of 2022, there were almost 295,000 refugees with roughly 350,000 displaced persons overall in the country. As of 2021, studies
suggest that over 41.8 percent of Niger’s population is living in extreme poverty, and while there was a GDP growth of 1.4 percent in 2021, projections show that new economic programs are expected to boost GDP per-capita by 15 percent in the next year. Furthermore, irrigation programmes and a good rainy season
increased agricultural production by 27 percent, a big boost considering agriculture alone accounts for 40 percent of the country’s GDP.
Niger has been faced with an influx of displaced persons from Nigeria and Mali, and as of 2022, there were almost 295,000 refugees with roughly 350,000 displaced persons overall in the country.
France has led regional security efforts for most of the last decade. Aside from setting up the G5-Sahel Force, Paris deployed over 5,000 troops under Operation Barkhane, the UN’s MINUSMA had a 15,000-troop presence while the EU had special forces deployed under Operation Takuba. Under these security programmes, terrorism and violence in the region only increased. When Ibrahim Traore ceased power in Burkina Faso in September 2022,
40 percent of the country’s territory had come under the control of jihadists leading France and its European allies to lose credibility as security providers in the region.
UN and French-led security programs have often failed with mainstream media often downplaying this while simultaneously exaggerating Russia’s growing influence in the region. While there is evidence of Russian actors
exploiting anti-western sentiments, these exist because of poor governance, foreign meddling, and developmental challenges. Military cooperation between Mali and France has also deteriorated since the coup. In April last year, Mali
expelled French troops ending Operation Barkhane after nine years of operations. In January 2023, Burkina Faso
ended a 2018 military agreement with France and demanded the expulsion of French forces operating in the country. In both instances, the expulsion of French forces was
celebrated by citizens who are often seen waving Russian flags alongside their own national flags.
UN and French-led security programs have often failed with mainstream media often downplaying this while simultaneously exaggerating Russia’s growing influence in the region.
The coups in Mali and Burkina Faso saw Niger becoming one of the main partners of France, the US, and the EU in the region. French and EU personnel were redeployed from Mali and Burkina Faso to Niger, which is also home to a French base and
at least two US airbases making it the main platform for France, AFRICOM, and the EU operations in the region. This is a security arrangement that the recent coup is going to disrupt. The Junta has
revoked two military cooperation agreements with France, one dating back to 1977 and the second was signed in 2020. Niger holds more importance to France and Europe beyond security in West Africa. For perspective, over 50 percent of Nigerien uranium ore
goes to France’s nuclear energy system, and 24 percent of uranium imports to the EU come from Niger. With the threat of a military leadership pivoting from France, Paris and Western allies are sure to deliberate action and support any means to restore Bazoum, thereby securing their access to key energy resources for Europe.
ECOWAS mulls intervention
While plans of intervention are been discussed by ECOWAS officials in Abuja, Nigeria, a delegation of officials
arrived in Niamey on 3 August as part of mediation efforts. However, the delegation did not spend the night as planned, nor did it meet with coup leader Abdourahamane Tiani or deposed President Mohamed Bazoum; a sign that talks did not go as planned. On that same Thursday, Senegal
confirmed its troops will join any ECOWAS intervention in Niger. While the Niger’s Junta
said; "any aggression or attempted aggression against the Niger will see an immediate and unannounced response from the Niger Defence and Security Forces on one of (the bloc's) members, with the exception of suspended friendly countries."
An ECOWAS military intervention is the worst thing that could take place in the region considering the existing security conditions. While Nigeria may contribute the highest number of troops to an ECOWAS military outfit, the country is
not in a condition to conduct a war involving multiple countries. Furthermore, mass displacement and high mortality and migration will surely follow. With numerous internal challenges, economic, developmental, and humanitarian, facing the Sahel region, triggering a conflict between weak and fragile states amounts to self-destruction.
A better approach is for ECOWAS to enact deeper sanctions while doubling down on a diplomatic solution
. In addition to the termination of existing financial aid packages, Niger could be on the receiving end of heavier sanctions that could be targeted towards financial ecosystems, transport, or other critical economic sectors. ECOWAS countries have enormous leverage vis-à-vis Niger. For Instance, Nigeria
supplies 70 percent of Niger’s electricity, and taken together Senegal and Cote Ivoire supply 40 percent of Niger’s refined petroleum. Commitments will also be tested under a sanctions-heavy environment. However, it is important to factor in the will of the Nigerien people, some of whom have expressed vocal support for the junta.
With numerous internal challenges, economic, developmental, and humanitarian, facing the Sahel region, triggering a conflict between weak and fragile states amounts to self-destruction.
In all, the coup in Niger is one coup too many for the region, but with regional security and geopolitical dynamics, it important to access the rationale of an ECOWAS military intervention. On a wider geopolitical front, multipolarity and elements of alignment and non-alignment are emerging faster than ever, and traditional relations are being tested, terminated, or renegotiated. The so-called great power competition is in full swing and African countries are moving away from being passive, occupying a proactive role whether or not it follows an ‘established decorum’.
One week after the coup, the Junta is making attempts to consolidate its grip on power. It has
announced the reopening of borders with five neighbours, appointed new governors to the countries five regions, and says the country is on a transition towards democracy. However, no timelines were given. This should be seen from a pragmatists lens as well considering the plausibility of an outright economic collapse. With these developments, it must be noted that military conflict will only affect vulnerable populations and further destabilise the region. An outcome that Africans do not wish for.
Ovigwe Eguegu is a Policy Analyst at Development Reimagined. He focuses on geopolitics with particular reference to Africa in a changing global order.
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