American leaders must abandon their decades-long dream of achieving strategic convergence between the US and Pakistan
This article is part of the series—Raisina Edit 2023.
Over the many decades of United States-Pakistan relations, the United States (US) relied on Pakistan for support in a range of strategic efforts. These included, most recently, the stabilisation of Afghanistan and prosecution of the Global War on Terror. Pakistan was, at best, a partial ally in these endeavours, often appearing to support the US’ efforts and interests while behaving in ways inimical to them. For example, from its birth in 1947 to the present, Pakistan employed militants and terrorist groups as instruments of national policy. This enabled Pakistan to challenge territorial boundaries in South Asia without the costs and risks of using its regular military forces.
< style="color: #0069a6;">From its birth in 1947 to the present, Pakistan employed militants and terrorist groups as instruments of national policy.
The Trump administration distanced the US from Pakistan in light of longstanding Pakistani support for terrorism. Its 2017 South Asia strategy made clear that business as usual between the US and Pakistan could not continue. It then cut US $1.3 billion in security assistance to Pakistan and supported the latter’s inclusion on the Financial Action Task Force’s grey list. The US made clear that such measures would remain in force until Pakistan significantly improved its behaviour. Pakistan subsequently assisted the US in negotiations with the Taliban over their departure from Afghanistan. Despite this help, however, US-Pakistan relations remained strained. For the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan was due, in no small part, to years of Pakistani support. And despite apparent Pakistani crackdowns on terrorist organisations, including the arrest and imprisonment of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) chief Mufti Mohammed Hafez Saeed, other important terrorists, including senior LeT leaders, remained at large in Pakistan. It was not clear that any changes in Pakistani policy would be deep or lasting. Upon taking office, the Biden administration largely ignored Pakistan. Currently, however, the US appears to be reversing course, and the relationship between the two countries is enjoying something of a renaissance. Its centrepiece is a US $450 million sustainment package for Pakistani F-16s. Recent months also have seen the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff visit Washington for the first time in roughly three years, as well as the US and Pakistan discussing potential counterterrorism (CT), and economic, energy, and environmental cooperation.
< style="color: #0069a6;">Pakistan subsequently assisted the US in negotiations with the Taliban over their departure from Afghanistan. Despite this help, however, US-Pakistan relations remained strained.
Such developments, particularly in the security sphere, are likely to undermine US-India strategic interests and cooperation. Specifically, they will increase the threat to India’s West, thus, distracting India from the task of balancing China. They will also suggest to India that the US is an unreliable partner, promoting close Indo-US cooperation even as it underwrites India’s sworn enemy. Given these problems, why would the US seek to provide Pakistan with military support such as F-16 sustainment? A number of justifications are possible, though on examination, none are convincing. For example, the Defense Department has claimed that the US F-16 sustainment package will enable Pakistan to better support US CT efforts. But relying on Pakistan for CT assistance ignores its longstanding support for terrorism. The US should instead cultivate other regional states for CT cooperation, even if doing so is difficult or costly. The US may also hope that military aid to Pakistan will enhance strategic stability on the subcontinent, balancing weaker Pakistan against stronger India. But the US should not seek equity between India and Pakistan. Rather, it should focus on strengthening India, its partner in offsetting rising Chinese power. Military assistance to Pakistan could be compensation for Pakistani arms transfers to Ukraine. But US interests in Eastern Europe, though important, are less significant than its interests in the Indo-Pacific. The US should not undermine its strategic partnership with India to facilitate third-party support for Ukraine. Finally, the US may hope that enhancing Pakistan’s F-16 fleet will help to prevent Pakistani overdependence on China.
< style="color: #0069a6;">The US should not undermine its strategic partnership with India to facilitate third-party support for Ukraine.
This does not mean that the US should ignore or isolate Pakistan. Pakistan is an important regional power, armed with nuclear weapons. Sometimes, moreover, US and Pakistani interests may converge, justifying limited cooperation in specific cases. With its withdrawal from Afghanistan, however, the US needs Pakistan less than at any other time in the last 20 years. Broad improvements in the relationship must be conditioned on Pakistan’s achievement of clear benchmarks demonstrating an end to its support of militancy and terrorism. In the meantime, dialogue between senior US and Pakistani leadership, along with limited economic initiatives, such as the creation of tariff-free zones for Pakistani exports to the US, could be helpful. But American leaders must abandon their decades-long dream of achieving strategic convergence between the US and Pakistan. Efforts to pursue it through measures such as expanded security assistance will not come to fruition. And they will damage the US’ real strategic interests in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific.
Hussain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United State and an Epic History of Misunderstanding, New York: Public Affairs, 2013.
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S. Paul Kapur is a professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and a visiting fellow at Stanford ...
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