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The role of technology has become ever more significant in global power dynamics, as seen in the intensified competition for technological advantage between the United States (US) and China. The competition for supremacy in an emerging new tech order is exacerbated by the vulnerabilities in supply chains resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. The Biden administration has laid the blame at China’s doorstep and initiated actions that seek to restore the tech-balance in America’s favour by ensuring a multigenerational advantage over Beijing in the long term. This brief situates the US-China relations in the new emerging tech order; analyses the actions taken by the Biden administration in response to China's technological advancement, including the executive orders, sanctions, and investment in emerging technologies; and evaluates the effectiveness of these measures and their potential impact on US-China relations and the global technology industry.
Introduction
The rapid advancement of technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and 5G networks, can potentially transform economies and societies and reshape the global balance of power. Emerging technologies are ushering a shift in the metrics of great-power competition. The promise of new and emerging technologies for critical sectors such as defence, research & innovation, and national security is immense. States are in heightening competition to develop and control cutting-edge technologies as they seek to gain advantages vis-à-vis other states in the pursuit of economic growth, innovation and national security.
In the past few years, the competition for technological supremacy has become particularly intense between the United States (US) and China, with both countries investing heavily in R&D, intellectual property protection, and talent development. For some years now, Washington has realised that for the first time since the end of the Second World War, the US could lose its qualitative and quantitative edge to China if it does not change the trajectory of its technological and innovation growth. The Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford had highlighted[1] this dilemma in 2017; subsequent administrations in the US have emphasised it more firmly.
Indeed, the US has historically dominated tech. In recent years, however, China has rapidly emerged as a formidable challenger, with its massive domestic market and a growing ecosystem of tech companies.[2] A recent report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) shows that China is leading the US in technologies related to advanced material and manufacturing; Artificial Intelligence, computing and communications; quantum; energy and environment; sensing, navigation; defence, space, robotics and transportation.[3] Until now, global innovation and growth in tech was primarily driven by the interlinkages between the US and China, along with a dependent interplay by other partner countries. For instance, China’s increasing trade deficit in electrical machinery (including semiconductor chips) from US$15 billion in 2001 to US$217 billion in 2021 depicts its dependence on foreign industrial goods with advanced technological features.[4] It was under the Trump administration (2017-2021) when the US placed strategic competition with China front and centre, seeking to renew the US’s competitive edge on tech: the elements of National Security Strategy (NSS) dealing with cyber security, space, intelligence and information statecraft have all been linked to the tech competition with China.
The US’s threat perception was fuelled by the investigations conducted by the US Trade Representative (USTR) in 2017. The investigation concluded[5] that China’s aggressive technology policies posed a significant risk to the US technology industry and the jobs associated with it. The report identified four ways in which China’s policies put US jobs at risk: forced technology transfer; license requirements at below-market rates; China’s acquisition of US technology for strategic purposes; and cyber theft. The US argued that these practices violated the provisions of the United States Trade Act of 1974, and the Trump administration filed a dispute against China under the provisions of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in March 2018, laying the groundwork for the technology decoupling with China. During the Trump presidency, tariff and export controls incentivised US companies to move their manufacturing bases out of China. The president also banned Chinese telecommunications equipment maker ZTE from buying American semiconductor chips and denied Chinese company Huawei access to US components.[6]
The Joe Biden administration has only reinforced the US’s bid to out-compete China, convinced that “China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.”[7] Some of the recent measures taken by the Biden administration, including those related to the regulation of export controls vis-à-vis critical and emerging technologies, seek to end the US’s dependence on China.
Today the US-China tech war encompasses a wide range of issues that include intellectual property rights, trade policies, and national security. The tariff war between the US and China preceded the tech competition which was foregrounded by the US decision to ban new Huawei and ZTE sales in the US in December 2022, citing security risks.[8] Both countries have implemented measures to protect their technology industries and promote their domestic companies. The US has, for instance, imposed tariffs on a wide range of Chinese goods including tech products; China, for its part, is focusing on its ‘Made in China 2025’[9] plan to become a global leader in advanced technologies such as AI and 5G. The tech order that is expected to emerge out of this rivalry will have significant implications for the future of technology and innovation globally. While competition can drive progress and lead to breakthroughs, it can also cause fragmentation and conflict, as both countries seek to protect their interests and assert their dominance.
The US tariff restrictions imposed by China as part of the trade war initiated under the Trump administration provided a context to the tech war that ensued. The first was a product of the Trump administration’s fixation with trade imbalance and a sense that China was subsidising its exports and that economic globalisation had hollowed out American manufacturing; the second has been about control of future technologies. This tech war is complex and continuously evolving, with both countries taking steps to limit the other’s access to key technologies and markets. Table 1 juxtaposes the tech war between the US and China with the wider tariff war that preceded it.
Table 1. U.S.-China Tech and Tariff Wars
| Consequential Year/s | Areas of Concern for the US | Steps/Events | |
| 1 | 2018 | Trade War Tariffs | In 2018, the US imposed tariffs on US$250 billion worth of Chinese goods, and China retaliated with tariffs on US$110 billion worth of US goods. The following year, the US imposed additional tariffs on US$300 billion worth of Chinese goods, and China responded with tariffs on US$75 billion worth of US goods.[10] |
| 2 | 2022 | Tech Company Restrictions | US restricted the ability of Chinese tech companies, such as Huawei and ZTE, to do business in the US and with US companies, citing national security concerns. China has had varying degrees of market access restrictions and coercive policies against US tech companies for much longer, but in December 2022, it took steps in retaliation for the sanctions and restricted access to its market for US tech companies. China’s banning of US chipmaker Micron from vital infrastructure projects is the latest example. |
| 3 | 2018 | Technology Transfer | The US accused China of engaging in forced technology transfer, where foreign companies are required to share their technology with Chinese partners in order to do business in the country. China denies these allegations. |
| 4 | 2022-23 | Semiconductor Industry | The US has sought to limit China’s access to US-made semiconductor technology primarily through export controls, while China has invested heavily in domestic semiconductor production. |
| 5 | 2018 | Intellectual Property Theft | The US has accused China of engaging in intellectual property theft, including through hacking and other means, in order to gain access to valuable technology and information. |
Source: Author’s own, using various open sources.
The stakes are high and the competition is fierce. The US-China tech rivalry could shape the future of the global technology ecosystem and carry far-reaching implications not just for the two countries but the world at large.
Biden’s Measures
President Biden’s approach to China is framed around both competition and cooperation. His administration has taken a tough stance on China’s human rights violations,[11] trade practices,[12] and military expansion in the Asia-Pacific region.[13] The Biden administration has maintained and expanded sanctions against Chinese officials and entities involved in human rights abuses in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. At the same time, the president has expressed willingness to work with China on issues such as climate change, global health, and nuclear non-proliferation. His administration has also emphasised the importance of maintaining open lines of communication with Chinese officials in order to prevent misunderstandings and reduce the risk of conflict. Overall, Biden’s approach to China appears to be based on the principles of “invest, align and compete”, and “cooperate wherever we can; we’ll contest where we must” as outlined by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in his China policy speech in May 2022.[14]
One domain where the US contests China is tech. To curb China’s competitiveness, it has been implementing stricter controls since 2017, affecting the transfer of technology across various sectors between the US and China. The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has imposed sanctions on the export to China of advanced semiconductors, chip-making equipment, and supercomputer components including advanced computing integrated circuits (ICs). Additionally, BIS is increasing regulations on transactions involving goods required for supercomputer and semiconductor manufacturing end uses.[15] For example, the updated regulation extends the range of foreign-produced items that require licenses to include 28 existing entities on the Entity List located in China. BIS has also stated that US individuals who support the development or production of certain ICs in China need a license. However, to lessen the immediate impact of this rule on the semiconductor supply chain, BIS introduced a Temporary General License that allows for specific, limited manufacturing activities in China for items designated for use outside of China.[16]
The US government argues that the steps taken by the BIS are aimed at preventing sensitive US technologies from falling into the hands of China’s military, intelligence, or security services.[17] This is part of the Biden administration’s response to China’s destabilising activities like provocative rhetoric, tech manipulation, flying PLA aircraft near Taiwan frequently, and weaponising the global commons. BIS is using export controls to counter China’s military-civil fusion strategy, military modernisation, WMD development, human rights abuses, and destabilisation efforts in the Indo-Pacific.[18] BIS maintains comprehensive controls related to China, including license requirements for military and spacecraft items, multilaterally-controlled dual-use items, and dual-use items intended for military use or military end-users in China. BIS has also expanded authorities, granted by Congress, to restrict specific activities of individuals or entities in the US to prevent support for weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related activities or military-intelligence purposes in China without proper authorisation.[19]
The US Entity List, which prevents companies from importing specific US items without a license, has expanded significantly from 130 to 532 entities between 2018 and 2022.[20] The list includes names of individuals, companies, businesses, and institutions that require a specific license for exporting, re-exporting, and/or transferring specified items to China. Most prominent Chinese companies and organisations involved in supercomputing and chip/semiconductor manufacturing are now on the US Entity List, such as Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. (SMIC), China’s leading semiconductor company. This has limited China’s access to critical US technologies. The extension of BIS’s “foreign product direct rule” to cover non-US items made using US technology has had a significant impact on Chinese companies such as Huawei. Most leading Chinese companies in the chip and semiconductor industry have been added to the Entity List.[a]
The BIS has also added some non-sensitive product manufacturing companies to the list, making it more difficult for China to circumvent export controls. These moves could lead to even harsher sanctions in the future. These measures have prompted US tech giants Dell and Hewlett Packard to make significant business decisions. Dell has announcing its intention to stop using Chinese chips by 2024, and Hewlett Packard withdrew from its joint venture with Tsinghua Unigroup, a semiconductor company based in Beijing.[21]
According to Alan Estevez, the Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, the US is taking action to prevent China’s military, intelligence, and security agencies from acquiring sensitive technologies that could have military applications.[22] On 25 August 2022, the Biden administration issued an Executive Order to implement the CHIPS Act of 2022,[23] which includes a series of export control measures that are expected to have significant impacts on China’s semiconductor industry. The measures include cutting off the supply of high-end semiconductor chips to China, preventing China from accessing global chip-making machines, and prohibiting US citizens (including Green Card holders) from working for Chinese semiconductor companies or providing them with support and expertise. This move by the US government signals a clear intent to separate from China, particularly in the high-technology sector. The US aims to achieve two main objectives with this strategy: to slow down China’s technological advancements, and to curb its economic and military ambitions.[24]
The CHIPS Act has allotted US$52.7 billion for semiconductor research and development over a period of five years. The Act also provides incentives for semiconductor manufacturing within the United States and includes ambitious plans for the expansion of the National Science Foundation, Department of Energy, and National Institute of Standards and Technology. These measures align with proposals outlined in the United States Innovation and Competition Act (USICA) and the COMPETES Act, both of which aim to establish a strong foundation for research, especially in STEM fields. Furthermore, the CHIPS Act introduces other new provisions, such as a 25-percent tax credit for investments in semiconductor manufacturing facilities within the US, restrictions on the expansion of semiconductor manufacturing in China, and authorisation of almost US$170 billion in funding over five years for research and development initiatives across multiple federal agencies.[25]
Since taking office, President Biden has taken several steps to address the challenge posed by China’s technology advancements:
The social media platform TikTok has emerged as the latest addition to US concerns, due to its control by Chinese parent company ByteDance. For some time now, lawmakers in the US and intelligence officials have expressed concerns that the Chinese government could potentially have access to the data of American users of TikTok. The Biden administration wants ByteDance to divest itself of TikTok to mark a clear dissociation from China.[31] Calls for banning TikTok in the US date back to 2020. The legislative grounds for the restrictions on TikTok and other foreign companies in the US have now been strongly laid under the Biden administration through its Restricting the Emergence of Security Threats that Risk Information and Communications Technology (RESTRICT) Act.[32] The proposed bill aims to give the US government authority to stop specific foreign governments from taking advantage of technology services functioning within the US that could potentially endanger sensitive information of Americans and the country’s national security. Under the RESTRICT Act, the US Commerce Department will have the ability to designate companies that have ties with foreign entities as potential threats to national security. The Biden administration has already ordered the removal of TikTok from all Federal employee devices. The decision has followed similar moves in Canada and the EU.[33]
With the RESTRICT Act, the Biden administration has sought to secure the ICT products and services supply chain by providing a framework for addressing high-technology risks in businesses and transactions. The legislation aims to equip the US government with new mechanisms to mitigate risks associated with high-risk technology companies that operate in the country. It provides a critical approach to address both individual and systemic risks posed by certain transactions with China in sensitive technology sectors. Through the implementation of the proposed bill, the Biden administration seeks to manage existing threats and proactively prevent such risks from harming US interests in the future.
Besides the above steps, in the coming months, the Biden administration is expected to bring out an executive order to ban investments in some Chinese technology companies and increase scrutiny of others.[34]
Persistent Uncertainty of US Steps
The Biden administration’s steps against China are yet to unravel with their full spectrum impact, making any holistic assessment a challenge at this stage. There are at least two ways in which the impacts of the tech war between US and China could manifest: First, what the export controls, sanctions and bans in the tech sector does to mutual trade and political relations; and second, how it affects global power balance with relationships shifting because of new tech-led support and realignments. The Biden administration may well be planning its next steps in imposing fresh export controls on the sale of artificial intelligence semiconductors to China. However, US companies like Nvidia have warned that any such restriction could bring hefty repercussions for its own economy. Already, the company has lost 2 percent of its shares.[35]
Yet, the trends emerging from these measures against China are revealing not just their repercussions on the global tech industry but also their inadequacies. This, because the Biden administration has found the US ability to completely choke funding of China’s tech sector—much of which continues to flow from US investors—limited. Despite measures by the Biden administration to slow China’s technological advance, a pressing concern still facing the US is how to stop the funding to China’s tech rise. The nature and implementation of the limitations will define their impact on investors. Currently, the proposed limitations on outbound investment seem to be directed towards private investment, specifically venture capital, instead of Chinese companies that are publicly traded.[36] Besides, an overall assessment of outbound investments from the US in China in the high-tech sector could prove costly for the Biden administration.
China’s disruptive tech capabilities and their use for espionage have become a concern for policymakers not only in the US. These concerns are perhaps most pronounced in the US, resulting in a stern policy response from Washington. The US is concerned about outbound American capital going to the Chinese technology sector. This has led to calls for screening investments and preventing any national security risks which may emanate from them. A Georgetown University report[37] examined American investment in Chinese AI firms from 2015 to 2021. The report identifies the primary US investors involved in the Chinese AI market and the Chinese AI firms that received US investment during this period. It also outlined the possible consequences and future steps for US policy. The following are some of the main points in the report related to US-China competition:
In 2020, China launched its own ‘Unreliable Entity List’ (UEL).[38] In February 2023, China placed two US companies on its UEL.[39] In its latest move, China has imposed export control on two rare-earth elements critical to manufacturing semiconductors: Gallium and Germanium. China is the largest producer of Gallium.[40] This decision comes on the back of the Dutch government’s restrictions on exports of certain semiconductor equipment.[41] The US is expected to ask more European partners to tighten export controls apropos China together with its own steps against Beijing.
While the US still maintains the lead over other countries, it is no longer unparalleled in the global technology space. The global technology space today is more diffused and competitive than even a decade back for various reasons: China has risen to be a peer-competitor of the US; a number of middle powers have carved out their own operational spaces in the tech sector; and most importantly, technology, in its manner of critical use, has itself evolved to necessitate a diffused dependence. These changes have made export control measures less effective than what the US desires. This also explains the singling out of the semiconductor and chips industry by the Biden administration to target China. Nevertheless, the success of the Biden administration’s policy in the semiconductor industry should not be measured in its ability to retard all tech development in China. Rather, for the US, the competition with China in chip manufacturing is about identifying the most cutting-edge nodes/aspects of the semiconductor ecosystem and denying China access to those.
At the global level, the US seeks to create new, restricted ecosystems, such as AUKUS, Quad, and trans-Atlantic partnerships in Europe which can arrive at rules that develop sanitised tech environments. The semiconductor industry remains less diffused than other tech sectors as manufacturing and supply remain limited only to a few countries. For instance, Japan, the Netherlands and the US together control close to 90 percent of chips-manufacturing equipment.[42] Despite interdependence as a core element of the semiconductor industry, the group of countries that can still manage control of production and supplies remains small, led by the US. The ‘CHIP 4’ alliance is perhaps the best illustration of how the US has moved to consolidate its lead over China in the tech industry along with other partners like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan—the world’s other top producers of semiconductors.
Global Impact
The US-China tech rivalry is bound to have implications for the rest of the world. After all, the US and China are the world’s largest economies and major players in the global tech industry and are competing for dominance in areas such as artificial intelligence, 5G technology, and advanced manufacturing with far-reaching effects on global markets, supply chains, and trade dynamics. Most recently, Europe has joined the contest, imposing its own export restrictions against Chinese entities and companies. In a letter to the Parliament, the Dutch trade minister announced restrictions on export of semiconductor technologies to ensure national security.[43] The restrictions are expected to impact European companies including the Dutch company ASML,[b] Europe’s key supplier to global chipmakers, including those in China. The decision is being seen as a US-led effort to gather like-minded countries to contain Beijing. Already, ASML is eyeing Southeast Asia for expansion, making plans to build semiconductor plants to reduce exposure to China.[44] Japan is part of the emerging consensus on chip equipment exports led by the US and is expected to soon announce its own steps in joining the US-led coalition against China. Already, in March 2023, Japan has unveiled a preliminary revision to a ministry regulation related to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act. The purpose of this revision is to enhance export controls on 23 specific types of equipment used in chip manufacturing.[45]
China’s position in the global chip supply chain is also expected to weaken in the wake of South Korea’s decision to integrate and align its interests in the industry with those of the US and Japan. Together with Taiwan, the US, Japan and South Korea are also boosting the CHIP 4 alliance. Recent efforts to improve relations between Japan and South Korea could further facilitate joint action on semiconductor supply chains.
China has reacted to these steps by the US with caution, while boosting its domestic capacities in the last decade. Chinese researchers have found that US sanctions imposed on the country’s high-tech industries have led to a 52.9-percent rise in research and development investment in these domestic sectors between 2010 and 2020.[46] However, the expenses associated with technological advancements have risen substantially, thereby complicating and decreasing the efficiency of innovative pursuits in China.[47]
The international tech isolation of China may yet prove to be the inflection point in reinvigorating internal cohesion and government-led push inside the country to seek a tech-led national resurgence. Indeed, the country has already embarked on a path to attain self-sufficiency in the tech sector. Chengdu, a technology hub in the southwest region, is providing subsidies worth US$72 million to semiconductor projects in the area as part of efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in chip manufacturing.[48] Chengdu’s municipal government introduced 12 new policies, including the provision of subsidies, to aid the city’s semiconductor industry. In 2022, the Chinese government announced a massive investment in its semiconductor industry to the tune of 1 trillion Yuan.[49] Over the past decade, China has made massive investments in this sector amounting to billions of US dollars. However, achieving self-reliance in semiconductor manufacturing is a difficult task, given its nature that involves multiple layers of the value chain. There have been notable accomplishments in producing lower-end chips in China, such as SMIC’s proficiency in 14nm chips and 7nm chips built just this year. However, the development of 5nm, and 3nm chips is lagging, and its large-scale production remains distant. Even the limited successes achieved so far have come at colossal costs and significant failures in major investment ventures for China.
Undoubtedly, there is strong emphasis on technological advancements and core technology, supported by various subsidies in China. Nevertheless, these measures do not guarantee favourable outcomes in the complex and competitive semiconductor industry. President Xi Jinping has given a call[50] to the private companies to fight international isolation along with the Communist Party at a time of increasing challenges at home and abroad: “In the coming period, the risks and challenges we face will only increase and become more severe. Only when all of the people think in one place, work hard in one place … can we continue to win new battles.”
Conclusion
The US-China tech rivalry has significant implications for the future of innovation globally. While competition can drive progress and lead to breakthroughs, it can also result in fragmentation and conflict, as both countries seek to protect their interests and assert their dominance in the domain. The US is expected to compete with China in the tech sector through a two-pronged strategy that involves domestic legislations and an international coalition of tech partners—with the two elements reinforcing each other to give it an edge over China in the long run. In this process, the US economy itself is expected to face headwinds from the impacts of its own strategic decoupling in specific sectors with China. Data from a recent DHL report on global interconnectedness suggests that despite trade figures between US and China having hit an all-time high of US$690.6 billion in 2022, there has been economic decoupling between the two countries in strategic sectors.[51] Furthermore, the proportion of Chinese goods in total US imports declined to 16.6 percent in 2022, marking a decrease from the 21.6 percent recorded in 2017.[52] Moreover, the lack of any directly commensurate response from China in response to the Biden administration’s export control measures should not be construed as a static policy for China. China’s strategy in this regard has been one of a cautious approach. Beijing may not see immediate and commensurate response to US steps in its economic interests. However, its retaliatory policies could gradually surface in specific sectors, even as its domestic capacities in such sectors grow, the time lag provides cushion to its economy for soft-landing, and if and when it finds alternative sectoral dependence away from the US pole globally.
Given current Chinese dependencies as well as US-led control of semiconductor industry, the chances of all the three possibilities may appear low. Yet, steps like the recent ban on US semiconductor giant Micron by China suggests that calculated retaliation is within Beijing’s plan when it looks to compete with the US in the chip manufacturing industry. With measures like tariff barriers, export controls, sanctions and blacklisting targeting Chinese entities, the US may be nudging China towards greater urgency in attaining self-reliance in the semiconductor industry and the critical and emerging technologies sector.
At the global level, China is likely to exhort partners like Russia, Iran and North Korea to script alternate pathways in the tech sector. Whether the Russia-Ukraine war could speed up this process, remains to be seen. After all, no one said Washington’s ambition to secure a multigenerational tech lead over Beijing would be an easy task.
Endnotes
[a] Among the affected companies is YMTC, China’s leading memory chip manufacturer.
[b] ASML, a company headquartered in Veldhoven, is a prominent worldwide producer of lithography machines that utilize light to create designs on silicon. Major customers like TSMC, Samsung, and China’s SMIC depend on the Dutch firm’s equipment to manufacture microchips in large quantities.
[1] U.S. Department of State, Jim Garamone, “Dunford Urges Congress to Protect U.S. Competitive Advantage,” https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1211668/dunford-urges-congress-to-protect-us-competitive-advantage/
[2] “China Emerges as Global Tech Innovation Leader,” The Wall Street Journal, October 30 2019, https://deloitte.wsj.com/articles/china-emerges-as-global-tech-innovation-leader-01572483727
[3] Jamie Gaida, Jennifer Wong-Leung, Stephan Robin and Danielle Cave, ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker: The global race for future power, Australian Strategic Policy Institute,
[4] Min-Hua Chiang, “China More Dependent on U.S. and Our Technology Than You Think,” The Heritage Foundation, July 7, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/china-more-dependent-us-and-our-technology-you-think
[5] Office of the United States Trade Representative Executive Office of the President, Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices related to Technology transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, March 22, 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF
[6] Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, Jue Wang, Yu Jie, James Crabtree, “US–China Strategic Competition: The Quest for Global Technological Leadership,” Chatham House, November 7, 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/11/us-china-strategic-competition/behind-us-china-trade-war-race-global-technological
[7] U.S. Department of State, The Administration’s Approach to People’s Republic of China, “Antony Blinken’s speech at The George Washington University, May 26, 2022, https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/
[8] Diane Bartz and Alexandra Alper, “U.S. bans new Huawei, ZTE equipment sales, citing national security risk,” Reuters, December 1, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/us-fcc-bans-equipment-sales-imports-zte-huawei-over-national-security-risk-2022-11-25/
[9] “Made in China 2025,” Institute for Security and Development Policy, June 2018, https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2018/06/Made-in-China-Backgrounder.pdf
[10] Dorcas Wong and Alexander Chipman Koty, “The US-China Trade War: A Timeline,” China Briefing, August 25, 2020, https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-us-china-trade-war-a-timeline/
[11] Jeff Mason, “Biden says China to face repercussions on human rights,” Reuters, February 17, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-china-idUSKBN2AH0AC
[12] Asma Khalid, “Biden kept Trump’s tariffs on Chinese imports. This is who pays the price,” npr, June 27, 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/06/27/1184027892/china-tariffs-biden-trump
[13] Edward Wong and Eric Schmitt, “Biden Aims to Deter China With Greater U.S. Military Presence in Philippines,” The New York Times, February 2, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/02/us/politics/us-china-philippines.html
[14] U.S. Department of State, “The Administration’s Approach to People’s Republic of China.”
[15] U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce Implements New Export Controls on Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), October 7, 2022, https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3158-2022-10-07-bis-press-release-advanced-computing-and-semiconductor-manufacturing-controls-final/file
[16] Federal Register, The Daily Journal of the United States Government, Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List Modification, October 13, 2022, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/10/13/2022-21658/implementation-of-additional-export-controls-certain-advanced-computing-and-semiconductor
[17] United States Department of Commerce, Statement of Alan F. Estevez Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearing entitled, “Combatting the Generational Challenge of CCP Aggression, February 28, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20230228/115362/HHRG-118-FA00-Wstate-EstevezA-20230228.pdf
[18] United States Department of Commerce, Under Secretary For Industry And Security, Statement of Alan F. Estevez, Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing entitled, “Combatting the Generational Challenge of CCP Aggression.”
[19] United States Department of Commerce, Statement of Alan F. Estevez Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearing Entitled, “Combatting the Generational Challenge of CCP Aggression.”
[20] Jon Bateman, “Biden Is Now All-In on Taking Out China,” Foreign Policy, October 12, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/12/biden-china-semiconductor-chips-exports-decouple/
[21] Ranjit Kumar, “US-China Tech War Is Opening A Big Door For India, And We Must Take Advantage,” abplive, March 12, 2023, https://news.abplive.com/india-at-2047/opinion-us-china-tech-war-opening-a-big-door-advantage-india-1587743
[22] U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce Implements New Export Controls on Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
[23] The White House, FACT SHEET: President Biden Signs Executive Order to Implement the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, August 25, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/25/fact-sheet-president-biden-signs-executive-order-to-implement-the-chips-and-science-act-of-2022/
[24] Vivek Mishra, “The Great US-China Tech Decoupling,” ORF, November 2, 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-great-us-china-tech-decoupling/
[25] Vivek Mishra, “The Great US-China Tech Decoupling.”
[26] The White House, FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Announces Supply Chain Disruptions Task Force to Address Short-Term Supply Chain Discontinuities, June 8, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/08/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-supply-chain-disruptions-task-force-to-address-short-term-supply-chain-discontinuities/
[27] The White House, FACT SHEET: The American Jobs Plan, March 31, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-plan/
[28] The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf
[29] Gavin Bade, “A sea change’: Biden reverses decades of Chinese trade policy,” Politico, December 26, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/12/26/china-trade-tech-00072232
[30] The White House, FACT SHEET: Executive Order Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Certain Companies of the People’s Republic of China, June 3, 2021,
[31] James Clayton and Ben Derico, “TikTok says US threatens ban if China stake not sold,” BBC News, March 16, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-64973156
[32] The White House, Statement from National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on the Introduction of the RESTRICT Act, March 7, 2023,
[33] Alex Hern, “Canada bans TikTok on government devices over security risks,” The Guardian, February 28, 2023.
[34] “Joe Biden plans to bar some U.S. investments in China, track others,” The Economic Times, February 11, 2023, https://telecom.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/joe-biden-plans-to-bar-some-u-s-investments-in-china-track-others-sources/97815798
[35] Asa Fitch and Yuka Hayashi, “Nvidia Warns of Lost Opportunities if U.S. Bans AI Chip Exports to China,” WSJ, June 28, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/nvidia-warns-of-lost-opportunities-if-u-s-bans-ai-chip-exports-to-china-293fa911?mod=hp_lead_pos6
[36] Reshma Kapadia, “The Latest U.S.-China Worry: Another Ramp-Up in the Tech Cold War,” Barron’s, September 18, 2022, https://www.barrons.com/articles/us-china-relations-tech-cold-war-51663425467
[37] Emily S. Weinstein and Ngor Luong, “U.S. Outbound Investment into Chinese AI Companies,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University, 2023, https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-U.S.-Outbound-Investment-into-Chinese-AI-Companies.pdf
[38] Morrison & Foerster LLP, China’s “Unreliable Entity List” Will Be In A Dilemma When Multinational Companies Respond To US Sanctions And “Long-Arm Enforcement, JDSUPRA, October 12, 2020, https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/china-s-unreliable-entity-list-will-be-79355/
[39] Frank Pan and Ivy Tan, “China Added Two US Companies to the Unreliable Entities List, Blog by Baker McKenzie, February 21, 2023, https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/china-added-two-us-companies-to-the-unreliable-entities-list/
[40] Hanna Ziady and Xiaofei Xu, “China hits back in the chip war, imposing export curbs on crucial raw materials,” CNNBusiness, July 3, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/03/business/germanium-gallium-china-export-restrictions/index.html
[41] Michael Race, “Dutch to restrict chip equipment exports amid US pressure,” BBC, July 1, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-66063594#
[42] Vivek Mishra (2023), “The Great US-China Tech Decoupling.”
[43] Dutch to restrict semiconductor tech exports to China, joining U.S. effort, CNBC, March 08, 2023.
[44] Francesco Guarascio and Toby Sterling, “Exclusive: Chip equipment maker ASML’s suppliers eye Asia plants outside China amid tensions,” Reuters, March 11, 2023,
[45] Japan to tighten controls on semiconductor exports to China, The Japan Times, May 22, 2023, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/05/22/business/semiconductor-exports-china/
[46] Stephen Chen, “US sanctions boost China’s R&D investment and output in some hi-tech fields: Chinese study,” South China Morning Post, March 14.
[47] Stephen Chen, US sanctions boost China’s R&D investment and output in some hi-tech fields: Chinese study.
[48] Ann Cao, “Tech war: southwestern tech hub Chengdu offers US$72 million in subsidies to local semiconductor projects amid China’s chip self-sufficiency drive, South China Morning Post, March 10, 2023,
[49] Matthew Gooding, “China has a $143bn semiconductor plan to beat US chip sanction,” TechMonitor, December 13, 2023,
[50] Laura He, “Xi Jinping hits out at US as he urges China’s private firms to ‘fight’ alongside Communist Party,” CNN Business, March 7, 2023,
[51] Steven A. Altman and Caroline R. Bastian, DHL Global Connectedness Index 2022,
[52] Steven A. Altman and Caroline R. Bastian, DHL Global Connectedness Index 2022.
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Vivek Mishra is a Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research interests include America in the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific and Asia-Pacific regions, particularly ...
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