Myanmar is ill-equipped to handle growing COVID-19 caseload on its own — it requires external help.
As may be recalled, China is where the pandemic emerged with the toll put at 83,305. Incidentally, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Myanmar while the virus containment initiatives were ongoing, back home. The visit was aimed at cementing bilateral relations further. However, amidst the current crisis, it’s important to re-assess how the relationship may unfold in the days to come.
Till a week back, Myanmar had reported only a handful of cases with no trace of the virus migrating from China. This may be partly since the Hubei province, where the pandemic epicentre Wuhan is located, does not border Myanmar. Also, both the regions have less business dealings.
However, a constant factor that stands tall amidst this humongous crisis is not to offend or annoy the heavy-weighted neighbour while it was facing its critical period. This move has been quite visible while receiving President Xi in Naypyidaw on 18 January. Myanmar’s State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi consciously avoided the topic of the new virus so as not to put her guest in an embarrassing position.
A few days later, Myanmar President U Win Myint sent a message of support to Xi Jinping, praising the merits of “Xi’s able leadership and those of China’s advanced medical technology.” As a goodwill gesture, Tatmadaw even supplied protective equipment to assist China in its tussle against the novel coronavirus outbreak.
While the number of cases and deaths within the country begins to rise, the government has been extremely discreet in highlighting that its COVID-19 cases were imported mainly from France, the US, the UK, Australia, Singapore, Switzerland, South Korea and Thailand. The rest, the government maintained, were locally transmitted. It has till now successfully dodged the question of the virus spreading into Myanmar from China.
This may seem true as of now. However, under-reporting of cases due to low testing and the country’s weak healthcare structure remains a major concern. In a recent video broadcast, the State Counsellor’s focus was entirely towards migrant workers returning from Bangkok and the apprehension over subsequent rise in the number of cases.
However, the government has delicately forgotten about a large number of migrant labourers working in Chinese industries. Some of them have since returned home. Some among the returnees have been stranded for the customary quarantine period of 14 days on roads outside Shan state without proper accommodation, food or healthcare.
Myanmar’s constant emphasis on China being a ‘good friend’ of the nation has been apparent and discussed. There may be three suitable reasons for this. First, the prolonged conflicts and the chronic under-investment in the healthcare sector within Myanmar have led to a gradual deterioration of health service infrastructure, inadequate and unreliable supplies of essential medicines and equipment, and a shortage and mal-distribution of health workers.
All this have translated into a rapid decline in both the availability and the quality of health services. The country has 61 doctors per 100,000 people and 1.1 critical beds per 100,000 people, falling short of WHO basic standard recommendations. There is just one laboratory in the country, with another under construction that has the capacity for conducting COVID-19 tests.
With the result, the country is ill-equipped to handle growing case-load on its own. Thus, Myanmar requires external help. China, which has been successful in controlling the virus, can provide proper resources, equipment and guidance to the otherwise less-prepared nation to fight the novel disease.
Second, as the largest trading partner and source of accumulative FDI in Myanmar, China has a vital role to play in the former’s economy. The investments from China are instrumental for the well-being of the nation amidst such trying times.
Myanmar understands that it remains vital to President Xi’s “One Belt One Road” project. Access to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar would decrease Beijing’s heavy reliance on the narrow and vulnerable Strait of Malacca for its imports. More specifically, the land holds the key to meeting China’s energy needs. The nation may leverage this opportunity to fulfill its economic and strategic needs to up its game in the regional forum.
Furthermore, China has been a sympathetic ‘friend’ and catalyst to mitigate the tarnished image of Myanmar on the human rights front. It has provided the strategy to deal with over 700,000 Rohingyas, now living as refugees in neighbouring Bangladesh, in the wake of bloodshed and brutal violence. The recent ICJ ruling has gone against Myanmar and thus maintaining fruitful relation with the dragon nation must be its aim.
After recovering from the early shocks of the pandemic, China has set foot to reclaim its regional hold. Keeping its sight on the progression of the BRI in the last week of March, China has announced $6.78 million in aid to Myanmar, for 22 projects under the Beijing-led initiative Mekong-Lancang Cooperation.
In addition, to increase border trade, custom clearances in Yunnan province and other border trading posts have been eased so that goods from Myanmar are able to pass into China more efficiently. On 17 March, after weeks of supply chain disruptions, China Enterprises Chamber of Commerce arranged to send 15 tonnes of textile and garment raw material to Yangon by chartered flight. On the health front, few Chinese health experts have reached Myanmar last week to help the country with its COVID-19 cases.
While it cannot be denied that China has a major footprint in Myanmar, both in trade and investment, but so does other partners like Japan as well as India. This provides Myanmar a significant degree of manoeuvrability, provided the country sustains and revives from the current crisis. Yet it will be vital to see how the current pandemic pans out.
This commentary originally appeared in South Asia Weekly.
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Sreeparna Banerjee is a Junior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation Kolkata with the Strategic Studies Programme.
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