By bringing China and Russia into the region and by developing strategic partnerships with important players such as India, Riyadh is signalling its intent to reduce its dependence on the US. Mohammed bin Salman is looking at a policy of multi-alignment that affords greater strategic autonomy.
There’s a remarkable new energy in Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy that has brought the country back to the centre stage of regional politics and is rapidly re-arranging the geopolitical map of West Asia. A team led by Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud and National Security Adviser Musaad bin Mohammed Al Aiban is giving shape to a distinctly non-ideological approach to the foreign policy that is driven by ‘Vision 2030’ outlined by Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and is now attracting the attention of top diplomats and analysts alike.
That’s a far cry from the position barely five years ago when the brutal murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Ahmad Khashoggi in Istanbul had put the country under the spotlight and MBS was accused by the West of impetuously dragging his country into the quagmire in Yemen.
The agreement signed by Saudi Arabia with arch enemy Iran in Beijing on March 10 to reopen embassies within two months was, perhaps, the most high-profile diplomatic move.
Two years of quiet, painstaking negotiations in Iraq and Oman and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Riyadh in December 2022 paved the way for China becoming a successful mediator in the agreement. It is worth remembering that this is the third time in less than four decades that diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran were ruptured and then restored. The antipathy between them goes beyond the ancient rift between the Shia and the Sunni strains of Islam, although Tehran’s proclivity to incite the Shia community in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon does give rise to legitimate fears that Iran is trying to create a ‘Shia crescent’ that would destabilise the Sunni monarchies of the Gulf.
< style="color: #0069a6">Equipped with Iranian drones and missiles, they have been able to strike oil facilities and targets in Saudi Arabia and drive home the real and present danger of asymmetric warfare.
The Houthis in Yemen are predominantly drawn from the Zaydi Shia community and Iran’s financial, technical and military support has been crucial in turning their ragtag militia into a formidable fighting force that not only ousted the government of then President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi from capital Sanaa in 2015, but also enabled the Houthis to establish control over the northern half of the country. Equipped with Iranian drones and missiles, they have been able to strike oil facilities and targets in Saudi Arabia and drive home the real and present danger of asymmetric warfare.
For Riyadh, an acceptable outcome in Yemen is one of the key takeaways from the rapprochement with Iran and it will now expect China to use its leverage on Tehran to bring about a modicum of resolution — at least to the Saudi-Houthi dimension of the conflict in Yemen. If it works, Riyadh would have the satisfaction of getting two monkeys off its back with one accord. With the ceasefire in Yemen being extended and prisoners being exchanged by the Saudis and Houthis, the initial signs inspire hope, but there are plenty of other factors that could put a ner in the works.
Beyond Iran and Yemen, there are several other significant initiatives over the last couple of years that merit a mention. The Al-Ula Accord reached in Saudi Arabia in January 2021 on the sidelines of the Gulf Cooperation Council summit brought an end to a debilitating dispute between Qatar and an Arab quartet, comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Bahrain; relations with Turkiye, which were strained following Ankara’s support to the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt in 2012 and had reached their nadir in the wake of the Khashoggi murder in 2019, have seen a remarkable upturn. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Jeddah in April 2022 to embrace MBS and bury the hatchet with the hope that a normalisation would not only bring Saudi investments into the flagging Turkish economy but also allow Turkish contractors to participate in Saudi Arabia’s lucrative construction boom.
Recognising the reality that Arab and western efforts to bring down the government of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria have failed miserably, Riyadh wants to offer an economic carrot that might prevent the regime from getting into a tighter embrace with Iran. Russia flagged its own influence by hosting talks between the Saudi and Syrian delegations in Moscow, leading to a visit by the Syrian Foreign Minister to Riyadh on April 12, followed by the Saudi Foreign Minister’s visit to Damascus six days later. The first high-level contacts in a decade have led to speculation that diplomatic ties may be restored soon.
< style="color: #0069a6">With the ceasefire in Yemen being extended and prisoners being exchanged by the Saudis and Houthis, the initial signs inspire hope, but there are plenty of other factors that could put a ner in the works.
Saudi Arabia is also reassessing its position towards Iraq and Lebanon and even towards Israel and we may hear more on this in the coming months.
These are deliberate moves, executed diligently over the last two years and probably driven by at least three distinct, inter-connected factors. First, MBS has clearly articulated in his ‘Vision 2030’ that he wants to make his country a global investment powerhouse that will leverage “our unique strategic location into a global hub connecting three continents — Asia, Europe and Africa. Our geographic position between key global waterways makes the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia an epicentre of trade and the gateway to the world.” But achieving this objective requires a relentless focus on the economy and a conscious effort of the kind being seen today to resolve intra-regional conflicts that are a drain on the country’s energy and financial resources.
Second, by bringing China and Russia into the region and by developing strategic partnerships with important players such as India, Riyadh is signalling its intent to reduce its dependence on the US. This does not mean that the US will stop being the preferred security partner for Saudi Arabia or indeed for other countries in the Gulf. But it does mean that like India and several other middle powers, MBS is also looking at a policy of multi-alignment that affords much greater strategic autonomy.
Third, the emphasis of ‘Vision 2030’ on moderation in Islam puts out a clear message that the foreign policy would be driven by considerations of pragmatism, national interest and realpolitik and not by fuzzy notions of fealty to an amorphous Islamic ummah.
Each of these elements provides a strong rationale for a closer engagement between Riyadh and New Delhi. This is visible in the emerging defence and security cooperation, in Saudi Arabia’s unwillingness to buy Pakistan’s line on Jammu and Kashmir and in the potential for much-larger Saudi investments in India. The fact that this year’s IPL billboards feature both Aramco and ‘Visit Saudi Arabia’ is, perhaps, a harbinger of a much more dynamic relationship.
This commentary originally appeared in The Tribune.
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