On 20 January of this year, a privately-owned Sri Lankan daily newspaper reported that Colombo is open to playing a constructive role between India and the Maldives for the greater interest of regional peace. This development comes when the India-Maldives relationship has hit rock bottom with newly-elected Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu advocating for a pro-China policy. Sri Lanka’s recent interest in shuttle diplomacy underscores the country's growing intent and interest to play a proactive role in the Indian Ocean.
Sri Lanka’s desire to play a proactive role in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is not a new phenomenon. But, there has been a renewed push for the same under the Government of President Ranil Wickremesinghe. In September of last year (2023), the Senior National Security Advisor to the President unveiled a new vision for Sri Lanka towards the IOR. This renewed energy is a product of new domestic and external complexities and evolving security dynamics in the Indian Ocean.
Sri Lanka’s recent interest in shuttle diplomacy underscores the country's growing intent and interest to play a proactive role in the Indian Ocean.
Domestically, the economic crisis has been a moment of great awakening for Sri Lanka and its security calculus. It has indicated the nature of defence expenditure and the need for reforms to cope with the new and evolving security challenges. Non-traditional security challenges like food and energy security, have taken precedence as security concerns. There is an understanding that high inflation and supply chain disruptions caused by the Covid-19 outbreak and the Russia-Ukraine war have also contributed to economic hardships. For an economically-recovering Sri Lanka, it has thus become crucial to secure sea lanes of communication, ensure resilient supply chains, secure its exclusive economic zones from other countries and non-State actors, conduct high availability disaster recovery operations, limit illegal fishing and trafficking, and promote maritime security.
Externally, for Sri Lanka, a key Indian Ocean island nation, its strategic and security environment is rapidly changing. Today, the Indian Ocean is becoming a contested geography between several major powers due to its key maritime trade routes and resources. India, a resident power, is increasingly contesting against China. The United States (US) has renewed its interests in the country, and powers like France and Russia too are increasing their presence in the island nation. For Sri Lanka, which has promoted the Indian Ocean as a “zone of peace”, this evolving competition is putting its non-aligned foreign policy under severe stress. The recently imposed year-long ban on foreign research vessels is just one example of this increasing pressure. As a result, Sri Lanka is hoping to avert excessive pressure from major powers by maintaining a proactive presence in the Indian Ocean, strengthening its maritime capabilities, and focusing on maritime security.
The Indian Ocean is becoming a contested geography between several major powers due to its key maritime trade routes and resources. India, a resident power, is increasingly contesting against China.
To supplement these ambitions, the Ministry of Defence has appointed a board to review the initial National Security Policy and National Defence Policy of Sri Lanka. The Government has advocated for defence reforms through a comprehensive document called the Defence Review – 2030. This document aims to “outline the evolving security landscape in the IOR and set the course for Sri Lanka’s defence policy in the coming years”.
Some of the objectives in the defence policy are as follows: protecting lines of communication, strengthening partnerships and relations for regional and international security and stability, and strengthening the armed forces and “right-sizing” them. The Government has already begun its work on the latter. It is keen to reduce the number of personnel from 200,783 to 135,000 by the end of this year and then to 100,000 by 2030. In this process, the Army is believed to face a reduction of 100,000 personnel, while the Navy and the Air Force will be reduced by 30,000 and 20,000 each, respectively, thus indicating that these objectives seem to be nudging for a stronger Navy and Air Force to promote the country’s capabilities and posturing in the IOR.
In addition, Sri Lanka is already boosting its maritime capabilities vis-a-vis its partners like India and France. Through India, Sri Lanka is receiving two Dornier aircraft, and setting up a maritime rescue coordination centre and a floating dock facility. Sri Lanka has also joined India’s Information Fusion Centre – IOR. These initiatives will help Colombo in monitoring its airspace, surveillance, search and rescue missions, disaster response operations, and protecting its Exclusive Economic Zone. With France, Sri Lanka is building a regional maritime safety and security training school.
Besides these slow-growing capabilities, Sri Lanka has also commenced to gesture its willingness to play a proactive role in the Indian Ocean. Its decision to deploy its offshore patrol vessel in the Red Sea as a part of the US-led Operation “Prosperity Guardian” is an indication of this gesture. The crisis in the Red Sea provides some opportunity for the Government to secure its supply chains and evade inflation through its maritime capabilities and posturing. This decision, as former Chief of Naval Staff, retired Rear Admiral Y.N. Jayaratna remarked, could be an opportunity for the Sri Lanka Navy to extend their operational interest in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Yemen. This flexing and posturing in the distant parts of the Indian Ocean have likely motivated the Government to commit to the Operation despite political criticism, high operational costs (more than Rs. 250 million), risks of upsetting Iran and joining a US-led Operation when even Western allies are hesitating to participate.
The crisis in the Red Sea provides some opportunity for the Government to secure its supply chains and evade inflation through its maritime capabilities and posturing.
Closer to home, Sri Lanka is trying to influence its immediate maritime security architecture. Sri Lanka’s anticipation of sour India-Maldives relations was also discussed in the bilateral closed-door negotiations between Muizzu and President Wickremesinghe during the former’s inaugural ceremony. Speaking to an Indian media channel, President Wickremesinghe stated: “Maldives needs their help, and India should not abandon them. Even Muizzu needs India.” Now, as India-Maldives relations have worsened with Muizzu advocating for close relations with China, calling India a “bully” and negotiating a US Dollars 37 million deal with Turkey to import drones, Sri Lanka is attempting to mediate. It is reported that during the recent Non-Aligned Movement summit, Foreign Affairs Minister, President’s Counsel M.U.M. Ali Sabry stressed the need for regional peace and stability with his Maldivian counterpart, and President Wickremesinghe allegedly discussed the tensions between India and the Maldives with the Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar.
For Sri Lanka, its immediate neighbours, India and the Maldives, are crucial to mitigating, cooperating, and countering maritime challenges and threats. As a result, in the immediate aftermath of the civil war, Sri Lanka joined New Delhi and Male for the trilateral coastguard exercise “Dosti”. Further, the three countries also formalised the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC), which halted as tensions between India and the Maldives exacerbated since 2015. It was only in 2020 that the CSC received fresh energy. Since then, CSC members have collaborated and cooperated on maritime security and safety, countering terrorism and radicalisation, trafficking and transnational crime, cyber security and critical infrastructure protection, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response. However, the Maldives’ absence from the last CSC meeting and its latest anti-Indian tilt will likely hinder this cooperation and collaboration. Sri Lanka also fears that an overt anti-India posturing by the Maldives could involve other external players and harm its desire to maintain the IOR as a “zone of peace". Therefore, it is attempting to play a mediating role and further shape and influence the security architecture.
CSC members have collaborated and cooperated on maritime security and safety, countering terrorism and radicalisation, trafficking and transnational crime, cyber security and critical infrastructure protection, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response.
Given its interest and intent, Sri Lanka is undertaking a proactive role in the Indian Ocean through diverse means. But, for a slowly recovering Sri Lanka, there is a significant mismatch between its ambitions and resources. On a positive note however, it is perhaps for the first time that a post-war government is acting (and not just speaking) on maritime security and a strategic and firmer presence in the Indian Ocean. And, one can only hope that this commitment persists, regardless of who is elected to power later this year.
This commentary originally appaered in The Morning.
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Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow with ORFs Strategic Studies Programme. He focuses on broader strategic and security related-developments throughout the South Asian region ...
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