There was a touch of deja vu as Turkiye’s extended election campaign ended with the victory of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
There was the ubiquitous, carefully burnished image of Erdogan as a strong, nationalist leader up against an opposition that is branded as kowtowing to the West and being soft on the (Kurdish) terrorists . The carefully crafted appeal to religious conservatives accompanied by disdain towards the liberal and secular followers of Kemal Ataturk and disparaging attacks on the LGBTQ community. The conscious amplification of the glories of the Ottoman empire with ‘Sultan’ Erdogan heralding the dawn of a new ‘Turkish century’ a hundred years after Ataturk established the secular Turkish republic in 1924. The ability to use high-profile diplomatic events to draw attention away from pressing bread and butter issues. The relentlessly efficient, grassroots driven party machinery against a fractured opposition. The overwhelming control of the media. The clear advantage in financial resources. And the questionable use of enforcement agencies against opposition figures.
The aggregate of these elements combined to deliver the fifth consecutive electoral victory for Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). The first three wins made him the country’s Prime Minister until the constitution was amended in 2017. The amendment abolished the parliamentary system and the office of the prime minister to create an executive presidency where the President becomes both the head of state and head of government. Erdogan was duly elected President in 2018 and the latest election gives him a second five year term with around 52% of the popular vote – a figure that has remained almost constant over six election cycles including the constitutional referendum of 2017.
The conscious amplification of the glories of the Ottoman empire with ‘Sultan’ Erdogan heralding the dawn of a new ‘Turkish century’ a hundred years after Ataturk established the secular Turkish republic in 1924.
The opposition had clearly hoped for a different outcome this time around. Afterall, the country has seen the value of the Lira drop by 90% over the last ten years of Erdogan’s rule and many economists blame the 44% inflation and a near empty foreign exchange kitty on his unorthodox economic policies and particularly his arm-twisting of the Central Bank to prevent an increase in interest rates. The dire economic situation was expected to trigger an anti-incumbency wave and yet, AKP has demonstrated the rock-solid support of its base by retaining its 52% share of the vote. A further analysis shows that much of Erdogan’s vote comes from the relatively less affluent hinterland where conservative Sunni Islam still has a substantial influence. His rival Kilicdaroglu’s promise to restore the more liberal parliamentary system, return to economic orthodoxy and reduce strains in ties with the West resonated well in the metropolitan areas of Istanbul and Ankara and in the affluent and more Westernized coastal areas but at the end, it was the high voter turnout in the heartland that carried the day for Erdogan.
More pragmatic, less ideological?
As he starts his third decade in power, Erdogan must bring the economy back on even keel. The faltering economy, to an extent, has already led Erdogan to temper some of his more ideologically-driven foreign policy postures in the region with a healthy dose of pragmatism. He has ended Turkiye’s proxy wars with Saudi Arabia and UAE and restored normal ties with both. They have responded by placing USD 5 billion each with the Central Bank of Turkiye to bolster its foreign exchange reserves. UAE has also pledged to invest USD 10 billion and has moved quickly after Erdogan’s re-election to announce ratification of their Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with the aim of raising non-oil bilateral trade to USD 40 billion in five years. Qatar remains a strong partner and a potential source of investments. Full diplomatic relations have been restored with Israel and a change in attitude towards the Bashar Assad regime in Syria could be in the offing.
The faltering economy, to an extent, has already led Erdogan to temper some of his more ideologically-driven foreign policy postures in the region with a healthy dose of pragmatism.
Erdogan has also leveraged the Ukraine conflict to reposition Turkiye as a pivotal player in the region. Although a NATO member since 1952, Turkiye has maintained close ties with Russia and Erdogan has often claimed a special relationship with President Putin. And yet, his government has supplied significant numbers of its Bayraktar TB2 armed drones to Ukraine. It was also at the heart of the Black Sea Grain Initiative allowing safe transport of food grains from Ukrainian ports. Meanwhile, Turkiye held back its assent on Finland’s inclusion as the 31
st member of NATO until March 2023 on grounds that the country was providing a safe haven for what Erdogan calls Kurdish ‘terrorists.’ And it continues to exercise a veto on Sweden’s inclusion for the same reason.
By maintaining a strongly independent foreign policy stance on ties with Russia and China even as it remains a key member of NATO, Turkiye under Erdogan is asserting its intent to reclaim the centrality that it enjoyed during the five centuries of Ottoman rule.
Ties with India
Despite a fair amount of goodwill at the popular level, India’s ties with Turkiye have failed to take off because Ankara has tended to view Jammu and Kashmir through the prism of religious fraternity with Pakistan. Sporadic attempts to give some momentum to the relationship have often been torpedoed by intemperate statements by Turkish leaders that betrayed a complete lack of sensitivity over India’s position. The most recent case was the manner in which Erdogan attacked India’s decision to revoke Article 370 in August 2019.
And yet, there might be some grounds for optimism. The economic crisis in Turkiye has coincided with the rise of India on the global stage and it is in the interest of both sides to expand their economic engagement. A breakthrough of sorts came about when Prime Minister Modi met with President Erdogan on the side-lines of the SCO Summit in Samarkand in September 2022. The request came from the Turkish side and the meeting turned out to be unexpectedly cordial. India also responded with a prompt and substantive humanitarian assistance package following the devastating earthquake that struck Turkiye in February. The G20 summit being hosted in New Delhi in September will provide a further opportunity for a Modi-Erdogan meeting and it remains to be seen if the pragmatism shown by Erdogan in re-shaping Turkiye’s foreign policy over the last two years also extends to its ties with India. Or will he remain wedded to his Islamist credentials and continue to side with an imploding Pakistan?
This commentary originally appeared in The Tribune.
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