MonitorsPublished on Jan 21, 2020
South Asia Weekly Report | Volume XIII; 3

Pakistan: Army establishment serves Chinese interests

Ayjaz Wani The call made by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo directly to Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa, after the recent assassination of Iranian commander Maj Gen Qasem Soleimani in an American airstrike has once again underscored the influence of the Pakistani Army on the country’s internal and external affairs. The elimination of Soleimani, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force, in a US airstrike at Bagdad international airport has resulted in serious escalation of tensions between the two countries. In any democratic setup, sensitive information of this nature is by protocol discussed and shared with the civilian government leadership. However, the army establishment in Pakistan has remained politically dominant and economically affluent not only when the country has been under army dictatorship but also during the  periods when the country has witnessed democratic civilian rule. The army has remained at the centre of power, with deep roots into all the formal governance structures in Pakistan. No wonder, therefore, that foreign governments have always given the army establishment in Pakistan more credibility than the incumbent civilian leadership. While the phone call by Pompeo clearly highlighted the dominant role played the military establishment in Pakistan, China – thanks to its enormous economic and security interests in the region – has always been keen to mollycoddle with the Pakistani army in its dealings with its ‘all-weather’ friend. The mutual bonhomie between Communist China and the Pakistani military complex has seen considerable growth in the past decade, following the former’s geostrategic investments under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China’s flagship project under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Af-Pak region, one of the world’s most crowded terrorist landscapes. Pakistan’s army chief, Gen Bajwa, the 16th COAS, has remained a loyal friend of China ever since he assumed office on 29 November 2016. He has also served Chinese interests well by assuring the security of Chinese workers, and the ongoing China-built infrastructure projects under the CPEC. Therefore, when Prime Minister Imran Khan-led Tehreek-e-Insaaf government announced the extension of the COAS’ term in August 2018, China was the first country to hail the decision. Terming Gen Bajwa as an “old friend of Beijing,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang claimed that he has made "robust” contributions to the Sino-Pak bilateral relations. The current COAS has also become the ‘go-to’ man for Beijing to keep in check the growing resistance against Chinese colonial policies in its restive province among Pakistani religious groups.

Judicial turbulence

Two recent developments revealed the glaring institutional imbalances in Pakistan. One was after the sentencing of former President Gen Parvez Musharraf by a Special Court on 19 December 2019. The other was the Supreme Court’s verdict on Gen Bajwa's extension. The capital punishment awarded by the special court to Musharraf for ‘high treason’ was unprecedented in the nation’s history. It broke the accepted tradition that the breach of the Constitution by dictators is to be overlooked – just like how, in the past, when no action was initiated against three military rulers – Gen Ayub Khan, Gen Yahya Khan and Gen Zia-ul-Haq – who brazenly violated the Constitution by overthrowing the democratically-elected governments to establish dictatorship in Pakistan. However, after the strong protest from the Army, Prime Minister Imran Khan-led government was quick to fall in line. The government succumbed to the pressure from the armed forces and moved the Supreme Court, seeking the dismissal of the special court judgement against Musharraf. The government also petitioned the Lahore High Court, seeking action against the special court judge, Justice Seth. True to tradition, and giving a sigh of relief to the government, the Lahore High Court on 13 January, 2020 ruled that the “treason case against the former President was not prepared in accordance with the law.” It even declared the formation of the special court, that had tried Musharraf’s high treason case, as “unconstitutional”. The second development happened when Pakistan's National Assembly passed three bills extending the tenure of the COAS without waiting for the outcome of the judicial review that the extension of Gen Bajwa’s tenure was subjected to. The court questioned the legitimacy of the right exercised by the government and asked for a specific legislation to be passed in both the houses of parliament in this regard. The bills, which extended the retirement age of all three services’ chiefs from 60 to 64 years, were supported by two mainstream political parties – Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Both these developments have further strengthened the grip of Pakistan’s military establishment over the government, dealing a serious jolt to the     hopes for supremacy of the civilian government. The prevalence of democratic institutions and the voice of pro-democratic activists of Pakistan have been crushed, as all the mainstream political parties and the judiciary meekly gave in to the affluent army establishment yet again. The support for Pakistan Army (Amendment Bill) 2020 on 7 January 2020 by the PML-N and the PPP – the very parties that had accused the COAS of rigging the elections of July 2018 to pave way for Imran Khan’s Tehreek-e-Insaaf – took every pro-democratic activist in the country by surprise. However, in the bargain, Imran Khan achieved his goal to ensure smooth sailing of his government for the next three years.

Cultural persecution

For China and its authoritative regime, the political stability of Pakistan has always been a primary concern to ensure the success of the CPEC and prevent any uprising in the volatile Xinjiang province. The strong military establishment and the extension of the tenure of the COAS thus provide guarantee to the Chinese when it comes to China’s on and off romance with different terror groups in the Af-Pak region. China’s owes much of the silence of Pakistan’s civilian government on the cultural persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang to the strong influence that the military wields in the country. Besides the internal security of Xinjiang and the success of the CPEC, Beijing is keen to have a strong army in Pakistan to safeguard its strong proxy links with the Taliban and serve it geo-strategic interests in Greater Central Asia. Furthermore, while it is now apparent that the CPEC – far from being an economic project – has a greater geostrategic and security aspect, it offers a sound platform for both China and the Pakistan’s military establishment to execute secret defence deals which include purchase of Chinese military jets, weaponry, other hardware and space equipment. China has used this strategy to steadily increase and expand the presence and influence of the People’s Republic Army in the international military community over last decade. For example, the recent exercise in Northern Arabian Sea titled “Sea Guardians-2020” between the Pakistani Navy and the PLA Navy. Unlike democracies, China has always interacted with every nation to suit its own vested interests without any regard of their cultural identities. However, in Pakistan, China has found a handy lever in the country’s military establishment to further its geopolitical and geostrategic ambitions in the region. The Pakistani military establishment, on the other hand, is happy to receive the much-needed technological and other material help to keep its institution strong and affluent and continue its dominance over the civilian government. The increasing arms export from China has also helped Pakistan to maintain a steady flow of funds for covert operations in Afghanistan and other parts of Greater Central Asia during the time of economic recession faced by the country.

Maldives: Need to secure Indian Ocean with India’s lead

N Sathiya Moorthy The week-end Colombo meeting India’s National Security Advisor (NSA), Ajit K Doval, had with Sri Lankan President Gotabhaya Rajapaksa should be of as much interest to common neighbour Maldives, if not more, compared to the other two. This is particularly so in the aftermath of the recent Maldivian acknowledgement of the existence of Al-Qaeda and IS affiliates (not ‘modules’) in the country. A larger, structural and institutional arrangement, however, will require the incumbent Government of President Ibrahim ‘Ibu’ Solih to work towards building up a ‘national consensus’. India seemingly has one through years and decades, so too Sri Lanka, though in the latter case, a policy-breach is often visible. A decade or so ago, the then Maldivian MDP government of then President Mohammed ‘Anni’ Nasheed and Sri Lanka’s post-war counterpart Mahinda Rajapaksa were reportedly in agreemSet featured imageent over out-sourcing their ‘external security’ cover. Sri Lanka, at the NSA-level meetings, was represented by then Defence Secretary Gota Rajapaksa, now the President. The two island-nations identified India for their ‘external security cover’. Their reasoning was simple and logical. The two of them did not have the resources to secure the open seas around them, and themselves from those open seas. India is the largest nation in the region, with its own security concerns and compulsions, which coincided with those of the two in broad terms. All three wanted the Indian Ocean secure. Maldives and Sri Lanka were also convinced that in ‘out-sourcing’ their ‘external security’ to a third nation – if ‘out-sourcing’ is the term – they should not complicate matters than in the natural course by inviting and involving ‘extra-regional powers’. India became the natural choice, and there followed tri-nation consultations at the NSA levels, where meetings were held in all three national capitals. The process died a natural death after the Rajapaksa regime permitted China to berth its submarine in its port. Leave aside the fact, India, the most concerne4d party in the matter was not taken into confidence, the Chinese reason for the sub’s presence in the Indian Ocean waters was even more unconvincing. At least there was no precedent in any nation deploying subs to neutralise ‘prates’, this one of the Yemeni kind as Beijing has claimed. This was followed years later by incumbent Maldivian President Abdulla Yameen asking India to take back the two helicopters, given as a gift, for air-borne surveillance of the nation’s seas. Between these, the reported Maldivian offer to host a tri-nation command, too, quietly fell through, though it may have been too early, even otherwise.

Denial mode

In general, national security can be classified as ‘internal’ and ‘external’. Traditional security concerns, and non-traditional issues like human security, cyber security, et al, are only about listing out and detailing the two. For all practical purposes, Maldives does not have ‘external security’ concerns of the traditional kind. It never has had throughout history, barring a bad patch in the 15th century, when the Portuguese tried to colonise the archipelago-nation and were repulsed. The nation’s contemporary concerns are only about ‘internal security’ matters.  Maldives does not have to fear neighbours like India and Sri Lanka coveting the nation’s territory. In geo-strategic terms, extra-regional powers may be on a ‘denial mode’, if only to ensure that other powers do not get a geo-political foothold in Maldives, even if they themselves do not get any. The nation(s) do(es) not have the clout and power to offset pressures from competing extra-regional powers. They can logically fend off pressures from another regional power in Pakistan, with its historic adversity towards India, by flagging the common Indian Ocean geo-strategic space between them India. Pakistan stands excluded from such an Indian Ocean neighbourhood security cooperation format.

Over-lapping nature

Given the overlapping nature of physical security in our times, Maldives also cannot differentiate internal and external security, to ‘outsource’ them to separate State entities. Worse still, Maldives, and also Sri Lanka, cannot ‘out-source’ their two arms of national security to two different nations, as India could out-source its defence procurement (as different from ‘national security’). Though Sri Lankan violation of a consensus of the nature when the Rajapaksas permitted Chinese sub docking at Colombo port, the consnsus thread is still strong and continual from a proven internal perception. India’s politics too is similarly polarised but there seems to be broad agreement on issues of national interest, especially foreign policy and security issues. In details however there are occasional changes, which at times could well lead to the consensus policy going for a toss. In Maldives, the Yameen government’s behaviour of asking India to take back the gifted choppers, owing to its unhappiness with New Delhi’s stress on restoring democracy and civil and political rights in Maldives, now demands the need for a national consensus on ‘security matters’. In context, Solih Government has greater political reach and constitutional credibility than the preceding two in  a ‘democratised’ Maldives for working towards a consensus on major policy initiatives, starting with national security and can include economy and the rest, where diverse views and positions now exist. How such a national consensus can be arrived at, what can at all be the markets and content is for Maldivian polity and security establishment to decide. It should also be incumbent upon the ruling party of the time, starting at least with this one, that the chosen mechanism ensures that a successor regime could upturn national interest at will and whim. The incumbent too should be aware of and alive to the possibility of the nation choosing another party and/or leader over the short, medium or long-term, and such a course cannot be wished away, now or ever.

‘Net provider’

Making the Indian point clear and taking off from where predecessor Manmohan Singh from a rival political party had left, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi commenced his Indian Ocean visits by combining Mauritius, Seychelles and Sri Lanka in a single leg. Maldives was a fourth nation PM Modi was scheduled to visit as a part of his four-nation Indian Ocean trip in March 2015, but owing to the tense domestic situation leading up to a local court ordering President Nasheed to 13 years in prison, it could not happen then. It happened when Modi became the only foreign dignitary for President Solih’s inauguration in November 2018. Before Modi, PM Singh had declared that India would be the ‘net provider’ of security in the region. Translated, it meant India was open to ensuring the external – and internal – security of nations of the region (excluding, of course, traditional adversary Pakistan). It also implied that New Delhi would not countenance third-nation interference, including extra-regional muscle-flexing, in South Asian waters. India has since expanded and re-worked its sea-centric neighbourhood priorities by bringing Madagascar, Comoros and French Reunion Island under the ‘Indian Ocean Division’ (IOR), which was a creation of the Manmohan Singh years. At the time, the MEA created the IOR Division by separating Bangladesh and Myanmar, from what was originally the ‘BSM’, and including Mauritius and Seychelles to Maldives and Sri Lanka. The new nations in the Division, starting with Mauritius and Seychelles, were a part of the Africa division in the MEA. The current change-over means that India is not just looking at geographies any more also the existing realities, which need greater coordination and cooperation with the Indian Ocean neighbourhood nations of the region, as a whole.

Sphere of influence

Taking the sea-based State-centric threats of a possible Chinese kind seriously, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has expanded its activities in recent times, moving further from the creation of the Southern Air Command at Thiruvananthapuram, followed by air bases in Thanjavur in Tamil Nadu, both closer to the shared waters with its neighbours. The IAF is now set to resurrect the ’222 Tigersharks’ squadron, and position Russian-made Su-30 Sukhoi fighter, which can deliver Russo-Indian BrahMos missiles over a 350-km radius. All this means that the Indian strategic community and Government agencies, starting with the Foreign Office and the Defence Ministry, toon would be looking at the Indian Ocean, from Madagascar to Sri Lanka and Maldives, to which India is the closest neighbour, in one great sweep. The nations, starting with India, Maldives and Sri Lanka, to begin with, will have to plan together, work together and stay together under the evolving concept of ‘Indo-Pacific’. A lot, however, would depend also on the Indian ability to convince all neighbours thus chosen to be included to be on the same page as New Delhi on the idea of ‘Indo-Pacific’. As bilateral and multi-lateral discourses begin, New Delhi may also be made realise that it cannot take unilateral decisions on common security and common strategies of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ or Quad kind and expect others in the region to accept and adopt. Instead, they would require prior consultations at least from this moment on, and hope to be consulted in advance before New Delhi rushes into such concepts and expect them also to follow. In nations like Sri Lanka, and even others, with their own decades and centuries-old definitions and understanding of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘territorial integrity’, domestic consensus also hinges on how the Government of the day is perceived on internal assessment of its external reach and out-reach. To this end, New Delhi needs to realise that the region used to be the ‘traditional sphere of Indian influence’, a universally-accepted position that it had voluntarily surrendered, to the erstwhile Soviet Union in the Cold War years. Post-Cold War, it was the US first and the Quad, later on, with their original term and understanding of ‘Indian Ocean geo-strategic sphere’ getting replaced by the ‘Indo-Pacific’, instead.

Country Reports

Afghanistan

SIGAR alleges US ‘lies’

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John Sopko, recently alleged the US officials in Afghanistan to have ‘routinely lied’ about the prevalent war like situation. The report was made to the US Congress. In fact of matter, most of the data was exaggerated in comparison to the actual status. He also mentioned the lack of knowledge of the US personnel sent into Afghanistan regarding the difference between Ai-Qaeda and the Taliban. This presentation holds the potential of changing the course of interaction between US and Afghanistan.

Bangladesh

China-funded project launch

Coal-fired Payra power plant, a joint venture of North-West Power Generation Company Bangladesh Limited, and China National Machinery Import and Export Corporation, became operational this week. The power plant, located in Patuakhali, around 200 kilometres off capital Dhaka, is the first mega power plant that became operational after the ruling Awami League came to power a decade ago. China is investing heavily in the power sector in Bangladesh. Due to its investment in the power sector it has emerged as the biggest investing country in Bangladesh

Trade talks with Thailand

The 5th meeting of the Joint Trade Committee (JTC) between Bangladesh and Thailand was held in Bangkok earlier in the month. In the meeting, the two countries agreed in principle for a Free Trade Agreement. Besides, the prospect of a direct sea link between Thailand and Bangladesh was discussed in the meeting. Thailand and Bangladesh are members of The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).  Bangladesh is a major trading partner for Thailand in the South Asia region but most the sea trade takes place via Singapore and Malaysia that takes around 7 to 12 days. Direct sea link with reducing times to around 5 days and likely to boost bilateral trade.

Biswa Ijtema

Biswa Ijtema, the largest congregation of Muslims, were held at Tongi in the outskirts of the capital, Dhaka. Members of Tabliq Jamaat, a religious movement that calls ordinary Muslims into believing in Islam and revive the faith, come to Bangladesh across the world to offer prayers.

Bhutan

SDF for regional tourists

Regional leisure tourists from countries like India, Bangladesh and the Maldives visiting Bhutan for the purpose of Leisure and Holiday would have to pay 25 percent of U.S$ 65 per night, Sustainable Development Fee (SDF) the government proposed in parliament on 16 January. The levy is expected to generate additional revenue besides promoting Bhutan as a high-end tourist destination.

PM for ending Five-Year Plans

The Prime Minister’s office is mulling a major change in the current five-year plan systems with the aim of not drafting a 13th Plan, but leaving it up to the next government to come up with its own system. The proposal is for a more dynamic annual or multi-year rolling system. The changes have already begun from the upcoming 2020-21 Financial Year budget where money will not be allocated in the usual way and where even good ideas outside the plan, will be given space over non-priority 12th plan activities. He says government has started the process in the way it will now allocate the budget.

Record fiscal deficit

The official 12th plan is Nu 310 billion with a fiscal deficit of Nu 29 billion. But, the real deficit could be up to Nu 40 billion due to DNT’s various pledges outside the plan. In terms of amount this will be the largest fiscal deficit ever. However, in terms of percentage it would around 3.68 percent fiscal deficit of the nominal projected GDP of Nu 241.361 bn in 2020-21 financial year. This would be the third highest fiscal deficit if it does not go any higher.

India

Union Ministers to visit Kashmir

The Central Government has decided to send a delegation of Union Ministers to visit the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. The Ministers are expected to have an interaction with the local people. According to sources, efforts would be made to inform the people about the development activities that has taken place after the government’s action of dilution of Article 370 in August. Such government initiatives include successful implementation of all beneficiary oriented schemes to all residents of J&K, implementation of the PMDP, industrial growth, employment and economic growth in all sectors. The group will attempt to convey the importance of the Centre’s policies for the holistic betterment of the Union Territory.

Maldives

For ‘de-centralisation’

The ruling MDP has to win the nation-wide island council elections, scheduled for 4 April, if his presidential poll promise for a ‘de-centralised’ Maldives has to serve its purpose, President Ibrahim Solih said, commencing the party’s campaign in this regard. This, even as the Opposition PPM-PNC combine claimed that the popular support for their jailed former President Abdulla Yameen was growing, and the latter’s one-time impeached Vice-President Mohamed Jameel Ahmed, now heading his defence legal team, called for the anti-MDP parties to come together. Inside the Jumhoore Party, a second claimant to top Opposition leadership, differences have erupted over identifying with the MDP, especially President Solih, ahead of the island council elections.

Myanmar

Xi visit

Chinese President Xi Jinping has arrived in Myanmar, laden with investment pledges worth billions which could reshape the nation. A high-speed rail line to the east, a deep-sea port to the west and a makeover for commercial heart Yangon are the major projects slated to enhance better economic as well as bilateral connectivity. While the nation is enjoying this phase of deep ties, the European Chamber of Commerce in China has shown little interest regarding BRI as it blames the entire initiative for lack of transparency and information.

ICJ decision soon

The International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) decision on the provisional measures requested by Gambia in its genocide lawsuit against Myanmar will be delivered on 23 January.  The three-day hearing in The Hague saw Daw Aung San Suu Kyi arguing that issuing provisional measures could “undermine the ongoing reconciliation” efforts in the strife torn area. She asked the court to help Myanmar “create unity out of diversity” by dropping the case. Whether the decision will bring justice for Rohingyas is yet to be seen.

Nepal

NC leader meets Indian minister

A senior leader of the Nepali Congress (NC), Ram Chandra Poudel, recently held a meeting with Rajnath Singh, the Union Minister of Defence, in New Delhi. Several aspects of bilateral collaboration and opportunities were discussed. What may be understood from this discussion is NC’s aim and aspiration to remain associated with the neighbour and the country’s politics as the main opposition, with brewing ideas to come back to power.

Poor revenue collection

The government of Nepal has fallen short of around Rs 104 billion with regard to its revenue collection in the current fiscal year. It must be mentioned here that an ‘ambitious target’ of 30 per cent growth in revenue was targeted. The Finance Ministry has come up with reduction in customs revenue as the main reason behind this unfortunate circumstance. The government undoubtedly needs to pay more attention to its monetary framework to remain in the rat-race of development in South Asia.

New Railway Bill

The Railway Bill has been approved by the National Assembly in Nepal that talks about allowing foreign countries to use its land for expanding its railway service if it gets the same kind of reciprocity from them as well. A separate security unit shall also be created to respect the presence of borders. The Ministry of Physical Infrastructure and Transport has been entrusted with the job of looking into the issue. Nepal seems to focus seriously on enhancing connectivity in the region.

Pakistan

‘Shuttle’ diplomacy

Amid heightened tensions between Washington and Tehran following the assassination of former Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani in a US airstrike at the Bagdad airport, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, began a whirlwind shuttle diplomacy. In a of just six days, he visited Iran, Saudi Arabia and the US. After meeting Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and his Saudi counterpart Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, Qureshi stressed on "maximum restraint and immediate steps for de-escalation." From Riyadh, Qureshi visited the USA where he was scheduled to meet US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, National Security Advisor Robert O' Brien and other senior Trump administration officials in wake of recent escalation in Middle East and Gulf region.

PM invited for India SCO

The next Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, which will be hosted by India later this year, can break the ice between India and Pakistan. Both neighbours were given the full membership of the SCO during the Astana summit in 2017. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson has confirmed that “All eight countries and four observers will be invited”. The invitation to Pakistan under the SCO can help in the bilateral relations. After the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack in 2008, SCO became the forum for heads of both the neighboring countries to meet each other at Yekatrinburg in June 2009.

Death penalty annulled

On 13 January, the Lahore high court overturned the death sentence handed down to former Army chief and ex-President General Parvez Musharraf, by declaring the legal process of the special court “unconstitutional”. This came as a huge relief to the former President who is currently undergoing treatment in Dubai. The case lies in lieu as in November 2007, Gen Musharraf suspended the constitution and imposed emergency rule – sparking huge protests in Pakistan. He resigned in 2008 to avoid the threat of impeachment. When Nawaz Sharif, an old rival whom Musharraf deposed in the 1999 coup, was elected prime minister in 2013, he initiated a treason trial against Gen Musharraf

Sri Lanka

Indian NSA meets President

On a low-profile visit to Colombo, India’s National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval  met with President Gotabhaya Rajapaksa and discussed bilateral issues of mutual concern and interest. In a tweet, post-talks, President Rajapaksa said that they had a ‘cordial discussion’ and said, "Strengthening of bilateral cooperation on national security, intelligence sharing, maritime security and fostering of regional collaboration were some of the key points of discussion.” Doval is the second senior Indian official to visit Colombo after External Affairs Minister S Jaishankiar, after Gota became President and made New Delhi his maiden overseas destination in power – and during his visit, Doval reiterated earlier promises of defence cooperation between the two countries and India funding $ 50-m security equipment procurement. The meeting comes in the midst of high-level, Foreign Minister level Colombo visits from China and Russia, and by a middle-leverl American State Department official, and also ahead of President Gota’s China visit and Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa’s New Delhi visit, next month.

Bibliography

Afghanistan

Opinion Pieces

Jamshid Mohammadi, “Enraged Iran Up for asymmetric Warfare in Afghanistan”, The Khaama Press News Agency, 14 January 2020

Bangladesh

Opinion Pieces

Mostafiz Uddin, “Sustainable ‘costing’ can empower factory owners”, The Daily Star, 14 January 2020 Saleemul Huq, “Promoting South-South cooperation to tackle climate change”, The Daily Star, 15 January 2020

Bhutan

Opinion Pieces

Sangay Wangchuck, “What can we learn from current Australian bushfires”, Kuensel, 11 January 2020

Editorials

Kuensel, “Rethinking hiland development”, 16 January 2020 Kuensel, “Where are we going as a nation”, 15 January 2020

India

Opinion Pieces

Pulapre Balakrishnan, “The perils of RBI’s fixation on inflation”, The Hindu, 17 January 2020 Satish Deshpande, “Four years after Rohith Vemula died, the public university is still riddled with crises old and new”, The Indian Express, 17 January 2020 Prathama Banerjee, “Bhima Koregaon incident is a symbol of the long history of Dalit warriorship social mobility”, The Indian Express, 17 January 2020 Vidya Subrahmaniam, “Sparkling people, a spiritless Opposition”, The Hindu, 14 January 2020 Suhrith Parthasarathy & Gautam Bhatia, “The warp and weft of religious liberty”, The Hindu, 13 January 2020

 Editorials

The Indian Express, “Ministers in Valley”, 17 January 2020 The Indian Express, “Power replay”, 16 January 2020 The Hindu, “Theological thicket: On SC's hearing in Sabarimala temple case”, 15 January 2020 The Hindu, “Unhelpful combativeness: On concerns about CAA”, 14 January 2020 The Hindu, “Matter of interpretation: On NCRB’s Crime in India Report 2018”, 13 January 2020 The Hindu, “Eloquently reticent: On validity of J&K curbs”, 11 January 2020

Maldives

Opinion Pieces

Fathmath Shaahunaz, “Real estate – the new titan in development”, The Edition, 13 January 2020 Ahmed Aiham, “Flourishing seeds of Maldives guesthouse business”, The Edition, 9 January 2020

Myanmar

Opinion Pieces

Aung Zaw, “An Unstable, Weak Myanmar: China’s Strategic Goal?”, The Irrawaddy, 17 January 2020 Nan Lwin, “Infographics: Chinese Leaders’ Visits to Myanmar Over 6 Decades”, The Irrawaddy, 15 January 2020 Joe Kumbun, “Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Myanmar Trip Aimed at Pushing Beijing’s ‘Two-Ocean’ Strategy”, The Irrawaddy, 15 January 2020 Archana Atmakuri & Mustafa Izzuddin, “For India, There Are Many Reasons to Engage Myanmar”, The Irrawaddy, 11 January 2020

Nepal

Opinion Pieces

Gopal Thapa, “Making foreign policy dynamic”, Republica, 16 January 2020 Pramod Mishra, “Hope and despair in Nepal”, The Kathmandu Post, 16 January 2020 Pranab Kharel, “Is the party over?” Republica, 15 January 2020

Editorials

The Kathmandu Post, “Space for hire”, 16 January 2020 The Himalayan Times, “Ad hoc plan”, 16 January 2020

Pakistan

Opinion Pieces

Talat Masood “Dealing with global security challengesThe Express Tribune, 16 January 2020 Zahid Hussain “Banning booksDawn, 15 January 2020

Editorials

Admin-police tussle, Dawn, 17 January 2020. LHC’s verdict on treason case, Dawn, 15 January 2020.

Sri Lanka

Opinion Pieces

Rajeewa Jayaweera, “President’s policy statement and Sampanthan’s amnesia”, The Island, 19 January 2020 Rajan Philips, “Two-faced Government waiting for two-thirds majority, courtesy Ranil & Sirisena”, The Island, 19 January 2020 Kumar David, “Stop constitutional amendment”, The Island, 19 January 2020 M Jananayakam, “The Thirteenth Amendment”, The Island, 19 January 2020 K S Sivakumaran, “Unity in diversity under a Sri Lanka identity”, Daily Mirror Online, 18 January 2020 Capt G A Fernando, “A secular flag, a national pledge and the national anthem”, Daily Mirror Online, 18 January 2020 M S M Ayub, “Why only Ranjan?”, Daily Mirror Online, 17 January 2020 N Sathiya Moorthy, “Time running out for UNP old guard?”, Ceylon Today, 14 January 2020 Jehan Perera, “The peril of damning judges and law enforcement system”, The Island, 14 January 2020 N Sathiya Moorthy, “13-A, ‘impractical’ or what?”, Colombo Gazette, 13 January 2020

Interviews

Jamila Hussain, “Rajapaksas were elected by the people, not appointed: Namal”, Daily Mirror Online, 14 January 2020

Contributors

Afghanistan: Shubhangi Pandey Bangladesh: Joyeeta Bhattacharjee Bhutan: Mihir Bhonsale India: Ambar Kumar Ghosh Maldives & Sri Lanka: N Sathiya Moorthy Myanmar: Sreeparna Banerjee Nepal: Sohini Nayak Pakistan: Ayjaz Wani
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