China is shifting from its traditional neutrality to actively participating in international mediation, especially in Africa
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This is the 163rd essay in the China Chronicles series.
In April 2022, during his address at the Boao Forum for the Asia Annual Conference, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the ambitious Global Security Initiative (GSI). He presented GSI as a comprehensive framework for addressing global security challenges, including maintaining global security, enhancing coordination among regional organisations, and addressing diverse challenges ranging from traditional conflicts to climate change to cybersecurity. China rarely participated in international mediation initiatives, preferring to be a neutral onlooker and retain its flexibility. Therefore, the new Chinese position in global security issues and its true objective became a matter of debate.
In April 2022, during his address at the Boao Forum for the Asia Annual Conference, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the ambitious Global Security Initiative (GSI).
Yet, the security focus of China should not be a surprise. Since Beijing announced its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, it has started taking more proactive actions in different conflicts, going beyond its traditional approach of limited engagement and playing a more assertive role as a mediator. As Beijing’s economic influence continues to expand, it has been trying to gain more political influence in the countries of South Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Therefore, the GSI represents China’s attempt to institutionalise its leadership role as a security provider. In other words, it is Beijing’s first step towards obtaining that coveted diplomatic clout, where it will be more capable of influencing the outcome of negotiations in different conflicts across the world. Elizabeth C. Economy, in her book “The World According to China”, opines that China’s ultimate aim is not only to remould the existing world order but also to supplant it with a new China-centric world order.
So far, Beijing’s conflict management approach is still primarily driven by its economic and security interests. It is characterised by participation and avoiding direct involvement. However, China is laying the groundwork for deeper involvement to create a new structure that would contribute to the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Global Security Initiative (GSI) is a decisive step towards Chinese rejuvenation, also known as the ‘China dream’, towards creating that alternative security architecture.
Over the past few years, China has steadily built its profile as a global security provider, particularly in Africa. One month before the announcement of GSI, in March 2022, China proposed an “Outlook on Peace and Development in the Horn of Africa” to facilitate a Chinese-led peace process in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. There is ongoing debate surrounding its modus operandi and probable implications of the GSI for Africa.
Indeed, over the years, while engaging with Africa, China has followed the policy of non-interference in internal politics, focusing only on economic aspects. The root of this policy lies in the five principles of peaceful coexistence, proclaimed by Zhou Enlai in 1954. However, Beijing’s recent diplomatic involvement in different parts of Africa, including Ethiopia, Mali, Somalia and now Niger, reveals its intention to play a more proactive role in conflict zones. Some scholars termed this as a shift from noninterference to creative involvement. Indeed, this pragmatic approach, non-interference with Chinese characteristics, allowed Chinese foreign policymakers to decide on the level of interference, moving away from strict noninterference.
China maintains a strategic ambiguity regarding its conflict resolution mechanism, a careful mix of interference, influence, and intervention. Moreover, China wants to retain its strategic autonomy to conduct a case-by-case evaluation and select conflicts to be engaged in, as well as its conflict resolution mechanisms based on its own interests, priorities, and limitations.
China maintains a strategic ambiguity regarding its conflict resolution mechanism, a careful mix of interference, influence, and intervention.
At present, in Africa, China is principally concerned with safeguarding its investments through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and otherwise, as well as maintaining trade relations. Indeed, Africa provides much of China’s resource requirements, which is critical for its energy security, ensuring that industrial activities continue uninterrupted. China has an interest in maintaining stability in the nations where it has invested, just as those nations that require investment have an interest in maintaining a stable relationship with China. Thereby, China’s involvement in conflict resolution in Africa is driven by political and economic interests as well as a desire to be seen as an effective mediator on the international stage.
As China climbs the global power ladder, it has started to revisit its decade-old non-interference policy. Indeed, its mediation with Chinese characteristics was palpable on several occasions in the past year. In March 2023, China successfully mediated a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Also, in the same month, the Chinese Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong visited Myanmar coup leader Min Aung Hlaing. At the same time, Xi travelled to Moscow to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin. Finally, China’s position paper on resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its success in forging a Palestinian peace accord where warring Palestinian groups Hamas and Fatah have agreed to form an interim “national reconciliation government” for the occupied West Bank and Gaza once the war with Israel gets over, reflects Beijing’s newfound interest in playing the role of global peacemaker. China’s outreach to various non-state actors such as Taliban, Hamas, and Hezbollah reveals its intention to distinguish its mediation diplomacy from that of US or West-led conflict resolution approaches. These successes will encourage China to be more assertive in Africa and engage with African leaders to nudge them towards agreements conducive to Chinese interests.
During a phone call last year, Xi, regarding US engagement with Taiwan, told US President Biden: “Those that play with fire get burnt.” Beijing brags about “non-interference” for itself and others. Yet, it has started to openly interfere in Africa.
During a phone call last year, Xi, regarding US engagement with Taiwan, told US President Biden: “Those that play with fire get burnt.” Beijing brags about “non-interference” for itself and others. Yet, it has started to openly interfere in Africa.
Thus far, in its conflict mediation, Beijing has relied on normative distinctions in host-government consultation. However, if some conflict emerges that threatens China’s economic or security interests, it may shred off its traditional way and start engaging more directly. Nowhere will it be more prominent than in Africa, given China’s resource dependency on Africa. While Africa must have taken note of Chinese rejuvenation, it may havebrace for a new China, which will increasingly take part in conflict resolution of the continent based on its interests.
Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation
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Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at ORF where he works on geopolitics with particular reference to Africa in the changing global order. He has a ...
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