Introduction

The evolution of India’s ‘Look East’ policy in the early 1990s to ‘Act East’ in 2014 signalled a pivotal expansion from a focus on economic cooperation to embracing strategic partnerships as well, amidst Southeast Asia’s growing geopolitical significance. The Act East policy extended India’s regional focus beyond trade to encompass security cooperation, infrastructure development, and people-to-people connectivity.

With the policy entering its 10^th year in 2024, the Modi 3.0 administration has demonstrated a renewed emphasis on Southeast Asia through unprecedented diplomatic outreach. Such intensification serves multiple strategic objectives: countering China’s regional influence; securing vital sea lanes; and advancing India’s vision of a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific. The policy is not merely diplomatic rhetoric but represents a comprehensive framework guiding India’s regional engagements.

India’s Southeast Asian strategy recognises the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the institutional foundation of regional architecture. India has systematically deepened its institutional ties with ASEAN through multiple mechanisms, such as the following:

• ASEAN-India Summit: This annual summit serves as the apex platform for policy direction, with Modi’s attendance at the 21^st ASEAN-India Summit in Vientiane, Laos, in October 2024, reinforcing India’s commitment.
• ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): India utilises this platform to address regional security challenges, particularly maritime security and terrorism.
• East Asia Summit (EAS): India’s active participation in this forum emphasises its role in broader Indo-Pacific strategic dialogues.
• ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+): Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s presence at the November 2024 ADMM+ meeting in Vientiane highlighted India’s security engagement with the region.

The Modi 3.0 administration has also emphasised ASEAN centrality through concrete initiatives. At the ASEAN-India Summit, Modi outlined 10 suggestions to enhance connectivity and resilience that included trade facilitation and the institutionalisation of a cyber policy dialogue.^[1]

Regional Initiatives in Southeast Asia Beyond ASEAN

India has supplemented its ASEAN-centred approach with sub-regional initiatives that address specific geographic and functional priorities. The following are some examples:

• Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC): This initiative, focused on the countries along the Mekong River (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) has seen renewed momentum with the establishment of an MGC Business Council during the 12^th MGC Ministerial Meeting in July 2023. The MGC will also explore new areas of development through Quick Impact Projects, an Indian initiative to build low-cost (below US$50,000) high-utility, high-visibility projects.^[2]

• Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI): Launched by Modi in 2019, this framework has attracted Southeast Asian partners, building on India’s broader vision for the Indo-Pacific region, and designed to foster cooperation among like-minded countries to address common challenges and opportunities in the maritime domain.^[3]

• Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC): This platform connecting South Asia and Southeast Asia has gained prominence in India’s strategy, with focused working groups on security, connectivity, and trade. The fifth BIMSTEC summit in March 2022 finalised a charter for the platform, along with the BIMSTEC Transport Connectivity Master Plan.^[4] In April 2025, the sixth summit took place in Bangkok, which resulted in the adoption of the BIMSTEC Bangkok Vision 2030, the first such vision document of the grouping that lays out a comprehensive roadmap for future cooperation.^[5]

These multilateral frameworks provide India with flexible platforms to advance regional cooperation while addressing specific geographic priorities. They reflect the strategic diversity of India’s Southeast Asian engagement.

Bilateral Engagements: A Thematic Analysis

In less than a year since PM Modi began his third term, India has had numerous bilateral engagements with Southeast Asian nations (see Table 1).

Table 1: India-Southeast Asia High-Level Diplomatic and Military Engagements (July 2024-January 2025)

Country	Head of State/Government Visits	Ministerial-Level Visits	Senior Official Meetings
Brunei	Aug 2024: PM Modi visits Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei.	-	-
Cambodia	-	-	Dec 2024: Inaugural joint exercise of Indian and Cambodian armies held in Pune, called CINBAX, with counterterrorism as the focus.
Indonesia	Jan 2025: Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto visits New Delhi as chief guest for India’s Republic Day celebrations.	Oct 2024: India’s Minister of State for External Affairs, Pabitra Margherita, visits Jakarta to attend President Subianto’s inauguration ceremony.	Aug 2024: India and Indonesia hold the 6th joint working group on counterterrorism in Jakarta. Sept 2024: The two countries hold their 8th Foreign Office Consultations in New Delhi. Nov 2024: Indian and Indonesian navies conduct the Garud Shakti Special Forces Exercise at Cijantung, Jakarta. Dec 2024: India’s Chief of Naval Staff, Dinesh Kumar Tripathi, visits Jakarta. Dec 2024: The Indian and Indonesian navies hold their 43rd Coordinated Patrol at Sabang, Aceh.
Laos	Oct 2024: PM Modi attends the 21st ASEAN-India summit in Vientiane; meets Laotian President Thongloun Sisoulith and Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone.	Nov 2024: Defence Minister Rajnath Singh attends the ADMM+ meeting in Vientiane.	-
Malaysia	Aug 2024: Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim visits New Delhi, India-Malaysia ties elevated to a Comprehensive Security Partnership.	Sept 2024: Minister of State for External Affairs Kirti Vardhan Singh visits Kuala Lumpur.	Dec 2024: 4th annual joint exercise in counterinsurgency and jungle warfare between India and Malaysia, called Harimau Shakti, held at Bentong Camp, Pahang District, Malaysia. Jan 2025: First India-Malaysia Security Dialogue held in New Delhi, chaired by India’s National Security Advisor to the PM, Ajit Doval.
Myanmar	-	-	Nov 2024: Think tank Indian Council for World Affairs holds a seminar on constitutionalism and federalism in New Delhi, to which representatives of both Myanmar’s ruling military junta’s State Administration Council (SAC), as well as organisations opposed to the junta are invited.
Philippines	-	Nov 2024: Defence Minister Rajnath Singh meets his Philippines counterpart, Gilberto Teodoro, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meet in Vientiane.   Jan 2025: MoS Pabitra Margherita visits Manila.	Sept 2024: 5th India-Philippines Joint Defence Committee meeting held in Manila. Sept 2024: 14th India-Philippines Policy Consultation and 5th India-Philippines Strategic Dialogue held concurrently in New Delhi.   Dec 2024: 1st India-Philippines Maritime Dialogue held in Manila.
Singapore	Sept 2024: PM Modi visits Singapore; Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed.   Jan 2025: Singapore President Tharman Shanmugaratnam visits New Delhi.	Aug 2024: 2nd India-Singapore Ministerial Roundtable held in Singapore, with several senior Indian and Singaporean ministers in attendance. Nov 2024: External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar visits Singapore.	Oct 2024: 6th India-Singapore Defence Ministers’ Dialogue held in New Delhi, with Minister of Defence Rajnath Singh and his Singaporean counterpart leading their respective delegations. Oct 2024: Indian Navy and Singapore Navy hold the 31st Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise in the Bay of Bengal. Oct 2024: 1st India-Singapore Cyber Policy Dialogue held in Singapore.
Thailand	Oct 2024: PM Modi meets Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in Vientiane.	July2024/Nov 2024: Thailand’s Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa visits New Delhi twice, the first time to attend the 2nd BIMSTEC foreign ministers meeting and the second time for talks with his Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar.	July 2024: The 15-day 13th edition of the annual India-Thailand military exercise, called ‘Maitree’, held at Fort Vachiraprakan in Tak Province, Thailand.   Dec 2024: 9th India-Thailand Defence Dialogue held in New Delhi.
Timor-Leste	Aug 2024: President Draupadi Murmu visits Dili, Timor-Leste.		-
Vietnam	July 2024: Vietnam Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh visits New Delhi.	-	Aug 2024: 4th India-Vietnam Maritime Security Dialogue held in Hanoi. Aug 2024: The 14th India-Vietnam Defence Policy Dialogue held in New Delhi. Dec 2024: 3rd India-Vietnam Security Dialogue held in Hanoi.

Source: Author’s own, using various open sources

Key Domains of India-SEA Cooperation

Maritime Security Cooperation: A Cornerstone of Strategic Partnership

Maritime security has emerged as a dominant theme in India’s Southeast Asian engagements, reflecting both geographic imperatives and strategic priorities. This focus has led to several key developments:

1. New institutional mechanisms: The inaugural India-Philippines Maritime Dialogue was held in Manila on 13 December 2024,^[6] coinciding with the 75^th year of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The fourth India-Vietnam Maritime Security Dialogue in Hanoi, held on 16 August 2024,^[7] demonstrated India’s systematic effort to institutionalise maritime cooperation with key littoral states. These dialogues transcended traditional naval engagement to encompass broader maritime governance issues, including illegal fishing, marine scientific research, and environmental protection.
2. Enhanced naval exercises: The scope and frequency of naval exercises have expanded under Modi 3.0, as evident from the 43^rd India-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol at Indonesia’s Sabang Port on 10 December 2024 and the 31^st Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise on 23-29 October 2024 in the Bay of Bengal.^[8] These exercises have evolved from symbolic engagements to complex operational collaborations focused on anti-submarine warfare and maritime domain awareness, along with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
3. Capacity-building initiatives: India has leveraged its naval expertise to strengthen the maritime capabilities of a number of Southeast Asian partners. These include the appointment of India’s first naval defence attaché to Manila in November 2024 and specialised training programmes for Filipino and Vietnamese naval personnel.^[9]

This maritime focus serves India’s broader strategic objective of positioning itself as a net security provider in the Indo-Pacific while countering China’s maritime assertiveness, particularly in the South China Sea. The pattern of engagement reveals a deliberate focus on states with territorial disputes with China (Vietnam, Philippines) and those strategically positioned along critical sea lanes (Indonesia, Singapore).

Defence Cooperation: From Symbolism to Substance

Defence cooperation has transitioned from symbolic goodwill gestures to substantive operational collaborations, emphasising interoperability and defence industrial partnerships. The following points outline the aspects of this shift:

1. Institutionalising defence dialogues: High-level defence mechanisms have been strengthened, which include the 6^th India-Singapore Defence Ministers’ Dialogue on 22 October 2024,^[10] the 14^th India-Vietnam Defence Policy Dialogue on 1 August 2024,^[11] and the 9^th India-Thailand Defence Dialogue on 12 December 2024,^[12] which provided structured platforms for strategic alignment and defence planning.
2. Evolving military exercises: India’s joint military exercises with Southeast Asian nations have grown sophisticated in recent times, as demonstrated by the Garud Shakti Special Forces Exercise with Indonesia at Cijantung, Jakarta, on 1-12 November 2024,^[13] the Harimau Shakti exercise in counterinsurgency and jungle warfare with Malaysia in Bentong, Pahang District in early December 2024,^[14] and the inaugural CINBAX exercise with the Cambodian Army in Pune on 1-6 December 2024.^[15] These exercises have shifted from basic drills to working on complex operational scenarios addressing contemporary threats such as counter-terrorism, urban warfare, and hybrid threats.
3. Defence industrial collaboration: The shift from a buyer-seller relationship to co-development is evident in India’s invitation to the Philippines, during their fifth Joint Defence Cooperation Committee meeting in September 2024, to partner in co-production of defence equipment.^[16] The Philippines’ decision to acquire BrahMos missiles represents India’s most significant defence export to the region.

This deepening defence cooperation reflects India’s efforts to reduce Southeast Asia’s dependence on traditional security providers while creating strategic interdependencies that serve its long-term regional interests. It also demonstrates Southeast Asia’s increasing comfort with India as a security partner, distinct from concerns about entanglement in the US-China competition.

Cyber and Technology Cooperation: New Frontiers

As traditional security cooperation matures, India has expanded engagement with Southeast Asia into emerging domains, particularly cybersecurity and digital technologies:

1. Cyber dialogues: The establishment of the India-Singapore Cyber Policy Dialogue, the first session of which was held in October 2024, represents a pioneering institutional mechanism to address digital security challenges, exchange threat assessments, and develop collaborative responses to cyber threats.^[17]
2. Digital infrastructure cooperation: India’s ‘Digital India’ initiative has found regional resonance, with agreements on digital public infrastructure sharing being signed during Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s maiden visit to India in August 2024.^[18] In the same month, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) also set up a Telemetry, Tracking and Tele-command station in Brunei.
3. Technology governance frameworks: India has advocated aligned approaches to technology governance, particularly in emerging fields like artificial intelligence (AI), data protection, and critical information infrastructure with Southeast Asian countries. The India-Singapore Ministerial Roundtable in August 2024 featured discussions on technological cooperation and digital standards.^[19]

This emerging domain of cooperation leverages India’s technological capabilities while responding to Southeast Asian concerns about digital dependency on China. It also creates new avenues for economic integration through digital connectivity and technical standards harmonisation.

Economic Engagement: The Unfinished Agenda

Despite progress in security and technology cooperation, India’s economic engagement with Southeast Asia remains underdeveloped. This can be inferred from:

1. Trade Imbalances: While India-ASEAN trade has recovered from the disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, structural imbalances persist. The comprehensive relationship with Singapore stands in contrast to the limited economic ties with other Southeast Asian nations.
2. Inadequate infrastructure connectivity: Despite rhetorical commitment to connectivity by both India and the Southeast Asian nations, tangible progress on flagship projects such as the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway has been slow. India’s decision in February 2024 to abolish the Free Movement Regime with Myanmar, citing internal security concerns, potentially complicates cross-border connectivity with Southeast Asia.^[20]
3. Modest investment flows: Singapore remains the dominant source and destination of bilateral investments between India and Southeast Asia. There is a clear need for diversified economic partnerships across the region. The elevation of India-Malaysia ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in August 2024 included ambitious economic targets, but implementation mechanisms remain underdeveloped.^[21]

The economic dimension represents the most significant gap in India’s Southeast Asian strategy. The imbalance potentially limits the sustainability of India’s regional influence in competition with China’s comprehensive economic engagement.

Country-Specific Engagement Patterns: A Comparative Analysis

While a thematic analysis reveals strategic priorities, examining country-specific engagement patterns highlights India’s differentiated approach to the Southeast Asian states based on their strategic significance, geographic location, and political orientation.

Maritime Partners: Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia

India has prioritised engagement with maritime states that share strategic concerns about China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea:

• Vietnam: The comprehensive nature of India-Vietnam ties is evident in the establishment of specialised dialogues between the two spanning maritime security, defence policy, and national security. Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh’s July 2024 visit—the second foreign leader to visit during Modi’s third term—underscores Vietnam’s priority in India’s strategic calculus.^[22] This was also the first Vietnamese prime ministerial visit in a decade. The relationship benefits from a shared wariness of Chinese influence.
• Philippines: The dramatic transformation in India’s bilateral relations with the Philippines is highlighted by the latter becoming the first country to buy Indian BrahMos missiles, as well as the launch of the inaugural India-Philippines Maritime Dialogue in December 2024. India’s firm support for Philippine sovereignty when tensions arose between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea in March 2024, demonstrated the relationship’s strategic depth. India’s appointment of its first defence attaché to Manila towards the end of 2024 also reflects the prioritisation of this partnership.
• Indonesia: As the largest Southeast Asian nation, Indonesia occupies a special place in India’s regional strategy, symbolised by President Prabowo being invited as chief guest at the Republic Day celebrations in January 2025.^[23] Naval cooperation forms the cornerstone of this bilateral engagement, with the 43^rd India-Indonesia Coordinated Patrol being held in December 2024, representing one of India’s longest-standing maritime security initiatives in the region.

These partnerships are characterised by substantial security cooperation, alignment on maritime governance principles, and shared concerns about external interference in regional waters. However, as noted earlier, economic engagement lags well behind the security links with these countries, particularly with the Philippines and Vietnam.

Gateway States: Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei

India has cultivated special relationships with states that serve as economic and connectivity gateways to the broader Southeast Asia region:

• Singapore: The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed with Singapore during Modi’s September 2024 visit reflects the country’s multidimensional importance in India’s regional strategy. The institutionalisation of the Ministerial Roundtable—bringing together multiple Cabinet ministers from both countries—demonstrates the relationship’s unique breadth. Singapore functions as India’s economic and financial gateway to Southeast Asia while providing a platform for regional defence engagement, through exercises like the annual Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX) and joint military training.^[24]
• Malaysia: Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s August 2024 visit to India marked a strategic reset in bilateral relations with Malaysia, with their elevation to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. India’s inaugural Security Dialogue with Malaysia in January 2025 expanded cooperation beyond traditional defence ties to encompass critical minerals and rare-earth elements, reflecting Malaysia’s importance in resource security. The relationship balances economic interests with growing security cooperation, exemplified by the Harimau Shakti exercise.
• Brunei: Modi’s historic visit to Brunei in August 2024—the first by an Indian prime minister—highlighted that India was now paying attention to even the smaller Southeast Asian states.^[25] The agreement to install an ISRO’s tracking station in Brunei gives it a place in India’s space programme infrastructure, while energy cooperation remains an underexplored dimension of the relationship.

These three partnerships are characterised by greater economic content, institutional density, and diplomatic investment compared to other Southeast Asian relationships. They serve as platforms for India’s broader regional engagement, particularly in emerging domains like cyber cooperation and financial connectivity.

Mainland Frontier: Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos

India’s approach to mainland Southeast Asia reflects the complex balance it has to find between security imperatives, connectivity ambitions, and political considerations:

• Myanmar: The tensions in India’s Southeast Asian strategy are best illustrated by Myanmar. On the one hand, India has been engaging with Myanmar’s military junta, such as through the India-Myanmar Foreign Office Consultations, the 20^th round of which was held in New Delhi on 6 December 2023^[26] (before Modi 3.0 began). Meanwhile, opposition forces in Myanmar were also hosted by India in November 2024,^[27] reflecting its  pragmatic balancing of democratic principles and strategic interests. India’s abolition of the Free Movement Regime across the India-Myanmar border in February 2024 marks a policy shift, prioritising border security over historical cross-border ties.
• Thailand: The relationship with Thailand bridges India’s maritime and mainland Southeast Asian strategies. The 13^th annual India-Thailand joint military exercise in July 2024,^[28] along with the ninth India-Thailand Defence Dialogue in December 2024,^[29] demonstrate the two countries’ security cooperation. Modi’s meeting with the newly appointed Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra in October 2024 at the East Asia Summit in Laos signals efforts to reinvigorate the relationship.^[30]
• Cambodia and Laos: India’s outreach to China’s traditional partners Cambodia and Laos reflects its newfound comprehensive regional approach. The inaugural CINBAX exercise with Cambodia in December 2024 and memorandums of understanding signed during Modi’s meetings with Laotian leaders in October 2024 demonstrate India’s efforts to expand its strategic footprint.^[31]

These four relationships are characterised by greater complexity, lower institutionalisation, and more pronounced security-development trade-offs compared to India’s maritime partnerships. They represent both the frontier of India’s Southeast Asian engagement and its most significant implementation challenges.

Emerging Focus: Timor-Leste

President Murmu’s unprecedented visit to Timor-Leste in August 2024 highlights India’s strategy to pay attention to even the newest Southeast Asian nations.^[a],[32] It reflects India’s comprehensive regional approach. While ties remain nascent, the presidential visit has established foundations for future engagement.

Conclusion: Strategic Recalibration and Future Trajectories

India’s intensified engagement with Southeast Asia in 2024 reveals a sophisticated recalibration of its regional strategy. The new strategy has three distinct patterns:

First, there is a clear prioritisation of maritime-oriented partnerships, evident in the establishment of new maritime dialogues with the Philippines and the expansion of naval exercises with Indonesia and Singapore. This serves dual purposes: it positions India as a capable maritime security partner while creating additional pressure points to counter China’s assertiveness in the region.

Second, the pattern of engagement demonstrates a deliberate effort to institutionalise relationships through new diplomatic and military mechanisms. The creation of first-time dialogues—from the inaugural CINBAX exercise with Cambodia to the first Security Dialogue with Malaysia—suggests a shift from ad-hoc interactions to sustained, institutionalised partnerships. This institutionalisation provides resilience to bilateral relationships and creates enduring channels for strategic cooperation that transcend political changes.

Third, India’s engagement reveals a nuanced approach to regional power dynamics. While maintaining robust partnerships with traditional partners, Modi’s government has made unprecedented outreach to smaller states like Brunei and Timor-Leste. This comprehensive approach helps India present itself as a more attractive regional partner than China, whose engagement has often focused primarily on the larger ASEAN states.

However, this strategic recalibration faces various challenges. The suspension of the Free Movement Regime with Myanmar highlights the tension between security imperatives and historical ties. Similarly, the simultaneous engagement with Myanmar’s military junta and opposition forces reflects the complexities of balancing strategic interests with democratic principles. These challenges suggest that India’s regional strategy, while more comprehensive than before, still grapples with reconciling competing priorities.

Looking ahead, the success of India’s recalibrated Southeast Asian strategy will depend on three factors: first, its ability to maintain the current intensity of engagement across multiple partners simultaneously; second, the extent of its success in translating diplomatic and military initiatives into tangible economic and technological cooperation; and third, its capacity to navigate the increasingly complex regional dynamics, particularly as Southeast Asian states themselves seek to balance their relationships amidst the broader US-China competition in the region.

India’s Southeast Asian engagement under Modi 3.0 represents a significant evolution from the earlier Act East framework and is marked by greater strategic coherence, institutional depth, and regional comprehensiveness. While implementation challenges persist, the foundations laid through this intensified engagement position India as an increasingly consequential player in Southeast Asia’s evolving strategic landscape.

Endnotes

^[a] Timor Leste (earlier called East Timor), was founded in May 2002, breaking away from Indonesia.

^[1] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “English Translation of India's National Statement at the 21st ASEAN-India Summit Delivered by Prime Minister Narendra Modi,” October 10, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/38399/English_translation_of_Indias_National_Statement_at_the_21st_ASEANIndia_Summit_delivered_by_Prime_Minister_Narendra_Modi.

^[2] Keshav Padmanabhan, “Connectivity, Peace at India-Myanmar Border: What Jaishankar Discussed at Mekong Ganga Cooperation Meet,” The Print, July 17, 2023, https://theprint.in/diplomacy/connectivity-peace-at-india-myanmar-border-what-jaishankar-discussed-at-mekong-ganga-cooperation-meet/1672584/.

^[3] Premesha Saha and Abhishek Mishra, “The Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative: Towards a Coherent Indo-Pacific Policy for India,” Observer Research Foundation, December 23, 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-indo-pacific-oceans-initiative-towards-a-coherent-indo-pacific-policy-for-india.

^[4] Asian Development Bank, “BIMSTEC Master Plan for Transport Connectivity,” April 2022, https://www.adb.org/documents/bimstec-master-plan-transport-connectivity.

^[5] BIMSTEC, “Thailand Hosts the 6^th BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok on 04 April 2025,” April 5, 2025, https://bimstec.org/event/247/thailand-hosts-the-6th-bimstec-summit-in-bangkok-on-04-april-2025-.

^[6] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38767/Inaugural_IndiaPhilippines_Maritime_Dialogue_Manila.

^[7] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38164/4th_IndiaVietnam_Maritime_Security_Dialogue.

^[8] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2070205.

^[9]Rajat Pandit, “India Steps Up Training of Foreign Military Personnel to Boost Ties,” Times of India, June 27, 2024, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-steps-up-training-of-foreign-military-personnel-to-boost-ties/articleshow/111298337.cms.

^[10] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2066727.

^[11] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2040680.

^[12] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2083914.

^[13] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2069969.

^[14] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2079649.

^[15] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2079505.

^[16] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2053803.

^[17] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38435/First_Cyber_Policy_Dialogue_between_India_and_Singapore.

^[18] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Joint Statement on India – Malaysia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” August 20, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/incoming-visit-detail.htm?38187/Joint+Statement+on+India++Malaysia+Comprehensive+Strategic+Partnership.

^[19] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38231/2nd_round_of_IndiaSingapore_Ministerial_Roundtable.

^[20] Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2003884.

^[21] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Joint Statement on India – Malaysia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”

^[22] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,  https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38048/State_Visit_of_HE_Pham_Minh_Chinh_Prime_Minister_of_the_Socialist_Republic_of_Vietnam_to_India.

^[23] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “India-Indonesia Joint Statement on the State Visit of H.E. Prabowo Subianto, President of Republic of Indonesia (23-26 January 2025),” January 26, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/38944/IndiaIndonesia+Joint+Statement+on+the+State+Visit+of+HE+Prabowo+Subianto+President+of+Republic+of+Indonesia+2326+January+2025.

^[24] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2066701.

^[25] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38243/Visit+of+Prime+Minister+to+Brunei+Darussalam+and+Singapore+September+0305+2024.

^[26] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/37345/India_Myanmar_Foreign_Office_Consultations_FOC.

^[27]“India Extends Unprecedented Invite to Myanmar’s Anti-Junta Forces: Sources,” Bangkok Post, September 23, 2024, https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/2870708/india-extends-unprecedented-invite-to-myanmars-anti-junta-forces-sources.

^[28] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2030153.

^[29] Ministry of Defence, Government of India, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2083914.

^[30] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/38408/Meeting_of_Prime_Minister_with_Prime_Minister_of_Thailand.

^[31] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Prime Minister Meets with President of Lao PDR,” October 11, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/outoging-visit-detail.htm?38406/Prime+Minister+meets+with+President+of+Lao+PDR.

^[32] President of India, Government of India, https://www.presidentofindia.gov.in/press_releases/president-india-timor-leste-meets-president-and-prime-minister-timor-leste.

• International Affairs
• India
• East and Southeast Asia
• act east policy
• act east policy india
• bimstec
• india china relations
• india in indo pacific
• india relations with southeast asia
• india's act east policy
• india's bilateral relations with south asia
• india’s southeast asian strategy
• modi 3.0
• regional initiatives in southeast asia

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