The Kargil War taught China and India that enhancing military capabilities and infrastructure is crucial for securing the LAC, with no room for compromise on this front
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This article is part of the essay series: Kargil@25: Legacy and Beyond
In July 2024, China completed a black-topped bridge on Pangong Lake in Eastern Ladakh, designed to facilitate armoured troop movements across both shores. This bridge symbolises two key aspects of India-China relations. First, it underscores China's commitment to developing military infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This process gained substantial momentum after the Kargil War as part of Beijing’s ‘Go West’ economic development strategy.
Second, the inauguration of the bridge during the ongoing India-China military standoff on the LAC since 2020, underscores China's continued shift in its position on the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir in the past two decades. Once neutral and occasionally playing a mediatory role, China has now moved to actively supporting Pakistan, protecting its notorious terrorists in the UN, and taking a more active role against India. This paper explores this issue, examining the key developments and reasons contributing to the current situation.
The 1999 Kargil War occurred when India was an emerging economic partner for China. Both had recently concluded two major agreements: the 1993 accord on maintaining peace and tranquillity along the LAC and the 1996 agreement on confidence-building measures between their militaries. Both had sought to downplay the LAC dispute and instead focus on enhancing diplomatic and trade interactions. Although they faced temporary strain from the 1998 nuclear tests, proactive efforts by the Indian diplomatic corps largely mitigated the damage by 1999.
India also benefited when Pakistan disregarded China's advice and proceeded with its 1998 nuclear tests that complicated China's international standing. Beijing was perceived as a crucial facilitator and enabler of Islamabad's nuclear programme and the US Cox Committee report accused China of supplying uranium enrichment technology, ring magnets, and other materials for Islamabad’s nuclear weapons development.
India also benefited when Pakistan disregarded China's advice and proceeded with its 1998 nuclear tests that complicated China's international standing.
Additionally, China discovered that Uyghur rebels from its Xinjiang province were among the intruders in Kargil. These battle-hardened Uyghurs could potentially fuel unrest in China’s Muslim-majority regions of Xinjiang and Ningxia Hui, making it imperative to resolve the conflict swiftly and curb the Islamic Jihadi’s influence.
Moreover, the unpredictability of escalation and a prolonged nuclear dispute could expose China's southwestern region to uncertainty and foreign intervention—an outcome Beijing found unacceptable. In response, China adopted a neutral yet active stance, positioning itself as a responsible stakeholder in Asia and working to de-escalate the conflict.
The frequent diplomatic interactions between New Delhi and Beijing played a crucial role in tempering Pakistan's nuclear-fuelled overconfidence. Pakistan had grown accustomed to China's active support in its disputes with India. During the 1965 India-Pakistan War, China's veiled threats compelled India to keep five of its seven mountain divisions deployed on the LAC. In the 1971 India-Pakistan War, China provided political and diplomatic backing and assisted Pakistani troops with weapons, logistics, and overflight rights. Therefore, China's neutrality and demand for a swift end to the intrusion surprised and disappointed Pakistan. With the US breathing down Pakistan’s neck to cease operations urgently, China's lack of support became a critical factor that undermined Pakistan’s resolve for battle.
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) observed the Kargil War and recognised the gravity of warfare in the world’s highest-altitude terrain and its implications for China’s southwestern borders. China identified a significant lack of coordination and an inadequate offensive strategy, which led to a protracted and costly engagement where India’s 8th Infantry Division suffered heavy casualties. The PLA believed India's reliance on numerical superiority rather than coordinated or joint operations, was further exacerbated by poor logistics and limited air support.
However, despite early setbacks, India readjusted its strategy. It used heavy artillery and laser-guided bombs for precision strikes, to support small groups of troops leading nighttime attacks and achieved favourable military outcomes, demonstrating a resilience that made a significant impression on China. Additionally, China observed a considerable disparity in military capabilities between India and Pakistan, concluding that Pakistan could not match India's substantial national strength in future. Additionally, the Indian Army raised the 14th Corps on 1 September 1999 to oversee the LAC. Stationed in Leh, the Corps has since focused on Ladakh's eastern region, enhancing India’s military preparedness on the LAC which proved crucial during the Galwan clash.
The lessons China drew from the Kargil conflict extended beyond the immediate battlefield. Recognising the Indian Navy's potential to disrupt its critical sea lines of communications (SLOCs), China's “Malacca Dilemma” contributed to the PLA Navy’s decision to increase its naval presence in the Western Indian Ocean.
Over the years, Chinese commentators have drawn parallels between the Kargil conflict and the Galwan clash, noting similarities, but differing in their interpretation of the aggressor.
Over the years, Chinese commentators have drawn parallels between the Kargil conflict and the Galwan clash, noting similarities, but differing in their interpretation of the aggressor. In Kargil, they blame Pakistan yet in the Galwan clash, they contend India was the aggressor, as its forces crossed into Chinese territory and attacked China’s border guards.
The Kargil War taught India the critical importance of developing border infrastructure. Since the 1960s, India had adhered to a “strategy of denial,” believing that underdeveloped borders would hinder the PLA’s advance toward India’s hinterlands. However, the Kargil Conflict exposed this strategy’s ineffectiveness, as India’s long lines of communication and logistical support gave the advantage to its adversary. This warranted an Indian recalibration for developing its border military infrastructure.
China had been constructing roads and communication tracks even before the Kargil Conflict. In its aftermath, Beijing’s border infrastructure development received a significant boost with the launch of the ‘Go West’ development strategy in 2000. This strategy induced substantial investments and infrastructure buildup in China’s western regions, particularly in the restive provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang, to enhance military capabilities in strategically critical areas. Over the next six years, China developed several border highways, airports, communication, and logistics facilities, and other military infrastructure projects along its western borders.
China had been constructing roads and communication tracks even before the Kargil Conflict. In its aftermath, Beijing’s border infrastructure development received a significant boost with the launch of the ‘Go West’ development strategy in 2000.
The Qinghai-Tibet railway’s inauguration in 2006 became a key milestone in this effort. It dramatically improved the PLA’s mobilisation capabilities for rapidly deploying up to 30 divisions to its Western Combat Theatre within days. In addition, China extended roads to within 5 to 10 kilometres of most border military posts, leading to increased PLA incursions into the Indian side of the LAC since 2006, eventually culminating in major clashes in the future.
In contrast, India’s military infrastructure construction took off only in 2006, when China’s rail link to Lhasa shocked and spurred the Indian government to launch the India-China Border Roads (ICBR) phase 1 programme, targeting 61 border road constructions by 2012. However, by 2016, only seven roads had been completed as India's lacklustre seasonal construction over unstable mountainous terrain didn’t achieve much. The Border Roads Organisation (BRO), tasked with building these roads, itself was plagued by internal conflicts and dual control under the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH), stalling progress.
Visible progress began after late Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar took the initiative in 2015, placing the BRO entirely under the MoD. He also acquired modern equipment, including tunnel-boring machines, and improved the work culture within relevant ministries. As a result, over the past nine years, India has nearly completed two phases of the ICBR and has significantly transformed its military infrastructure on borders.
As long as China’s military infrastructure ensured its dominance over the LAC, India-China border relations remained relatively peaceful. However, sustained progress and India's accelerated efforts to achieve near-parity in military infrastructure, have made China uncomfortable. A direct consequence of these developments contributed to the 2013 standoff on the Depsang Plateau. China was particularly stirred by India's reactivation of advanced landing grounds at Daulat Beg Oldi, Fukche, and Nyoma, and by the construction of observation bunkers at Chumar. These border developments triggered the Depsang standoff and the PLA’s deployment at Raki Nala, a dispute that remains unresolved. Subsequent India-China disputes at Doklam and Galwan are closely linked to the military infrastructure buildups.
In the post-Cold War era, China had numerous incentives to strengthen its relationship with India. Therefore, China stayed neutral during the Kargil War, projected itself as a responsible stakeholder and safeguarded its southwestern border by seeking a swift conclusion.
However, the conflict propelled China and India to augment their military capabilities in force building and logistics, prompting competitive military infrastructure expansion. India’s intensifying focus on border infrastructure challenged China’s aspirations for comprehensive dominance over the LAC, gradually shifting China’s stance from neutrality during the Kargil War to outright hostility. Over the past three decades, China has rekindled its alliance with Pakistan, openly shielding Pakistan’s terrorists at the UN and supplying it with various offensive weapon systems.
The core lesson both China and India took from the Kargil War remains clear: augmenting military capabilities and developing military infrastructure is essential for securing the LAC, and neither country can afford to compromise on this for international political considerations.
Atul Kumar is a Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Atul Kumar is a Fellow in Strategic Studies Programme at ORF. His research focuses on national security issues in Asia, China's expeditionary military capabilities, military ...
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