Originally Published 2019-04-03 07:55:41 Published on Apr 03, 2019
What to make of India's ASAT test

Announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on March 27, India’s recent anti-satellite test not only impacts domestic politics, with national assembly elections upcoming, but has also sparked two interesting streams of conversation among intelligentsia. On the one hand, space experts have focused on how this test indicates India’s ability to deter adversaries from targeting India’s space-based assets. On the other hand, nuclear strategists and scholars are emphasizing that the test contributes to India’s efforts in developing ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities. Indeed, a ground-based ballistic missile interceptor, developed by the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) as part of India’s BMD program, was used used to hit a low-orbital Indian satellite. Although the test has implications for both India’s space-based deterrence and BMD capabilities, the reference to augmentation of India’s BMD potential, which the Indian government has categorically avoided in this instance, presents a more destabilizing image.

Prime Minister Modi made the announcement of the test in a nationwide address delivered in Hindi. His sole emphasis was on the vitality of India’s space-based assets in furthering India’s developmental and security needs and how the test ensures the safety of those assets. The government has pitched the test as a deterrent to any adversaries who may seek to attack India’s space-based assets in a conflict. This was evident in the remarks made by Finance Minister Arun Jaitley, who noted: “Just like our nuclear capability, this too is a deterrent capability.”

Even though Modi underlined that the test is not directed against any specific country, China, with its ASAT capabilities demonstrated in 2007, is arguably the nation against which this deterrent is primarily directed. As Indian space scholar Rajeswari Rajagopalan notes, the Chinese ASAT test was a wake-up call for India. In the aftermath of China’s ASAT test, then and former heads of DRDO and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) had argued that India’s space-based assets must be secured.

However, while the Indian government and space scholars have emphasized that the test establishes India’s space-based deterrence, scholars of nuclear strategy have argued that the test supports India’s ongoing efforts towards the development of BMD capabilities. This also ties in with the narrative that India is exploring counterforce options, particularly against Pakistan. Scholar Vipin Narang, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for instance, tweeted: “India’s ASAT test today has huge implications for what Christopher Clary and I wrote on India’s interest in counterforce. One piece is hunting nukes, but the other is intercepting residuals—BMD—so your hunt doesn’t have to be perfect. Today’s test was about BMD.” Narang went on to use Jaitley’s reference to “nuclear” in his speech to substantiate the argument that India is seeking to limit damage to offset Pakistan’s second-strike capability.

While Modi’s speech highlights the government’s attempt at prioritizing national security as an election agenda, emphasis on “pride” arguably diminishes the relative role of imminent external threats as a factor influencing the decision to conduct the ASAT test. Instead, Modi’s address captures prestige as the primary rationale for it.

Notwithstanding the arguments, the two readings offer distinct interpretations of how the test is perceived. Viewing the test as a natural corollary to the Chinese test of 2007 offers a more responsible justification – India seeks to secure its space-based assets from China’s ASAT threat by demonstrating the ability to damage Chinese assets in return, irrespective of how credible the deterrence is. On the other hand, emphasis on augmenting BMD capabilities for damage limitation as part of what some scholars suspect is India’s strategy of eliminating Pakistan’s nuclear assets in a first strike presents a more destabilizing image. It also ties the test to the India-Pakistan conflict dyad. Nevertheless, both these readings are driven by external threats and India’s attempts to address them.

But in his brief address, Modi used the word “गर्व”, which translates to “pride,” thrice. He further noted that only three countries have achieved this feat so far, bringing India to the table with the United States, Russia, and China, and lauded Indian scientists for this accomplishment. While Modi’s speech highlights the government’s attempt at prioritizing national security as an election agenda, emphasis on “pride” arguably diminishes the relative role of imminent external threats as a factor influencing the decision to conduct the ASAT test. Instead, Modi’s address captures prestige as the primary rationale for it. While the test is likely to only marginally influence the outcome of the upcoming elections in Modi’s favor, it captures how national pride and prestige have been a long-term factor in contributing to India’s strategic choices – be it in the nuclear or the space realm.


This commentary originally appeared in South Asian Voices.

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Mairi Dupar

Mairi Dupar

Mairi Dupar Senior Technical Advisor Climate and Development Knowledge Network ODI

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