Given the complexity and potential risks associated with the biotechnological advancements, India should establish a dedicated biosecurity agency to assess and mitigate biosecurity threats
India has a web of biosafety policies that oversee conservation and biodiversity. This includes participation in the Convention on Biological Diversity, which consists of two global treaties—the Cartagena Protocol and the Nagoya Protocol, on trade and transfer of biological materials research that may impact different ecologies and access to benefits derived from any.
Despite the global and domestic biosafety landscape, the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact was swift and devastating, resulting in over 7,000,000 deaths globally and over 500,000 deaths in India alone. This ramped up the concern regarding pandemic preparedness, biosafety, and biosecurity. Additionally, public concerns and speculation on potential biosecurity have increased. Although allegations regarding the SARS-Cov-19 virus being a Chinese bioweapon have been debunked, the concerns about establishing strong biosecurity measures remain an important aspect of a comprehensive approach to securing the country against attacks. The absence of a dedicated biosecurity agency in India leaves the nation vulnerable to potential bioterrorism and misuse of biotechnological advancements, highlighting the urgent need for such an agency.
Globally, the approach to biosecurity has been slow, with a few countries taking the lead in establishing governing and research bodies. While most countries continue to group biosafety and biosecurity under one umbrella, very few approach biosecurity as an important space altogether. In April 2024, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched its first Biotechnology and Human Enhancement Technologies Strategy, emphasising leveraging advanced biotechnologies such as genetic engineering, synthetic biology, and neurotechnology, to enhance operational capabilities and ensure member states’ security. By maintaining technological superiority, enhancing operational readiness, and upholding ethical standards, NATO aims to effectively integrate these innovations into its defence operations. The strategy also highlights the importance of investment in research and development, inter-agency coordination, and international collaboration to achieve these goals while mitigating potential risks through stringent policy and regulatory measures.
By maintaining technological superiority, enhancing operational readiness, and upholding ethical standards, NATO aims to effectively integrate these innovations into its defence operations.
The United Kingdom (UK) is another jurisdiction that, with its Biological Strategic Strategy, established the UK Biosecurity Leadership Council. The Council oversees both biosecurity and pandemic preparedness with biosafety. Regarding biosecurity, the Council engages with other departments on emerging risks through regular assessments and encourages responsible innovation within the region.
The European Union (EU) also has the European Union Biosecurity Forum. This Forum was formed under the (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats) CBRN Action Plan 2013-2014 with the collaboration of Denmark, France, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. While the Forum has been inactive in terms of publications since 2014, they have established a toolbox for biosecurity preparedness. The EU, however, mainly derives its response to potential bioterrorism through its Bioterrorism Handbook published by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, established under the CBRN Action Plan 2017.
Japan has policies that oversee trade and quarantine suspicious and risky biological samples, including animals and plants. It also has laws, including the Infectious Disease Control Law, which includes surveillance and occupational measures for lab workers and others exposed to potential pathogens. However, despite the alleged use of biological weapons in the country, a biosecurity law or an overall institutional structure that oversees the intentional misuse of pathogens is lacking.
While all the countries mentioned above approach biosafety comprehensively and biosecurity in ways aligned to the global standard, i.e., the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), not many cover the gaps in the convention to increase the scope and comprehensively cover biosecurity.
The Commission is tasked with studying the intersection of biotechnology and national security and providing policy solutions to the US Congress.
One country that has made moves in this direction is the United States (US). In 2022, the US established the National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology (NSCEB) under the National Defence Authorisation Act. The Commission is tasked with studying the intersection of biotechnology and national security and providing policy solutions to the US Congress. Its work includes monitoring technological developments, including bioinformatics, biomanufacturing, synthetic biology and genetic engineering, a field ignored mainly by biosecurity governance tools in other countries and internationally. Additionally, the research is meant to evaluate risk and potential dual use and help assist safe innovation and ethical guidance for scientists globally. The NSCEB collaborates with various government agencies including the Department of Defense, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the National Institute of Health, to ensure a cohesive approach to biotechnology security. Further, the organisation's mandate also engages with international partners to establish global standards and protocols for biotechnology research and protection.
By engaging with international organisations, fostering bilateral and multilateral partnerships, promoting research collaboration, advocating for global surveillance systems, harmonising policies, and building capacity, the NSCEB actions provide a model for how other countries can engage in and benefit from international collaboration in biotechnology and biosecurity and highlight the crucial role of global cooperation in addressing biosecurity challenges.
The organisation's mandate also engages with international partners to establish global standards and protocols for biotechnology research and protection.
Australia also has a well-formed biosecurity strategy titled Commonwealth Biosecurity 2030. This strategy aims to reduce future defence threats through the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry. Additionally, Australia is also home to the Australia Group. While this is not a group representing Australia, the initiative started in 1985 to form a multilateral regime discussing export controls on chemical weapons to ensure global safety and has evolved as an informal group that discusses issues on weapons trade control, including overseeing transhipping and export controls on the development of biological and chemical weapons. In 2018, India joined the Australia Group.
India’s approach to biosafety is characterised by a structured framework that ensures the responsible use and containment of biological materials, primarily through Biosafety Level (BSL) laboratories. India’s regulatory ecosystem includes a range of guidelines and authorities, such as the Department of Biotechnology (DBT). India has robust biotechnology capabilities focused primarily on research and development for public health, as evidenced by the National Biotechnology Development Strategy 2021–2025 and efforts targeting diseases like cancer, tuberculosis, and malaria. However, it has lacked biowarfare and biological weapon deterrence. This gap stems from a disconnect between scientific expertise and policymaking. With its burgeoning biotechnology sector, India stands to gain significantly by establishing a nodal agency that oversees biosecurity and adopting strategies and frameworks similar to the NSCEB. Some areas include:
Establishing a dedicated biosecurity agency becomes imperative, given the complexity and potential risks associated with these biotechnological advancements.
Given its vulnerabilities—high population density, weak public health infrastructure, and insufficient biosecurity training—India needs to enhance awareness, bridge the gap between science and policy, and effectively mobilise resources to address biological threats. Establishing a dedicated biosecurity agency becomes imperative, given the complexity and potential risks associated with these biotechnological advancements. Such an agency would be crucial in monitoring and regulating biotechnology developments, assessing and mitigating biosecurity threats, and coordinating efforts across various sectors and international partners. By promoting ethical standards and ensuring preparedness against biosecurity challenges, a biosecurity agency would not only play a vital role in safeguarding national and global security but also pave the way for harnessing the benefits of biotechnology safely and responsibly, instilling a sense of optimism about the future. A new coordinating agency could ensure strategic alignment and eliminate siloing across agencies. This agency would also facilitate capacity building and regular training in biosecurity.
Shravishtha Ajaykumar is an Associate Fellow with the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation
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Shravishtha Ajaykumar is Associate Fellow at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology. Her fields of research include geospatial technology, data privacy, cybersecurity, and strategic ...
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