A year into the post-Hasina transition, Bangladesh grapples with forging a new democratic framework through the contentious July Charter.
Image Source: Wikipidia
August 2025 marks one year since the regime change in Bangladesh. The nationwide protests that precipitated the fall of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in early August last year were triggered by a violent government crackdown on student demonstrations against quota reforms. Yet the unrest reflected deeper undercurrents—long-standing public discontent over the perceived erosion of democratic norms and the ruling party’s repeated return to power through contested mandates. In the aftermath, restoring democratic governance became one of the interim government’s stated priorities.
Under Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus, the interim government was tasked with creating a National Consensus Commission to draft a Charter via an all-party consensus, as a blueprint for democratic reform. The ‘July Charter’, originally slated for release at the end of July 2025 and then rescheduled for August 5—the first anniversary of the regime change—has now missed both deadlines. It remains unfinished and unpublished. Although promised to be an inclusive endeavour, not all political parties have participated in drafting it, and several among those involved have critiqued its propositions. As the Charter will be crucial in determining Bangladesh’s political future, it is necessary to review the importance of this document and its reported terms in light of the current political climate.
In history, charters have been born in the aftermath of societal upheavals, in moments of political transition and institutional uncertainty. These are, essentially, guiding frameworks for governance—outlining the rights, responsibilities, objectives, or rules of an organisation, institution, group, or government. The Magna Carta, signed in 1215 in England between King John and rebellious barons, is one of the most famous examples of a charter. Similarly, the Atlantic Charter, issued by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in August 1941, articulated the vision for the post-war world order and inspired the formation of the United Nations. Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, is no stranger to charters, with several dotting its fifty-five-year history. The Six-Point Movement of 1966, though not resulting in a charter, put forth a clear political blueprint for economic autonomy and federalism within Pakistan. Likewise, the Proclamation of Independence in April 1971 provided the first written foundation of the sovereign state of Bangladesh. These documents embodied the democratic aspirations of people—which existing structures could no longer serve and therefore had to be reformed.
In a political scenario where questions are being increasingly raised about the scope of powers and tenure of the interim government, such a consensus indicates both faith in this system and awareness of the need to regulate it.
In a similar spirit, the interim government initiated a national reform process to formulate the July Charter, envisioned to frame a set of recommendations for the country’s future governance based on an all-party consensus. The National Consensus Commission (NCC), under the aegis of Professor Ali Riaz, is tasked with conducting expansive dialogues to arrive at this consensus. The latest iteration of this was held on 21 July at the Foreign Service Academy in Dhaka, where stakeholders from thirty political parties across Bangladesh participated. A key outcome of this dialogue has been the consensus to revive the once-abolished caretaker government system. The Commission presented a proposal outlining the method of formation, composition, tenure, and limitations of a constitutional caretaker government, drawing on suggestions from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, the National Citizen Party (NCP), and the Revolutionary Workers Party of Bangladesh. It was supplemented by feedback from participants attending the dialogue. In a political scenario where questions are being increasingly raised about the scope of powers and tenure of the interim government, such a consensus indicates both faith in this system and awareness of the need to regulate it.
According to the proposal, the Chief Adviser of the caretaker government should be selected at least 15 days before the dissolution of the parliament, by a selection committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Opposition Leader, the Speaker, the Deputy Speaker, and one representative from the third-largest party in Parliament. The Chief Adviser is to be selected by the committee within 120 hours of its formation from among candidates provided by parliamentary parties, other parties registered with the Election Commission, and independent lawmakers, at least 30 days before the dissolution of the parliament. In instances where this procedure fails, the committee will shortlist three candidates, each nominated separately by the ruling party, the opposition, and the third-largest party, and attempt to reach a consensus. However, if no consensus is reached, the committee members will cast individual votes through a secret ballot and determine the Chief Adviser using the ranked-choice method.
These recommendations reflect certain convergences with and divergences from Bangladesh’s earlier system of caretaker government, which was abolished in 2011 by the Sheikh Hasina government.
The Chief Advisor must not be older than 75 years and will be appointed by the President for a term of 90 days. He will subsequently, in consultation with the selection committee, appoint up to 15 advisers who fulfil the eligibility criteria outlined in Article 58C of the 13th Constitutional Amendment. The national election must be held within 90 days of the expiration or early dissolution of parliament. The caretaker government can take an additional 30 days to conduct the national election in case of unavoidable circumstances.
These recommendations reflect certain convergences with and divergences from Bangladesh’s earlier system of caretaker government, which was abolished in 2011 by the Sheikh Hasina government. For example, its tenure of 90 days has been retained, but the number of advisers to be appointed has been increased from 10 to 15. The most significant change, however, is in the selection process of the Chief Adviser. Previously, the President would appoint the most recently retired Chief Justice to the position if the candidate was suitable and willing to accept. If unavailable, the President would choose the next most recently retired Chief Justice, and so on down the list. If none fit the bill, the President would appoint the latest retired Judge of the Appellate Division. If none were willing, the President, after consulting major political parties, would appoint a qualified citizen as Chief Adviser. If all options proved futile, the President would assume the role. As per the reported terms of the Commission’s proposals, the primacy offered to judges to assume the role of Chief Adviser has been bypassed in favour of popular candidatures. The initiative is driven by the democratic need to uphold the separation of powers and preserve judicial independence. This comes as Bangladesh’s judiciary has been severely criticised over the past year for being subservient to the former Awami League administration.
As per the reported terms of the Commission’s proposals, the primacy offered to judges to assume the role of Chief Adviser has been bypassed in favour of popular candidatures.
While a consensus has indeed been reached on the caretaker government system, several parties have also submitted new propositions, which are being integrated into the draft to reflect the core positions of each party. The political parties also remained divided on the second part of the dialogue, which deliberated whether an individual can simultaneously hold the positions of Prime Minister, leader of the parliament, and the party chief. While the BNP, National Democratic Movement, and Liberal Democratic Party did not consider it undemocratic for one person to combine all three roles, Jamaat-e-Islami and the Revolutionary Workers Party of Bangladesh held that the leader of parliament and the Prime Minister can be the same person but suggested a reform by which the person could no longer be the party chief. The NCP, on the other hand, proposed that three different individuals should hold the three offices, as separation of powers is essential for checks and balances and enabling future leaders. This dilemma between political parties over the concentration of powers in the Prime Minister is natural, as they are aspirants to the role. While intended to uphold democratic principles, excessive division of powers may lead to diminished authority with the Prime Minister, red tape, and bureaucratic inefficiencies in practice.
As the National Consensus Commission struggles to overcome this limbo, it has succeeded in reaching a consensus on some fronts, including women's representation in Parliament, the formation of the Election Commission, and the procedures for appointing the comptroller and auditor general and the ombudsman. Indeed, despite the enormity of the task, the NCC has compiled a preliminary draft outlining the agreed-upon points and has circulated it among the participating political parties for their approval. However, the Jamaat-e-Islami, the NCP, and the BNP have expressed their reservations about the draft. The BNP has expressed partial agreement to the proposed reforms but has strongly objected to enshrining the historical significance of the July uprising in the constitution, apprehending that it could pave the way for certain groups to promote the idea of a "Second Republic". The party further stated that the July Charter deserves state recognition but not constitutional status. The Jamaat-e-Islami termed the draft charter “incomplete and dangerous,” and has demanded that it be backed by an ordinance ratified by parliament or a public referendum to ensure legal legitimacy. The NCP has critiqued the Commission for finalising these points without adequate discussion.
While the NCC is indeed making headway in the herculean task of reaching a national consensus for the restoration of democracy, it must also be wary of party prejudices, including the biases of the interim government itself.
Meanwhile, the Awami League, which ruled the country from 2009 to 2024 and can lay claim to some popular support, was disbanded in May 2025 and was not part of this ongoing political dialogue. The Jatiya Party, which has long been viewed as a silent supporter of the erstwhile ruling party, has also been left out. This raises questions about the inclusivity of the terms of the July Charter. While the NCC is indeed making headway in the herculean task of reaching a national consensus for the restoration of democracy, it must also be wary of party prejudices, including the biases of the interim government itself.
If the Charter is indeed to shape Bangladesh’s future governance, it is vital to maintain objectivity in its recommendations. A more thorough examination of its provisions is warranted once the draft is made publicly accessible. As the promised elections of 2026 approach, there is significant anticipation surrounding the July Charter. Thus, its architects must prioritise inclusivity, legal legitimacy, and transparent dialogue and timeliness for the July Charter to serve as the foundation of Bangladesh’s next democratic chapter.
Sohini Bose is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Sohini Bose is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Kolkata with the Strategic Studies Programme. Her area of research is India’s eastern maritime ...
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