Introduction 

Most contemporary analysts appear to agree that the United States’ (US) ‘unipolar moment’ has passed.^[1] There are differing opinions, however, as to whether another bipolarity is emerging, such as between the US and China, or some other variant of a multipolar order.^[2] The different configurations of global power brings challenges of varying degrees and character, which in turn raise the risk of wars and other crises. This creates issues for the US-led liberal international order (LIO) and sets the stage for a shift in the balance of power and its distribution among state actors in the international system.^[a]

Four states commonly described at present as ‘revisionist’—i.e., China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK)—represent four varied (sub)geographies; among them, two (China and Russia) are in strategic alignment. The observed behaviour of the CRINK states, either on their own or in convergence with each other, carries serious implications for the evolution and maintenance of the LIO.

In the past decade, the China-Russia alignment as a fulcrum of the CRINK-centred network has materialised. Chinese President Xi Jinping has consolidated the broad contours of an alternative worldview of a mutually beneficial cooperation to conceptualise a different model for the conduct of international relations.^[3] This sowed the seeds of the 21^st-century revisionism which gradually became a loose nexus among the CRINK states. Beginning in 2022, Russia’s war against Ukraine served as an inflection point for the revisionist states to undertake policies with more consequential outcomes against the already challenged position of the US in the post-unipolarity phase.

Against this backdrop, this special report scrutinises the question: How do revisionist states behave during times of crisis? Indeed, amidst the uncertainty brought about by crises, states can create opportunities for themselves, too. Among the revisionist actors, it is ambition that fundamentally drives their behaviour—i.e., their quest for change in the current global order.

The articles in this report are guided by the framework of ‘systems theory’,^[b] which views a particular system as having its own sub-elements that also, on their own, influence the entire system—i.e., a “system of systems”. An international order is thus a constituent product of different functions constituting an “order of orders”. These numerous functions result in sub-orders—namely, military order, information order, political order, economic order, nuclear order, maritime order, and technological order. Certain analysts posit that an order and its analysis  encompasses “an order’s creation, consolidation and decline.”^[4]

An international order is therefore subject to influence due to changes in the policies and approaches of the key actors, with implications for the equilibrium of power and the structure of the international system. The analyses presented in this report encompass the activities, threats, opportunities, and challenges either being created or exploited by the revisionist states to pursue their respective and collective ambitions.

The world thus faces a dilemma: while a more effective international order is urgently needed, it is becoming more difficult to come to an agreement on the basic principles, norms, and rules that will guide such cooperation. Indeed, all concepts of international order, regardless of who promotes them, are contested as a result of power shifts and power diffusion.^[5]

This report studies the behaviour of the CRINK states by analysing not the actors, but the processes and functions. It is divided in eight chapters. 

Chapter 1 identifies the ideological convergence that forms the basis for a growing alignment among the CRINK states. This new alignment is centred around the political understanding among the leaders of the CRINK states that is also manifesting in the military domain. The political alignment also shapes the contours of their economic and governance-related convergence.

Chapter 2 delves into the logic of economic cooperation flowing from the political understanding among the CRINK states—that of creating alternative mechanisms against the trade wars and tariffs from the US to reconfigure global geoeconomics. Platforms like BRICS, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) exemplify the concerted efforts of these revisionist states to challenge the dominance of the decades-old Bretton Woods framework. 

Chapter 3 underscores how military power—generally the last resort and ultimate arbiter in international politics—is undergoing a transition. The consolidation of military power by revisionist states—challenging the regional order in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia—is having the effect of normalising the threat or use of force in the nuclear environment. This behaviour raises the risk of escalation and challenges regional peace and order across geographies.

Chapter 4 decodes how the nuclear order is moving towards a state of disorder. State postures, including Russia’s TNW-based sabre-rattling and policies more inclined towards brinkmanship and warfighting, bring a massive challenge for escalation management and deterrence. The idea of arms control amidst lack of trust in the US-Russia dyad has come to an end. China’s modernising arsenal, North Korean brinkmanship, and the Iranian challenge to the non-proliferation regime comprise the structural challenges to the existing nuclear order. 

Chapter 5 unpacks how the CRINK nexus is disrupting the information order, particularly in cyberspace, due to the lack of institutionalisation of norms for managing technological advances. Cyberspace has thus become a zone of operations for the revisionist states to target and manipulate democratic processes to undermine these countries’ institutions and weaken cohesion within societies. Such deliberate “cyber (dis)order” erodes trust and risks fragmenting the global information order. Both normative and institutionalised efforts are required to mitigate this challenge.

Chapter 6 underscores how the great-power competition in the 21^st-century has increasingly shifted to the high seas. The revisionist states, especially China, have adopted an assertive maritime posture underpinned by A2/AD technological capabilities. Through sustained naval signalling, large-scale exercises, and strategic access to overseas ports, Beijing and others are aiming to consolidate influence and secure control over critical sea lanes. Consequently, long-standing norms of freedom of navigation and open connectivity have become targets of coercive, infrastructure-linked policies, reflecting a broader contest over access, mobility, and maritime governance.

Chapter 7 focuses on institutions that form the bedrock of the liberal international order. However, the ideational contestations of the CRINK front on issues of global governance, marked by the quest for change in the institutional frameworks and coordinated measures to bypass norms and processes, have become the new reality. Since the war in Ukraine, these revisionist states have defied UN sanctions, thereby undermining institutional mechanisms. 

Chapter 8 outlines how high-end technological leaps in artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum, and their associated supply chains, have become a new arena of inter-state contestations. The CRINK states have formed an alignment to support R&D and innovation measures in the domain of critical technologies to achieve autonomy and simultaneously challenge the historical tech dominance of the West. This has implications for export controls, regulation, as well as governance frameworks related to technology.

This report finds, overall, that there remains an element of ambiguity among CRINK states, impeding a complete convergence against the prevailing international order. It argues that there are limits to the multi-dimensional front that the revisionist states are attempting to create, due to the lack of both will and capabilities. At the same time, however, mitigating the new and more complex challenges facing the liberal international order will not be an easy task. The US, its allies, and like-minded partners are under more pressure than ever to find effective solutions to the current elements of disorder.

Read the report here.  

Harsh V Pant is Vice-President, Observer Research Foundation.

Rahul Rawat is Research Assistant, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.

Endnotes

^[a]  The international system is concerned largely with how states behave and interact with each other, primarily defined by the lack of a central authority. The system is thus anarchic in nature. The international structure primarily includes organising principles and the distribution of power based on configurations resulting in polarity (unipolarity, bipolarity or multipolarity). The international order is about the rules, norms, and institutions shaped by the existing structure which helps consolidate a wide legitimacy in behaviour and, therefore, predictability among states.

^[b] The Systems approach is the study of inter-related variables forming one system, a unit, a whole which is composed of many facts, a set of elements standing in interaction. This approach assumes that the system consists of discernible, regular and internally consistent patterns, each interacting with another, and giving, on the whole, the picture of a self-regulating order. It is, thus, the study of a set of interactions occurring within, and yet analytically distinct from, the larger system.

^[1] Jennifer Lind, “Back to Bipolarity: How China's Rise Transformed the Balance of Power,” International Security, Vol 49 No 2 (2024); 7–55. DOI. 

139. Kupchan, “Bipolarity is Back: Why It Matters,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol 44 No 4 (2021), 123–139.

^[2] Emma Ashford and Evan Cooper, “Yes, the World Is Multipolar: And That Isn’t Bad for the United States,” Foreign Policy, October 3, 2023.

^[3] MoFA, “Follow the Trend of the Times and Promote Peace and Development in the World: Speech by Xi Jinping at Moscow State Institute of International Relations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’s Republic of China, March 23, 2013.

^[4] William Walker, A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order, (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 14.

^[5] Hanns W. Maull, “The Rise and Decline of the Post-Cold War International Order,” Hanns W. Maull, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 3.

• International Affairs
• crink alliance
• crink countries
• crink states
• russia china relations
• united states unipolar moment
• us unipolar moment

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