INTRODUCTION

Special Operations Forces (SOF) are highly specialised military forces that are deployed in combat at the strategic and operational (theatre) level and in non-combat military operations which require unique modes of force deployment. Such forces are especially equipped and trained to utilise unique tactical techniques in hostile, denied and politically sensitive environments. These high-risk operations are often characterised by their clandestine and time-sensitive nature, low visibility and are conducted with or in support of indigenous forces that possess a high degree of regional knowledge and language expertise. SOF could be deployed both within a state's own borders, in its immediate neighbourhood over which the state has a considerable degree of familiarity, or in non-familiar 'out of area' territories where the intervening state may have far less knowledge of the language, terrain and strategic environment. Special operations could be classified into two main categories: 'clandestine' and 'covert' operations.

Military Special Operations and Intelligence Operations are different because the former is 'clandestine' in nature while the latter is classified as 'covert'. 'Clandestine' operations typically involve reconnaissance, surveillance and 'direct action' missions and are executed by SOF. 'Clandestine' operations, meanwhile, may be secretive, but eventually diffuse into public knowledge after the event. Covert operations cannot be attributed to a particular state actor as the perpetrator always remains anonymous and they generally fall within the realm of intelligence agencies. Thus 'assassination and snatch' operations in another country are considered to be 'covert' operations that face likely political fallout if they are attributable with a degree of circumstantial evidence. This differentiation is significant, keeping in view the various provisions of the Geneva Conventions that are applicable to military personnel.

However, over the past two decades, especially in the United States, the US Military SOF has increasingly been involved in covert operations. After 9/11, US SOF have been designated as the lead military arm in waging the so-called 'Global War on Terror'. This is due to domestic political compulsions, as operations undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are required by US laws to be scrutinised by Congress. The US military does not face such scrutiny with regard to its classified operations as these could be undertaken with presidential approval.

THE NEED FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE SOF

India's uncoordinated and chaotic response to the terrorist attacks on the Pathankot Air Force base in January 2016 have once again brought to the forefront the issues of tasking, synergy and jointness in the operational capabilities of India's SOF. Some years ago, the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai had already exposed the inadequacies and limitations of India's SOF in responding to terrorist attacks on civilian soft targets in urban settings. The Pathankot attacks have sparked a wider debate about how and in what manner India's SOF should be deployed in an emerging combat theatre and what role should it play in the exercise of 'Comprehensive National Power' (CNP). Moreover, it raises the more fundamental question of how SOF fits into India's national security doctrine as a potent instrument in orchestrating the country's national security strategy. The subject also assumes significance in light of media reports that the government is still deliberating the need for a Special Operations Command (SOC) which has been in the works for some time.² The integration of India's SOF under a 'Tri-services Command' is a particularly trenchant challenge, considering the fact that the current force structure of India's SOF is highly fragmented and spread across multiple organisational silos encompassing the three services of the armed forces under the Ministry of Defence, intelligence agency (Research and Analysis Wing - R&AW) under the Cabinet Secretariat, and the Ministry of Home Affairs.³

This paper is the result of a workshop that was held on 'Employment of Special Forces' organised by the Observer Research Foundation on 29 January 2016. The aim of the paper is to suggest the necessary actions that the government needs to initiate to develop the capacity, infrastructure and capabilities of India's SOF. The paper has benefitted greatly from the expertise of national security and intelligence experts and several serving and military veterans who actively contributed to the roundtable discussion. The wide-ranging discussion touched upon the history of India's SOF and the experience of other SOF in the United Kingdom, United States, China and Pakistan. It addressed several factors that have hobbled the effectiveness of India's SOF—the strategic role of SOF in advancing India's foreign policy objectives, securing national interests within the wider context of exercising CNP, developing the capabilities of synergy and jointness amongst the forces in a given operational theatre, aligning the political mandate for SOF with greater role clarity and strategic tasking, intelligence and reconnaissance deficiencies, and enhancing the strategic deterrence effects of SOF.

The following section provides an overview of the evolution of India's SOF since Independence. It then examines the current operational structure of the SOF and the growing stature of SOF and its role in securing Indian interests. The paper then addresses the changing nature of the global strategic environment and the need for India to build SOF capabilities to address the contingencies emanating from the proliferation of fourth-generation warfare. It closes with a set of policy recommendations and potential remedies to address the current deficiencies in India's SOF.

INDIA'S SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES: A BRIEF HISTORY

Both the Indian and Pakistani Special Forces were established with the active involvement of the CIA in the mid-1950s. In 1962, the Kennedy administration worked with India for the creation of a Special Frontier Forces (SFF) unit in the Indian military. In 1965 and 1971, respectively, the 'Meghdoot force' and the 9 and 10 PARA were among the initial Special Forces units that were conceived and established in the Indian army. In 1980, 1 PARA was converted for special operations, focused on strategic employment and not merely as a tactical 'super infantry' of the army.⁴

Learning about SOF operational planning, strategies and tactics in the Indian Army (as in other armies) is heavily influenced by the burden of history. For example, the 'Chindits' operations during the Second World War had an impact on the Indian army's understanding of special operations, sometimes in deleterious ways. This could be attributed to the possible manipulation of the historiography of 'Chindits' by rival British army officers. However, India's SOF has performed commendably in several operational theatres over the years. In the past, India's SOF have been deployed in various prominent operations such as 'Operation Pawan' in Sri Lanka, 'Operation Cactus' in Maldives, 'Operation Khukri' in Sierra Leone, as well as in various UN peacekeeping operations. In its most recent special operations, India's 21 PARA (SF) were deployed in mounting a cross-border raid against terrorists operating from Myanmar.5

CURRENT COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE

The current organisational structure of India's SOF comprises independent units ('silos') distributed across several military and civilian forces.

• Army: The Army's SOF comprises nine PARA (SF) and five PARA Battalions which form part of the Parachute Regiment and function under the command of the Military Operations (MO) Directorate of the Indian Army. It is necessary to differentiate between these units, which while organised and trained to operate behind enemy lines, have separate and unique skill sets that are pertinent to their specific mission profiles. While PARA (SF) units work in small teams and are focused on operations other than war (OOW) and on strategic reconnaissance, surveillance and target designation (RSTAD) and direct action (DA) tasks. PARA units operating in strength are focused on air assault, coupde main, raids and rear area disruption missions along with providing the spearhead elements of our National Rapid Reaction Capabilities. That apart, they have overlapping mission requirements which require them to work in conjunction with each other.
• Navy: The MARCOS (Marine Commandos) is a special operations unit of the Indian Navy that was created in 1987. MARCOS is involved in several special operations including anti-piracy and safeguarding of off-shore energy assets, among others.
• Air Force: The Garud Commando Force was created in 2004 by the Indian Air Force. The Garud Force is involved in Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), protecting air bases and other vital air force infrastructure, among other duties. As protection of air bases is not a task for SOF, role definition in their case needs reassessment.
• Ministry of Home Affairs: The National Security Guard (NSG) operates as an independent force and is tasked to act as a Counter Terror intervention force. It is involved in launching operations against terrorists (as witnessed during the 26/11 at tacks in Mumbai ) , ant i -hi jack operations and hostage rescue, apart from VIP protection, though the latter task is not mentioned in its charter of duties.
• Intelligence Agencies (R&AW): The Special Frontier Force (SFF) is an adjunct of the Cabinet Secretariat and operates under DG (Security), who also heads R&AW as Secretary (R). The SFF is primarily involved in 'intelligence-based' special operations.

SOF IN THE CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The past two decades have witnessed enormous changes in the strategic environment— current, emerging and overlapping changes—and these realities confront India as it rises on the world stage. With the presence of two nuclear powers in South Asia, large-scale conventional 'big fight' wars look increasingly unlikely to materialise anytime in the near future. However, the likelihood of conventional operations limited in time and space under the nuclear threshold remains pertinent, as does the scope for lowintensity/ asymmetric warfare. Over the last several years, India's own economic and strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, West and Central Asia and the African littoral have increased substantially.

India's response to theatres where SOF was required has always been reactive. In the future, India's SOF need pre-emptive and proactive capabilities to better anticipate and plan for contingencies. The digital age is altering the battle space and SOF is not immune from the wave of digitisation that is sweeping the military landscape. Armed forces which are designed to operate in the industrial age need to step up to the digital age to engage in 'network-centric warfare'. Emerging strategic technologies like Artificial Intelligence, robotics and miniaturisation are likely to play an increasingly important role in future warfare. In today's world, drone technology could provide a lot more information for reconnaissance and intelligence than boots on the ground. Network technology has evolved rapidly over the past few years that some of the SOF tasks such as reconnaissance and surveillance can be performed by using drones and satellites, without giving away intentions or loss of manpower. The Indian armed forces are not an exception to these trends that are shaping the future of warfare.

Driving the imperative of revamping India's SOF is the country's rise as a major global economic power and its expanding global interests. According to the Price Waterhouse Coopers report, “The World in 2050”, India will be the third largest economy in the world in PPP 6 terms by 2050. Without a doubt, economic interests will play a disproportionate role in shaping the size, structure and geographical scope of India's SOF.

With asymmetric fourth-generation warfare emerging as an essential feature of present and future conflicts, India's SOF would be increasingly relied upon to safeguard the country's strategic interests in its immediate and extended neighbourhood. The appropriate role of the SOF in responding to a growing array of asymmetric threats that seek to undermine India's strategic interests needs to be addressed. These include the following:

• Furthering India's sphere of influence in selected countries which would be in keeping with the country's growing stature as an economic powerhouse and a world power of its own standing.
• Identification of future threats in the domain of terrorism, energy, food, finance and economy. Embedding SOF in organisations operating in regions of India's concern and shaping the strategic environment to India's advantage will become a strategic imperative.
• Responding to the call for military assistance from a friendly country to support them during a hostile takeover or terrorist strike.
• Setting up of military bases in friendly countries at the request of the host nation, which could also be viewed as a base for intervention to protect India's vital national interests.
• Prot e c t ing Indi a ' s Se a Line s of Communication (SLOC) by proactively projecting the navy's capabilities against likely threats. Increasingly, Indian SOF would be called upon to play a role in ensuring energy security, as more than 93 percent of India's hydrocarbon and energy resources would have to be imported by 2030, often from conflict-prone regions. As India's needs and interests grow, it would have to protect its assets in regions far away from the homeland.
• Ensuring the safety and security of Indian citizens abroad in the event of a local crisis. This may include their evacuation from conflict zones during times of civil unrest and breakdown of political order.

POTENTIAL SOF MISSIONS AND CONTINGENCIES

The reality is that India is constrained by having two inimical nuclear armed neighbours, facing grave challenges to internal cohesion and having little choice but to focus on poverty alleviation and the development of basic infrastructure. These challenges are unique to India and require the country to focus more on regional challenges and less on global threats. For now, India's interests and threats are primarily limited to its immediate neighbourhood. As India's strategic interests expand, the need for deploying India's SOF to address a broader scope of contingencies is also expected to grow.

SOF plays a critical role in responding to a range of contingencies that needs to be addressed today and in the future. The force structure and the responsibilities of the proposed Special Operations Command (SOC) should be entrusted with proactively responding to contingencies in the following 'fourth-generation warfare' scenarios.

• Terrorist attacks on civilian 'soft targets'
• Unconventional, asymmetric and subconventional warfare (counter insurgency, low intensity conflict and proxy wars)7
• Attacks on domestic military installations (bases and other military targets) and other strategic facilities (nuclear, defence and space research laboratories, satellite ground stations)
• Hijackings and hostage situations
• Cross-border raids in pursuit of terrorists
• Counter terrorist (CT) and hostage rescue operations in urban settings8
• Covert and Clandestine Operations
• Direct Action
• 'Out of Area (OOA)' Contingencies
• Neutralising terrorist attacks on Indian embassies abroad
• Humanitarian Missions: Rescue of Indian citizens in the cross-hairs of civil conflicts in foreign countries.
• Protecting Indian strategic and economic assets on foreign soil
• Foreign Internal Defence: Responding to mercenary attacks that threaten India's security interests on foreign soil
• Attacks on Indian military bases on foreign soil
• Attacks by large-scale armed groups engaged in 'urban warfare' in a large Indian city
• External intelligence gathering
• Strategic reconnaissance
• Combat search and rescue9 ?Search and destroy missions
• Information operations
• 'Intelligence Based' Operations
• 'Social warfare' missions in peace time as 10 well as in war
• Counter-proliferation

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

It is pertinent to note that India's SOF needs to be constituted keeping in mind the larger objective of bolstering 'Comprehensive National Power'. To this end, crucial is the capacity to utilise India's soft power assets in an organised manner as well as to maintain a robust “Out of Area” (OOA) capability. It is here that SOF, suitably organised, whether utilised to provide the spearhead element of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) or used independently for conducting a vast range of missions; some even in conjunction with other elements of national power would pay dividends. The following are the main recommendations stemming from the ORF workshop:

• SOF terminology: While discussing the concept of special operations and the forces that conduct those operations, it is agreed that 'Special Operations Forces (SOF)' is a more appropriate term to describe the forces at an aggregate level instead of 'Special Forces (SF)', since SF are only an individual component of SOF. This is in consonance with how other armed forces, including the US, describe their special forces.
• Special Operations Command (SOC): The establishment of an SOC would go a long way in ensuring that India's SOF are organised, equipped and trained jointly to ensure their optimal utilisation. This will also enable India to put in place a triservice special operations doctrine grounded in the reality of its circumstances and thus enable focused capacity building and establishment of linkages within the security establishment and other ministries toward their employment at the strategic and operational level.
• Strategic tasking: Special Operations Forces are not intelligence operatives and should not be expected to act like one. More clarity is required in distinguishing between cover t and c landes t ine operations. In NATO and US terminology, for example, covert operations require the highest degree of plausible deniability and are largely non-attributable, while clandestine operations have lesser need for secrecy. Therefore, while covert operations fall within the mandates of intelligence agencies, clandestine operations are the SOF's forte. In the case of a covert operation that requires force, intelligence agencies could use their own paramilitary units which normally comprise of ex-SOF personnel. Thus SOF tasking should be mainly restricted to Direct Action and Strategic Reconnaissance & Target Designation. The organisational structure needs to be tailored towards this end. While their utilisation in below- the-horizon operations of a politico-military nature must continue, the Army's SOF should not be deployed for assassinations of terrorist leaders in third countries as part of counter terrorism operations.

While conceptualising and planning for strategic tasking, India must avoid the missteps of American SOF. In 2015, US SOF was deployed in 147 countries, mainly for joint training purposes, but with limited results. Despite a three- to fourfold increase in the capacity of SOF since 9/11 and extensive employment in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia and Libya, US performance in these campaigns were by no means an unqualified success. A $500- million program, run by the Green Berets, to train a Syrian force of more than 15,000 personnel was abandoned due to poor outcomes.11

• Language expertise: Today, Indian SOF lack the requisite language skills to operate either in far-flung regions within the country or on foreign soil. Therefore, developing foreign language expertise and being equipped with language skills is an area in which Indian Special Forces need to see substantial improvements in the future.
• SOF influence and reach: India needs a well-articulated strategy for deployment of the forces in the 'outer circles' of West Asia and Central Asia and the 'inner circles' within India's immediate neighbourhood. With minimal cost, India could assume the task of small-scale training of foreign forces in the 'outer circle'. India should begin to exert some influence in shaping the security environment in countries located in the 'outer circle'.
• SOF's role in diplomacy: Diplomacy plays a key role in achieving India's national security goals. Those responsible for achieving India's foreign policy goals must have at their disposal a range 'in-country' assets will provide additional flexibility and options in dealing with contingencies that may occasionally arise. Linkages could be established between India's soft power institutions and SOF. For example, when diplomacy fails, there are situations wherein some states may be hostile to addressing India's concerns. In such circumstances, while the government continues with its use of soft power and diplomacy to change the discourse, the option for punitive action must also be considered, either in tandem or?Coordinating external Intelligence with military forces: The key element for SOF employment at the strategic level i s the avai labi l i ty of ac t ionable intelligence, especially where SOF may be required to carry out Direct Action tasks. Conversely, SOF deployments in the training and advisory role can provide key inputs in formulating regional/country specific intelligence assessments. In such a context, the role that SOF can play and the institutional linkages that need to be established between them and India's intelligence community and External Affairs establishment need to be examined. In the long run, integrating miliary and civilian intelligence capabilities and assets should be a vital factor in all 'Intelligence based' special operations.
• SOF as deterrence: The Mumbai attacks of 26/11 demonstrated the need for investing in India's deterrence capabilities to thwart terrorism emanating from Pakistan. SOF could play a decisive role in ensuring that India develops adequate deterrence capacity to thwart threats emerging from Pakistan. India needs a comprehensive strategy to develop indirect means of using force to counter asymmetric threats.12
• Composition of SOC: In the context of SOF, while strategic countervailing operations have lost their importance to some extent, given that airspace and time constraints will impact large-scale operational deployment, the need for a balanced Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) has increased exponentially, especially in the context of Out of Area Contingencies (OOAC). Thus the Parachute Brigade, for example, which forms the nucleus of India's rapid deployment capability, needs to be reorganised and reoriented to be able to meet its new mission requirements. Similarly, the PARA (SF) battalions also need to reexamine their operational tasking and employment philosophy in the context of the prevailing geo-political scenario.

It is also necessary to ensure that units that function under the SOC (as and when it is constituted) are not duplicated within any of the Services, given that India neither has the economic capability nor the wherewithal to indulge in wasteful expenditure. While small-scale operations are an important facet of Special Operations, Direct Action capability and heavier support, as provided by the American 75th Ranger Regiment for example, must also be ensured. There is, however, a need to ensure that India does not blindly follow the West or other SOF models, as India's requirements are unique. In addition, the Indian Air Force (IAF) must look at specifically designating and training air elements for SOF. These elements, along with air resources from Army Aviation and the Navy, must also form a part of SOC.

• Reorganisation of NSG: There is also a need to review the NSG, as jointfunctioning of Police and Army personnel has not proved particularly effective over the years. Moreover, there has been a change in the nature of how terrorists operate with the emphasis now on causing maximum damage to lives and property in the shortest period of time. These new terrorist tactics require counterterrorism doctrines to be suitably modified to meet future contingencies. There is a necessity to consider removing the SAGs from the NSG and placing them under the SOC, to ensure better utilisation of manpower. The NSG should increase the number of Ranger Groups to ensure pan-India deployment for quicker response. In the event of hostage taking, for instance, the SAGs can be requisitioned for intervention operations and utilised as hither-to-fore.13
• Socio-cultural issues in recruitment: In 1995, when the Special Forces Regiment in the Indian Army was disbanded, it was done purely because of manpower constraints as volunteers were not forthcoming. The fact that Indian troops have a strong preference for regional affiliation, provided by the country's system of regimentation, was ignored and the tenure-based system that replaced it just did not find favour with the troops. In this context, the socio-cultural and economic requirements of those who join the army need to be given due consideration. Tenure-based service considerations impact an individual's acceptance back in their original Regiment/Corps on completion of tenures, as this adversely affects promotion prospects of others in their parent units. It is thus important to address the issue of service rules and expectations which are grounded in the socio-cultural traditions of the armed forces.

Moreover, service considerations such as those that enable individuals to have their 'kith and kin' recruited on 'Unit Headquarters' quota are not available to tenure-based units, thereby rendering them unpopular. Moreover, tenure-based units that are permanently located at one place, such as the Special Action Groups of the NSG, tend to only attract servicemen from the immediate vicinity of their own homes, which adversely impacts training, operational preparedness and motivation. In general, tenure-based service rules have not been popular with new recruits and young soldiers.

The American and the British models of 'Special forces' may not be the right model for India, because America's reach, resources and capabilities are of an order of magnitude higher than what is possible in the Indian context. For example, US SOF, which number 66,000 have an 14 operational budget of US$ 10 billion which excludes pay and allowances and equipment costs. India, on the other hand, has a total defence budget of US $45-50 billion for all of its Armed Forces.

India would have to come up with a policy that is in consonance with its own unique requirements and the resources at its disposal. India also needs to avoid duplication of resources when setting up the SOC as the US did, in an effort to ensure that individual services continued to exert command and control over some of these forces. The establishment of the SOC must not also result in duplication of capability as there is every possibility of it becoming a white elephant with limited utility, a situation that needs to be avoided at all costs.

CONCLUSION

The ORF workshop examined the deployment of SOF in the tactical and strategic sphere, including the essential capacities and infrastructure for meeting their mission goals within the broader context of attaining India's foreign policy objectives and securing its strategic interests. To address the current deficiencies in India's SOF, the country needs to envision a SOF doctrine and strategy that stem from its exercise of CNP and the formulation of national security strategy.

Before charting the long-term requirements for India's SOF, several questions need to be answered. To what extent do India's strategic ambitions dovetail with the need for a more robust SOF? How does SOF fit into the larger context of India's conception of CNP? How should India address the prioritisation of the nature, scope and scale of SOF capabilities and their influence and reach in the short, medium and long term?

In today's dynamic environment, India's SOF not only need a good understanding of the strategic milieu, but also the requisite language, cultural and social skills to be able to shape the strategic environment to their advantage. In this regard, it is pertinent to learn from Multinational corporations (MNCs) which have cultivated the capability to safeguard their critical assets including people and other resources in conflict zones. In essence, India needs a sound strategic rationale for the constitution and deployment of its SOF in order to address special security challenges today and into the future.

Though India's SOF have been deployed in various mobilisations and wars, the operational roles of the special operations forces have not really changed in many years. India's existing SOF capabilities and organisational bias focus on India's ability to carry out a range of missions in a conventional war scenario, small-scale crossborder actions, and in combating insurgencies. The country has limited capabilities in dealing with 'Out of Area' contingencies.

Ultimately, the political mandate and direction for India's Special Forces should emerge from deliberations within the government. At a seminar held at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) in November 2004, then Indian Defence Minister (and current President of India) Pranab Mukherjee presented a remit for Indian Special Operations Forces that covered a wide 'arc' of the global terrain extending from the Cape of Good Hope to the Malacca straits, Central Asia and China. However, India's SOF has largely been confined to operations in India's own immediate neighbourhood. Clearly, the stage is set for India's foreign policy, strategic and military planners to address this lacuna as soon as possible.

India's sphere of influence is rapidly expanding beyond its immediate neighbourhood to encompass the Indian Ocean Region and beyond. The growing Indian diaspora and its increasing economic interests worldwide make it necessary for the government to invest in enhancing India's SOF capabilities to protect its interests abroad. The government must have the ability to utilise a wide range of SOF assets in its tool kit. Such flexibility and dexterity in SOF planning would provide the necessary synergy required to ensure that India can successfully meet its foreign policy, security and economic objectives in its areas of interest and influence at the time and place of its choosing.

ENDNOTES

1. Deepak Sinha, “Pathankot operation: Unmitigated disaster?” March 5, 2016, ORF Online Commentaries, http://www.orfonline.org/research/pathankot-operation-unmitigated-disaster/

2. The need for a Special Operations Command (SOC) was first mooted by the Naresh Chandra Committee task force that was set up to review higher defence management. The committee which was constituted in June 2011by the Government of India submitted its report in May 2012. Though the report is classified, the salient contents of the report have been widely discussed in think tanks and in the Indian media. Please see for example, Nitin Gokhale, “Naresh Chandra Task Force's Report on National Security: An Appraisal”, Vivekananda International Foundation, July 16, 2012, http://www.vifindia.org/article/2012/ july/16/naresh-chandra-task-force-s-report-on-national-security-an-appraisal#sthash.NR5JsYKW.dpuf http://www.vifindia.org/article/2012/july/16/naresh-chandra-task-force-s-report-on-national-securityan- appraisal

3. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Control Issue Stymies Creation of Indian Special Operations Command”, Indian Defence Review, January 17, 2016, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/land/2016/01/17/ control-issue-stymies-creation-indian-spec-ops-command/78731008/

4. For an in-depth historical evolution and overview of India's Special Forces, please see: Prakash Katoch and Saikat Datta, India's Special Forces: History and Future of Special Forces (New Delhi: Vij Books (P) Ltd, 2013).

5. India Today “Indian Army's Myanmar operation: 10 insider facts”, June 10, 2015. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indian-army-myanmar-operation-details-indian-airforce/ 1/443455.html

6. Price Waterhouse Coopers , “The World in 2050: Will the Shift in global economic power continue?”, February 2015, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/the-economy/assets/world-in-2050-february-2015.pdf

7. CLAWS Research Team, “Special Forces: Do we need a Unified Tri-service Command?”, Scholar Warrior, Autumn 2011, http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/1676494754_SpecialForceCLAWSResearchTeam.pdf

8. Ibid

9. Ibid

10. Ibid

11. Andrew Feickert, “U.S.Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service,November 19, 2015,

12. For an assessment of India's missing 'Indirect approach' to warfare, please see: Arzan Tarapore, “India's Use of Force: The Missing Indirect Approach”, ORF Brief, December 2015, http://www.orfonline.org/ research/indias-use-of-force-the-missing-indirect-approach/

13. Deepak Sinha, “Revamp National Security Guard”, The Pioneer, 18Jan 2016, http://www.dailypioneer.com/ columnists/oped/revamp-national-security-guard.html

14. Jim Thomas and Chris Dougherty, Beyond the Rampart: The Future of US Special Operations Forces, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington D.C, 2013.

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