A recent commentary in the Chinese government mouthpiece Global Times came down heavily on Foreign Minister S Jaishankar, accusing him of being an “obstacle” to “gradually improving China-India ties”. However, a closer look at the current Chinese discourse on India suggests that substantial resistance to improving China-India relations continues to come from within Chinese society.
It is true that a section of the Chinese strategic community is keen to create some positive atmospherics around China-India relations, projecting the impression that tensions between the two are gradually easing. Accordingly, there is much deliberation on the Chinese internet about a possible reset, even if “tactical”, in bilateral ties.
It is being argued that since 2024, China-India relations have shown signs of easing, with frequent high-level interactions. In July, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met Jaishankar in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan; at the end of August, the two met again in Vientiane, Laos. Such intensive high-level interactions have been rare in the past four years, which sends a positive signal to both domestic and international constituencies. In addition to high-level interactions, there has also been some progress in border affairs consultations.
As the exchanges and consultations between the two sides deepened, India, it is argued, has also begun to adjust its China strategy by gradually relaxing restrictions on Chinese investments and showing a positive attitude towards issuing visas to Chinese personnel.
At the end of July and August, the two sides held the 30th and 31st border affairs consultations in New Delhi and Beijing, respectively. As the exchanges and consultations between the two sides deepened, India, it is argued, has also begun to adjust its China strategy by gradually relaxing restrictions on Chinese investments and showing a positive attitude towards issuing visas to Chinese personnel.
The domestic public opinion in India, the Chinese side notes, is also quietly changing, with a growing consensus on the necessity of restoring Sino-Indian economic ties for India’s own economic development. According to some Chinese observers, the objective behind these efforts is to create the right conditions for a meeting between the two heads of state during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming visit to Kazan for the BRICS summit.
Why are “rumours” of conflict gaining traction?
On the other hand, in the past few days, sensational news of fresh clashes between Chinese and Indian soldiers have been doing the rounds on Chinese social media websites like Douyin and TikTok. These reports claimed that soon after the 31st meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on China-India Border Affairs (WMCC) was held in Beijing, the People's Liberation Army crossed the LAC, pursued the Indian Army to a depth of 20 kilometres, lost 6 soldiers in the process, but finally succeeded in recapturing the Chumar bunkers.
The timing of the campaign, the careful design of details (including specific dates, locations, and even the names of the victims), the professionalism on display took the Chinese internet by storm. So much so that on September 6, the PLA Western Theatre Command had to intervene and issue a statement, saying: “The internet is not a lawless place! The production and dissemination of rumours involving the military should be stopped!”
Social media platforms like South Asia Studies Newsletter, considered close to the Chinese government, went to great lengths in debunking these “rumours” and argued how such a “misinformation campaign” is completely out of sync with the current theme of the “warming up of China-India ties”.
Others sought to put the blame on certain vested interest groups within and outside China, accusing them of trying to sabotage the current positive trends in China-India ties. However, common citizens remained somewhat unconvinced by the explanations and wondered if the rumours were true. “There can be no smoke without fire! It may be that the timing of the announcement is contrary to the national strategic policy,” read one post on the Chinese social media website Weibo.
For India, this is reminiscent of the developments in 2013 as well as 2014, when high-level interactions between China and India took place under the shadow of serious border conflicts. Therefore, the lesson we need to draw is to stay prepared for conflicts, even as we tend to talk peace with China.
This commentary originally appeared in India Today.
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