Introduction

India has been steadfast in its commitment to non-proliferation: to not engage in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems to other states and non-state actors. Its relationship with international non-proliferation regimes, however, has not been without challenges, including with the export control regimes designed to serve the same objectives. Over the last decade, this relationship has changed dramatically. From once being a target of these mechanisms, India is now becoming an active participant. This improvement has been a result of better understanding between India and the international non-proliferation community on the country’s role in the global cause. The global non-proliferation community has come to realise that it stands to gain by having in its fold a responsible power with advanced technologies such as India.

NSG coordinates export controls on items which can be used to build nuclear weapons directly, listed in its Trigger List, and indirectly, listed in its Dual-Use List. MTCR coordinates export controls on items, listed in its Annex, which can be used in the development of systems that can be used to deliver WMD. AG maintains Common Control Lists that include items which could be used to develop chemical and biological weapons. WA, meanwhile, coordinates controls on exports of munitions and dual-use items and technology. Coordination of export controls and their implementation by members of these regimes are voluntarily done. These regimes function on consensus and are voluntary associations that do not have any mechanism to ensure compliance by their members to the export control guidelines issued by them.

India has since the 1950s acknowledged the need to control exports of sensitive items, unchecked transfer of which could have been destabilising for the international order. While India set up export controls on various categories of these items separately, it was in the 1990s that it decided to merge all of its export control policies and practices under one roof. This was accompanied by efforts to bring them in line with the international best practices on export controls. Simultaneously, the US government, as one of the key founding members of these regimes, recognised the role India could play in strengthening these regimes. With integrating India into the global non-proliferation architecture as one of the objectives, Washington initiated civil nuclear cooperation with New Delhi, which led to altering of the global rules of engagement on nuclear commerce with the latter. This was captured in the waiver that India got from NSG in 2008, in particular on sections 4 (a), 4 (b) and 4 (c) of the NSG guidelines – granted only to nuclear weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Having accomplished the first stage of India’s integration into the global non-proliferation architecture, both India and the US identified New Delhi’s accession to the four export control regimes as the next logical step in completing the integration process. India’s interest in becoming member to these export control regimes is multi-faceted. Membership to these regimes would reflect India as a “like-minded” partner on issues of non-proliferation. It would allow New Delhi to proactively contribute to global efforts on managing threats of proliferation of WMDs. Meanwhile, by joining these regimes, India will be in a better position to negotiate trade of sensitive items from supplier countries who are also members of these regimes.

India’s entry into these export control regimes will be significant for the global non-proliferation architecture for a couple of reasons. Firstly, given that India has in the past been one of the targets of these regimes, in particular the NSG and MTCR, India’s accession would reflect a major change in both India’s and these regimes’ approach to each other. Secondly, if India gets into the NSG, it will be the only member of the Group which will not be a signatory to the NPT.

There are technical parameters which India will be required to meet in order to join these regimes. These include harmonisation of its national export control list with the lists issued by these regimes and adherence to their guidelines through its national export control system, among others. Apart from these technical requirements, there exist political challenges to India’s entry addressing which will be important in facilitating India’s accession. Much of these political challenges emerge from the fact that India is not a signatory to the NPT, especially with the case of India’s membership to the NSG. An objective assessment of the relationship between the NPT and the NSG is important in addressing these political challenges. Also important would be to weigh the implications and benefits of India’s inclusion for these regimes.

In this context, it is important to highlight the various steps New Delhi has already taken. As part of the US-India nuclear deal, India undertook separation of its nuclear facilities, placed its civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, ratified Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, tightened the domestic export control regimes, reviewed and updated its Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technology (SCOMET) list to harmonise with those of the export control regimes. Additionally, India has joined the Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, which not only goes to directly impact India’s membership application to MTCR, but also, at a broader level, creates a positive momentum as member countries consider India’s inclusion into the other three regimes.

This report attempts to objectively assess the prospects of India’s inclusion to the export control regimes. It begins by analysing the technical parameters for membership and whether India already meets or not. This includes an examination of India’s domestic export control system – both control list and legal framework. The following chapter delves into the political debates on India’s membership to the four export control regimes. This takes into consideration the objections that a few members of these regimes raise to India’s accession. The report finally lays out a set of recommendations for the Indian government as well as member countries of these regimes on both technical and political factors assessed, consideration of which could facilitate India’s entry into the export control regimes.

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• India

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