India’s Nuclear Revolution, 25 Years after Pokhran

This piece is part of the series, 25 Years Since Pokhran II: Reviewing India’s Nuclear Odyssey

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On 11^th May 1998, India declared itself a nuclear weapon state by conducting a series of nuclear weapon tests in the Thar desert. Under Nehru and Homi Bhabha, India laid the foundation of an elaborate nuclear science programme in 1948, just a year after its independence. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion in May 1974. Yet, India took almost five decades to embrace nuclear weapons. No other country in the history of the nuclear age gestated on its nuclear weapon-making potential for so long. India’s conscientious forbearance of the nuclear option did not also result in any material or diplomatic gain. The guardians of the global nuclear order – primarily the Western countries led by the US – remained suspicious of India’s ultimate nuclear intentions, resulting in heavy technological sanctions on its nuclear and defence industries. It also failed to limit the nuclear programs of its adversaries. In the 1960s, China was included as a nuclear weapon state in the non-proliferation treaty; in the 1970s and 80s, Pakistan developed its nuclear weapons program by pilfering technology and material from the West. China also abetted Pakistan’s nuclear program. Under duress, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi ordered the weaponisation of India’s nuclear deterrent in 1989. Yet, New Delhi was unprepared to embrace its nuclear status fully, given its decades-old diplomacy for nuclear disarmament. India’s nuclear ambiguity only symbolised its hesitation to behave like a normal state in international politics: one which acknowledges power and interests as fundamental drivers of the state’s security and foreign policy. The 1998 nuclear weapons tests unshackled India from the idealism of its international relations.

The guardians of the global nuclear order – primarily the Western countries led by the US – remained suspicious of India’s ultimate nuclear intentions, resulting in heavy technological sanctions on its nuclear and defence industries.

An explicit self-acknowledgement of India’s nuclear weapon status first helped break the inertia of its foreign policy idealism and the psychological constraints imposed by its secretive nuclear weapons programme. India was now ready to engage with the world as a nuclear weapon state, even when the world may have refused to treat India as such. Second, the nuclear tests were a blessing in disguise for India-US relations, its most critical bilateral relationship. If India’s nuclear ambiguity sputtered hopes in Washington DC that New Delhi would eventually relent to its non-proliferation agenda, New Delhi viewed American non-proliferation advocacy as a significant roadblock in its rise in the global order. The tests liberated India of its self-imposed restraints and allowed the US to move beyond its non-proliferation agenda. Not without reason, therefore, within a decade of the 1998 nuclear weapons tests, it achieved three primary diplomatic objectives. During the Kargil War, India’s responsible and restrained nuclear behaviour laid the foundation of the India-US strategic partnership and the dehyphenation of India from Pakistan in America’s South Asia policy. Second, India’s rise as an economic and military power raised its stature as an Asian powerhouse, in league with China. Even today, among all US allies and strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific, only India is a nuclear weapon power. Third, the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal of 2008 recognised India as a de facto nuclear-weapon state. New Delhi also faces some significant challenges as it celebrates the 25 years of its nuclear assertion. India’s responsible nuclear behaviour was built on the edifice of its nuclear restraint. This restraint was visible in both nuclear strategy and the growth of its nuclear arsenal. The doctrine of no first use and massive retaliation, which guides India’s nuclear deterrent, has failed to impress Pakistan’s use of sub-conventional warfare under the shadow of its nuclear arsenal. The continuous invocation of nuclear exchange also forced India into a shell, unable to respond to many Pakistani provocations, whether the Parliament attack in 2001 or the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The growing asymmetry in military power on the Himalayan border with China has also led some in India’s strategic community to suggest relinquishing of the doctrine of no first use.

India’s rise as an economic and military power raised its stature as an Asian powerhouse, in league with China.

Second, even when India has made rapid strides in developing a nuclear triad of delivery vehicles, the technological development of its nuclear force remains short of providing her with a credible second-strike capability vis-à-vis China. Changing the doctrine to the first use of nuclear weapons will not resolve India’s predicament with Pakistan and China. Nuclear weapons will not provide any tactical or strategic advantage on the border vis-à-vis China. Any use of nuclear weapons in the mountain passes will not only be highly hazardous, given that India is a lower riparian state but will invoke a strategic response from China, a more capable nuclear power. Moreover, India-China military contingency will mostly be restricted to grey zone operations or limited wars. The only answer is beefing up India’s conventional military force on the border to increase the costs of China’s opportunism. With regards to Pakistan, India should be more willing to use conventional military options and call out Pakistan’s nuclear bluff and bluster. Since the 1998 nuclear weapon tests in South Asia, India’s military restraint resulted partially from the fear of a conventional military crisis escalating into a nuclear one. The 2016 surgical strikes and the Balakot attacks have given enough empirical evidence to shatter the prevalent belief that even limited military engagement in South Asia would eventually lead to a nuclear war.

With regards to Pakistan, India should be more willing to use conventional military options and call out Pakistan’s nuclear bluff and bluster.

Lastly, even after 25 years of Pokhran, India is still building a credible second-strike capability vis-à-vis China. The deployment of Agni-V, India’s first intercontinental-range ballistic missile, is a significant upgradation in the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. However, the third leg of its nuclear force – its SSBN fleet – is still immature: the boats are underpowered and under-armed. Until and unless India develops, demonstrates and deploys a capability to target most of the Chinese territory through SSBN, which can safely operate in the Southern Indian Ocean and launch submarine-launched ICBMs targeting the entire Chinese territory, India’s second-strike capability will lack credibility. China’s modernisation of its nuclear forces will only add to India’s imperative. Along with the 1991 economic reforms, the 1998 nuclear weapons tests opened the pathway to India’s rise as a global power. India’s diplomatic gains have been substantial. However, the need to absorb the nuclear revolution in its military strategy is still a work in progress.

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This commentary originally appeared in Hindustan Times.

• International Affairs
• Nuclear Security
• China
• India
• Neighbourhood
• Pakistan
• USA and Canada
• Global Nuclear Order
• India-US relations
• nuclear deterrent
• nuclear tests
• Nuclear weapons
• Pokhran
• technological sanctions

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