Information dissemination is an often overlooked but key component of biosecurity, making governmental regulation and public communication essential
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In December 2024, Australia released information on a breach of one of their biosafety labs in August 2023. This breach involved the theft of the Hendra virus, lyssavirus, and hantavirus. Despite this being a breach from 2023, due to existing reporting, many individuals only received and reacted to this information a year later in 2024. Due to irresponsible information dissemination, many assumed the threat was recent, urgent, and akin to the leak from the Wuhan biosafety lab in 2019.
Another critical case in June 2024 was the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) study on the intersections of artificial intelligence (AI) and biotechnology, which raised concerns about creating new biological agents that could be weaponised. In response to this perceived threat, the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC) illustrated that their systems were operating correctly and that these threats were exaggerated. The IGSC astutely highlighted how this study cast scepticism on industry standards and thus needed better public communication. Active public and policy information dissemination and communication play a key role in biosecurity activities because they provide the public and policymakers with information about new threats that may arise, influencing the regulatory environment of the biotechnology field and related activities. Aside from these two more recent cases, the impact of the global COVID-19 pandemic undoubtedly highlighted the need for open, rapid, and direct information-sharing between the government, health agencies, and the population. In the face of biological threats (as was seen with the COVID-19 pandemic), which can manifest alongside other threats that may be intentional or accidental, ensuring that accurate information is disseminated quickly can help prevent panic, ensure proper containment measures, and promote public compliance with health guidelines.
The IGSC astutely highlighted how this study cast scepticism on industry standards and thus needed better public communication.
Biosecurity regulations are designed to mitigate risks associated with biological threats, ensuring public safety without stifling scientific and technological progress. These rules cover national, international, and industry-specific regulatory areas, each aiming to address particular elements of biosecurity and information management.
In India, there are existing mechanisms for public communication regarding biological threats. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) is tasked with formulating policies, plans and guidelines for managing such disasters. The NDMA also hosts SACHET, the only portal for disaster management information (not limited to biological threats).
The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) is the central authority for health emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic, and takes a leadership position in dealing with disease outbreaks in India. Under the MoHFW, the National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) is the entity that conducts disease surveillance, while also monitoring, investigating, and coordinating responses to ecological threats. This centre tracks disease epidemics and provides guidelines for implementing control and containment measures.
The ministry also has Operational Guidelines for Metropolitan Surveillance Units that aim to enhance disease surveillance in urban settings to factor in the challenge posed by population density in any disease outbreaks. Diseases are monitored and tracked through these units using a standardised approach that involves early warning systems and risk mapping. Hospitals, clinics, and other health facilities provide real-time data integrated into national surveillance systems, such as the Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme (IDSP). This approach is greatly assisted by technology through the use of mobile applications, Geospatial Intelligence Systems (GEOINT) and AI in the analysis to map out and predict the trends of diseases and the use of available resources.
When information is not clear or actionable, it tends to feed public uncertainty and mistrust rather than reassure the public or guide appropriate responses.
However, there are still gaps in information availability and last-mile connectivity regarding early warnings and public perception.
Although existing structures, such as SACHET, have proven vital for last-mile connectivity, delays and unclear updates sometimes make centralisation unreliable, and access to such portals is difficult for those in rural communities who lack access to smartphones, the internet, and other such technologies. The consequence is uneven access to crucial public health information, with the risk of misinformation and panic in the community. Many, therefore, rely on information communicated anecdotally or unclearly. When information is not clear or actionable, it tends to feed public uncertainty and mistrust rather than reassure the public or guide appropriate responses.
Another concern is the gap in coordination between different levels of government and healthcare services. For instance, although the NDMA and the MoHFW remain the central authorities in managing disasters and health crises, their lack of coordination at the ground level, especially with ASHA (Accredited Social Health Activist) workers, nurses and midwives, may hamper smooth and efficient diffusion of information. This has been particularly problematic when disease outbreaks have crossed regional boundaries, or require a country-wide response because varied messages from different authorities have often led to confusion among the people.
In addition, early warning systems are usually marred by delays in communication with the public. An example is the COVID-19 pandemic, where the lack of information availability and communication created panic. Rumours and misinformation about the virus spread rapidly in many parts of the country, especially urban centres, exacerbating fears. The flow of reliable information was patchy in rural areas where communication infrastructure is weaker. Many were left confused about treatment, protection methods, the availability of beds in hospitals, and oxygen supplies, resulting in panic and the adoption of unverified treatment and protection methods.
As biotechnology continues to evolve, so must biosecurity regulations and information dissemination practices. India’s adoption of the IHR and coordinated governance with the CDC and WHO shows India’s approach to biotechnology innovation and governance through international collaborations.
These gaps in the communication of biotechnology innovation, biosecurity and biosafety can be addressed in three main ways.
International frameworks: At the global level, treaties such as the International Health Regulations (IHR), provide vital structures for managing biological risks. The IHR requires ongoing, efficient, timely, and open information sharing on epidemic outbreaks to ensure national preparedness for a biological threat. India is already a signatory in the IHR; however, adopting measures recommended by the IHR for information dissemination and learning from other IHR members may prove beneficial for India. For instance, New Delhi can learn from the United States’ The Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) which combines all threat communication and uses push messages to reach every individual.
National regulations and biotechnology oversight: Nationally, governments impose targeted legislation to oversee biosecurity in their countries. They are also responsible for laboratory biosafety, biotechnology activity, and public health surveillance. For example, in India, as mentioned earlier, the NDMA is in charge of managing disasters; in addition, the Department of Biotechnology currently oversees biotechnology innovation and biosafety labs. In parallel, in the United States, the Federal Select Agent program ensures the safe management of hazardous agents. Agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) organise public health information dissemination and reports of outbreaks. The CDC is relevant globally despite being a federal government organisation in the US.
Monitoring dual-use research: To further this, however, it is vital that governments also monitor the perception of dual-use research. With the development of technologies like Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR, a form of gene editing technology) and gene synthesis, and with MIT studies that show risks, it is essential to communicate these risks effectively. Regulatory agencies like the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) determine which research must be curtailed or modified to avoid risk. Instead of overburdening the Department of Biotechnology arbitrarily, India must form a committee in contact with the NSABB, that oversees dual-use research and development. Such a committee can be formed under the DBT or the MoHFW and can help ensure that industry standards are maintained, communicated well and trusted by the public, even outside of times of disaster.
Ethical considerations and public trust: Ethics review is a fundamental aspect of biosecurity, especially in biotechnology. As highlighted by the IGSC in their response to the MIT study, ethical standards must ensure that the research being conducted ensures both industry growth and public benefit, and it also must be communicated as such. It is imperative to not only increase transparency but also to preserve public credibility. Misinformation, or the reporting of false positivity in biosecurity screening results can damage trust and delay scientific advancement. A committee established under the DBT or MoHFW responsible for communication can also ensure that ethical reviews occur regularly to maintain standards.
As biotechnology continues to evolve, so must biosecurity regulations and information dissemination practices. India’s adoption of the IHR and coordinated governance with the CDC and WHO shows India’s approach to biotechnology innovation and governance through international collaborations. This must be furthered by including the private sector in designing strong biosecurity frameworks adaptable to emerging threats. Public confidence in these systems rests on transparency, accountability, and ethical governance. Integrating transparency and proper communication are achievable ways to use biotechnological potential in public health and security management.
Shravishtha Ajaykumar is an Associate Fellow with the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Shravishtha Ajaykumar is Associate Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology. Her fields of research include geospatial technology, data privacy, cybersecurity, and strategic ...
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