Chinese credibility deficit

China’s defence exports have historically faced a credibility deficit, rooted in persistent performance and reliability issues. Repeated cases, such as Thailand and Algeria replacing crucial components in Chinese weapon systems with Western alternatives, underscore systemic shortcomings and enduring doubts. This perception has been reinforced in the previous years by instances such as the operational failure of ground combat platforms in African states as well as technical deficiencies in airborne early warning and control systems and frigate exports to Pakistan.

However, the most notable shock emerged during the Operation Sindoor clashes between India and Pakistan, where Chinese systems reportedly failed across domains. The episode ended up casting doubts on China’s capacity to sustain competitive defence exports and questioned the maturity and resilience of its broader military-industrial complex.

Dependence exposed in combat

Since the early 2000s, China has become Pakistan’s principal defence partner, significantly reshaping the region’s military balance. By the time of Operation Sindoor, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 81% of Pakistan’s defence inventory came from China. This was more than an arms trade, it reflected deep strategic dependence.

During Operation Sindoor, Chinese support even extended into space and signals. Beijing provided satellite reconnaissance, real-time targeting data, and secure ultra sets for satellite-based communications. Some of this intelligence, routed through the Pakistan Army, has reportedly reached even terrorists.

Pakistan’s order of battle was dominated by Chinese systems: J-10C and JF-17 fighter aircraft, JY-27A long-range air surveillance radars, and multiple surface-to-air missile systems. The Fatah rockets were modelled on China’s A300 rocket system. Chinese SH-15 self-propelled artillery was utilised on the Line of Actual Control. Beijing’s drones, such as the CH-4 and Wing Loong series, were crucial assets, backed by an extensive radar grid.

This set-up wasn’t just tactical, it also reflected structural shifts. Historically, Pakistan relied on its air force for air defence, with ground-based systems playing a secondary role. China helped build the Comprehensive Layered Integrated Air Defence (CLIAD) and expand the Air Defence Ground Environment System (ADGES) into central components of Pakistan’s posture. The JY-27A radar at Mianwali operated in the very-high frequency (VHF) band and tracked stealth aircraft up to 500 km. China’s YLC series radars, deployed across key installations, formed the core of Pakistan’s ADGES network. Pakistan’s CLIAD was built almost entirely with Chinese hardware: HQ-9Ps and HQ-16s for high- and medium-altitude coverage, HQ-17s, FM-90s, and FN-6s for short-range protection.

During Operation Sindoor, Chinese support even extended into space and signals. Beijing provided satellite reconnaissance, real-time targeting data, and secure ultra sets for satellite-based communications. Some of this intelligence, routed through the Pakistan Army, has reportedly reached even terrorists.

However, when the real tests came, Chinese weapon systems failed across domains. Drones were jammed, radars neutralised, and missile batteries underperformed. The much-touted ADGES and CLIAD crumbled in real combat. Pakistan’s deep military reliance on China-produced integration, not superiority, and for Islamabad, the cost of dependence became visible as the strategic alignment delivered hardware, not success.

China’s security apprehensions

Although Chinese internet commentators blamed Pakistan’s poor training and limited personnel competence for the underperformance of Chinese weapons during Operation Sindoor, the outcome revealed deeper flaws in China’s defence manufacturing. The operation exposed serious gaps in the capability and combat reliability of Chinese-made systems.

There are signs of innovation—civil-military fusion has helped Chinese manufacturers integrate advanced civilian technologies into weapons design. Yet, these gains are overshadowed by long-standing credibility apprehensions.

China’s state-dominated military-industrial complex has, since long, produced weapons that outwardly match Western or American systems in appearance and advertised specifications. Yet, most of these systems have never been battle-tested. Without real combat data, their actual performance remains speculative. Moreover, corruption in China’s defence sector is a well-known issue, raising doubts about the quality and integrity of production. The risk of compromised and underperforming systems remains high.

Still, this hasn’t stopped Beijing from inducting these weapons into its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or exporting them to friendly regimes or those with funds. Most of the surface-to-air missile systems and radars used in the May clashes form a central part of China’s own air-defence network. The JY-27A radar is deployed opposite Taiwan and India. Over 500 J-10 fighters are in PLA service. The PL-15 is its standard beyond-visual-range missile.

While Pakistan received export variants, concerns about reliability extend to China’s own versions. For instance, Beijing suspects that Moscow supplied a downgraded S-400 system to avoid the risk of reverse engineering, while India received a fully capable version. As a result, China finds itself in a bind—its domestic systems are often untested and prone to flaws, while its imported ones are restricted in capability. Compounding the problem, the West’s arms embargo since the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown continues to block China’s access to the advanced weaponry.

There are signs of innovation—civil-military fusion has helped Chinese manufacturers integrate advanced civilian technologies into weapons design. Yet, these gains are overshadowed by long-standing credibility apprehensions. As a result, a core question persists: Is the PLA truly prepared to fight and win the wars that the Chinese Communist Party intends to fight in the future?

Lessons for India

Operation Sindoor has revealed four key takeaways. First, China and Pakistan now form a de facto military partnership, integrating capabilities across space, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, cyber, electronic warfare, and communications. Though China avoids overt support, it tacitly bolsters Pakistan’s hand. Second, Chinese weapons, despite advanced outward appearances, performed poorly in battle. Beijing is now eager to study battlefield data to improve its systems. Third, India’s indigenous weapons are maturing, boosting both combat capability and export potential. Lastly, India must intensify local weapons development while selectively pursuing foreign collaboration. Timely induction of reliable indigenous systems is now central to India’s military and strategic preparedness.

• International Affairs
• Neighbourhood
• Domestic Politics and Governance
• Great Power Dynamics
• Defence and Security
• China Foreign Policy
• China
• China
• Chinese Military
• Chinese Weapons
• India
• India China
• PLA

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