The almost decade-long intergovernmental regulatory efforts around lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) is in a catch-22 situation. Continued annual discussions to regulate LAWS have arguably hampered the creation of a regulatory framework for them, however,  not having those discussions in the first place would also mean no progress at all. Thus, the discussions are indispensable to the regulatory process even though they act as an impediment to it. Following a pioneering report on lethal autonomous robots (LARs) in 2013, a couple of years later, the dialogue around LAWS was initiated at the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), and formalised under a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) format. The CCW GGE on LAWS convened meetings annually since 2017 but failed to agree on a normative and operational framework until the end of their mandate in 2021. Although their mandate was renewed by the Sixth Review Conference of the CCW in 2021 to continue their discussions, there were no constructive developments in 2022 either, and the meetings are now set to resume in 2023.

The CCW GGE on LAWS remains the only multilateral forum till date where LAWS are exclusively discussed, which makes it the sole option we currently have to regulate LAWS in an increasingly volatile global scenario.

While the GGE languishes in its work, LAWS continue to be developed, and also deployed, stripping the regulatory process around them of a purportedly pre-emptive regulation advantage. The CCW GGE on LAWS remains the only multilateral forum till date where LAWS are exclusively discussed, which makes it the sole option we currently have to regulate LAWS in an increasingly volatile global scenario. Although many other weapons systems have been similarly discussed under the CCW with varying levels of success with regard to their regulation, the structuring of the CCW GGE on LAWS itself seems to predispose it to a gridlock.

A stalemate

The most visible flaw is the consensus-based approach of the GGE, which implies that all of the high contracting parties (HCPs) in the Group, and not just a majority, need to be able to agree on every single aspect of the proceedings of the GGE. The HCPs at the GGE have their own differing national priorities and interests with respect to LAWS. The lack of any regulations around them may be a favourable environment for countries that are currently researching, developing, testing, deploying, and/or trading LAWS, such as Russia, South Korea, Israel, and Türkiye. Other countries without the resources or the national interest to do so, or at risk due to an adversary’s use of LAWS, may prefer a robust regulatory framework to be developed soon. It is usually a pyrrhic victory if consensus is ever reached at the GGE with this background, such as the 2019 11 Guiding Principles which are only based on the least common denominators to make themselves palatable to several opposing HCPs.

Since LAWS were at the time of their initial discussion, and still are to some degree, very nascent weapons technologies, there have always been several technical, legal, and military-oriented questions around them which are hard to answer for primarily policy personnel.

Another structural speedbump is that the Group, as it is named, is made up of governmental experts, i.e. diplomats who might have only a general idea of LAWS. Since LAWS were at the time of their initial discussion, and still are to some degree, very nascent weapons technologies, there have always been several technical, legal, and military-oriented questions around them which are hard to answer for primarily policy personnel. The GGE, thus, principally remains an insular group where LAWS are repeatedly debated at a policy level, within the same intergovernmental echo chamber, and without structured clarification around technical and legal issues that form the crux of the discussions and much of the mystification around LAWS. This is why debates around core characteristic issues such as definitions, the ideas of autonomy and meaningful human control, and technical and ethical considerations have plateaued over the years and crystallised into their current forms, inhibiting the deliberations from translating into a legal or policy framework.

How can this be resolved?

It is clear that the regulatory process around LAWS in its current form has not found much success. While catch-22s in theory are paradoxes, the LAWS catch-22 can be solved by moving the discussions out of the CCW GGE and into another forum where these delaying factors are absent, or at least diminished. This has so far been difficult to do since HCPs at the GGE have routinely expressed that the CCW GGE is an appropriate forum to discuss LAWS. A number of states like the United States subscribe to the idea that the CCW GGE, as a forum, is uniquely positioned due to its ‘mix of diplomatic, military, legal, policy, and technical expertise.’ Many such states wish to strike a regulatory balance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations at a security-oriented forum like the GGE, even though LAWS as a UN issue originated in the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and some have clamoured for its return.

A number of states like the United States subscribe to the idea that the CCW GGE, as a forum, is uniquely positioned due to its ‘mix of diplomatic, military, legal, policy, and technical expertise.’

Civil society has often opined that the GGE has been ineffective for far too long so another forum must be sought and that states campaigning to contain the LAWS discussion solely at the GGE are implicit in its incumbent deadlock. This seems to be a growing trend as LAWS discussions proceed through the years, with many pro-LAWS countries blocking or delaying critical wording in final reports, disagreeing with majority opinions on regulatory questions, and hijacking discussions to air their own grievances and political tirades rather than attempting to reach a collaborative consensus. It can be argued that the consensus-based constriction at the CCW GGE on LAWS has become somewhat of a ‘tyranny of equals,’ and countries that are interested in taking advantage of the catch-22 and delaying discussions are the biggest benefactors of the system. Deliberations on other weapons systems have been taken out of failed CCW cycles before with comparatively much more success than the GGE on LAWS is experiencing currently, such as the Convention on Cluster Munitions of 2008 and the Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention (Mine Ban Treaty) of 1997. A potential parallel path for LAWS, in the form of a civil society initiative, UN General Assembly conference like the one for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, or even a possible ad-hoc process led by a state, may be a feasible option to explore. As we enter into the second decade of formalised intergovernmental regulatory delays on LAWS in 2023, the hope (for most parties, at least) is to get out of this catch-22 predicament  as soon as possible.

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The Republic of Türkiye changed its official name from The Republic of Turkey on 26 May 2022.

• Defence and Security
• Development
• Nuclear Security
• European Union
• India
• USA and Canada
• The Pacific, East and Southeast Asia
• developing
• LAWS
• Military
• Nuclear weapons
• UN General Assembly
• weapons

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