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Despite its importance, the nuclear issue has slipped from global focus, yet recent crises remind us it remains ever-present, with global turbulence risking its use
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On 1 August, President Donald Trump ordered two nuclear submarines to move to “be positioned in the appropriate regions” in response to former Russian President Dimitri Medvedev’s remarks a day earlier about the risk of nuclear war between nuclear-armed adversaries.
The move came shortly after Trump’s 31 July remark, where he mentioned, “I don’t care what India does with Russia. They can take their dead economies down together, for all I care.” In India, the remark drew disbelief and amusement, given its position as one of the most vibrant economies in the world.
However, in Russia, it took a different turn. Playing on the word “dead”, Medvedev invoked“the fabled ‘Dead Hand’”, a reference to the semi-automatic Russian command system that will launch Russian missiles even if its leadership has been wiped in a nuclear strike.
This exchange comes amid growing tensions between Russia and the US as Trump continues to mount pressure on Putin to agree to a ceasefire in Ukraine.
It was in response to this that Trump ordered the move of two US nuclear-propelled submarines, observing “ just in case these foolish and inflammatory statements are more than just that,” Trump said in his Truth Social post on Friday. Aware of the escalatory potential of words with someone like Trump, Russia has since played down the move, saying that there had been no real escalation and that everyone needed to be “very cautious” with nuclear issues.
This exchange comes amid growing tensions between Russia and the US as Trump continues to mount pressure on Putin to agree to a ceasefire in Ukraine. The Trump-Medvedev spat began when Trump reduced his deadline for Putin to agree to a peace settlement from 50 days to 12.
The relations between the two nuclear heavyweights remain fraught because of the collapse of the arms control regime created during the Cold War .Today, all major post-Cold War US-Russia arms control agreements are either dead or, as in the case of the New START, suspended.
Earlier this month, Russia announced that it would no longer be bound by the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, from which the US had formally withdrawn in February 2019. While the American action was aimed at countering Chinese missiles in the Indo-Pacific region, Russia’s belated exit was aimed at sending the message to Europe, which is the target of its short- and medium-range nuclear missile forces.
Despite its importance, the nuclear issue seems to have slipped from the forefront of global concern.. Yet, as recent crises remind us, this threat is ever-present, and the continuing global turbulence and disorder can act as a catalyst in triggering nuclear use.
From the onset of his invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that any interference by outside powers would lead to consequences “such as you have never seen before in your entire history.” This was interpreted as a nuclear threat.
In the ensuing years, according to a CSIS study, there have been over 200 instances of Russian leaders speaking of nuclear weapons in the context of the Ukraine war. From the Western side, there have been no direct threats, but several messages asserting the importance of deterrence.
Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that any interference by outside powers would lead to consequences “such as you have never seen before in your entire history.” This was interpreted as a nuclear threat.
The nuclear issue formed a key element in the recent Iran-Israel war, though neither side issued explicit threats. But Israel said its actions were aimed at eliminating Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile threat. So, their strikes were claimed to be preemptive even though there was no evidence that Iran had or was making nuclear weapons.
Then there was the India-Pakistan four-day war. Since both countries possess nuclear weapons, it has generated concern across the world. Adding to the problem was the fact that this was a war featuring missiles and aircraft, both of which are also used for nuclear delivery.
Even before the crisis escalated, Pakistan had hinted at a nuclear response. Following the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) by India, a statement from the Pakistan Prime Minister’s office said that any attempt to stop or divert the waters would be considered as an act of war, and responded to with full force across the complete spectrum of national power.” This reference to “complete spectrum” clearly relates to nuclear weapons.
Speaking to the Pakistani TV channel Geo News on the 7th, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khwaja Asif said, “If they impose all-out war on the region and if such dangers arise in which there is a stand-off, then at any time a nuclear war can break out.”
The US, which initially called for de-escalation, got more actively involved when concerns over the nuclear issue surfaced. Sometime on 9-10 May,an Indian strike hit Kirana Hills, a reported Pakistani nuclear weapons storage site near the Sarghoda air force base. According to the imagery analyst, the strike was a shallow one “with nothing of value in its immediate vicinity.” An Indian spokesman, too, denied any strike in their briefing on 11 May. But though the hit could have been accidental, it could also be seen as messaging. On May 10, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called for a meeting of the National Command Authority, which oversees the use of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Though the meeting was denied, the original announcement was seen by the US as an act of signalling.
In his claim that he brokered the ceasefire, President Trump insisted that he had averted a nuclear conflict. “It could have been a bad nuclear war. Millions of people could have been killed”, he said.
The US concern is legitimate. Both India and Pakistan have nuclear arsenals of about 200 warheads each, and India’s Operation Sindoor and Pakistan’s Operation Bunyan al-Marsus involved missile and drone attacks. India used the conventionally armed Brahmos and Scalp EG missiles, and there are some grounds to believe that the Brahmos can also carry a nuclear warhead. In 2022, there was an incident when India accidentally fired a Brahmos missile without a warhead that had landed 124 km deep inside Pakistan. It had taken India 48 hours to admit the misfire.
Both in 2019 and 2025, India and Pakistan have taken measures to control escalation. However, in a warlike situation, this may not always be possible.
Operation Sindoor markedly altered the Indian counter-terror doctrine in two ways. First, rather than shallow commando raids that were conducted after the Uri attack of 2016, India has, since 2019, used primarily air power to deliver retribution. Second, his was laid out by no less than the Prime Minister himself who said , in his May 12 address to the nation that “India will not tolerate nuclear blackmail. India will strike precisely and decisively at the terrorist hideouts developing under the cover of nuclear blackmail.” In other words, the nuclear factor will not restrain India from counter-terror actions using air power.
Both in 2019 and 2025, India and Pakistan have taken measures to control escalation. However, in a warlike situation, this may not always be possible. An inadvertent strike at a sensitive target, be it a nuclear storage site or a civilian facility, could lead to an escalatory cycle.
In recent remarks in a lecture series published by the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS), the Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Anil Chauhan hailed the “psychological impact” of India’s long-range precision strikes in Operation Sindoor. What we need to look out for are the consequences of this impact, such as strikes that could inadvertently hit nuclear weapons storage sites, triggering a Pakistani reaction. India needs to work out ways to ensure that this does not encourage Pakistan to use nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan have an agreement from 2005 that requires the two countries to give advance notification of three days of flight tests of land or sea-launched missiles. By and large, the two sides observe this by issuing NOTAMs of tests, but this does not cover warlike situations.
Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the ORF. He has been a journalist specialising on national and international politics and is a commentator and ...
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