The term Low Intensity Conflict Operations (LICO) has gained wide currency among the Indian armed forces. It is a war waged by the State against guerrillas, insurgents and subversives, and includes a wide range of military initiatives that have a limited dimension of firepower. It also has political and economic instruments. All actors that engage in national liberation, insurgency, terrorism and guerrilla warfare come into this category. From the perspective of guerrilla/insurgents/freedom fighters the primary aim of
these conflicts is to challenge the existing government or a political system. Individuals/groups that feel aggrieved or oppressed take recourse to violence and engage in conflicts to achieve political, social or even economic goals. These conflicts involve a protracted struggle of competing principles and ideologies.

The non-state actors aim to weaken/challenge state authority by application of force to an extent that it is short of conventional war. Such conflicts have proliferated in several developing countries and at times are supported, aided, abetted and directed by external forces to achieve political and ideological goals. To that extent, the identity of such actors has also gone through a metamorphosis resulting in debates that centre on expressions such as ‘one man’s freedom fighter is another’s terrorist/insurgent’. In India, LICO is broadly divided into three categories: internal security, counter insurgency and counter terrorism. It is a limited politico-military action by the state to achieve political, social, economic or psychological objectives.

Warfare at sea is traditionally concerned with safeguarding Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), maritime interdiction, sea denial, sea control, and defence of maritime infrastructure. The post Cold War security environment is under transformation and the nature of future conflict at sea is undergoing a paradigm shift.

These conflicts can be categorised into linear and non-linear conflicts. Linear conflicts involve conflicts between states i.e. historical pattern of warfare, whereas non-linear conflict are between the state and the non-state/sub-state actors. The non-linear actors rely on asymmetric strategies and their tools include terrorism, information warfare and threat of use of weapons of mass destruction.

Till the 1990s, the navies were structured to handle linear conflicts. The nuclear doctrines were based on ‘counter value’ and ‘counter force’ targeting while the conventional forces were tailored to engage in classical warfare involving sea control and sea denial. However, in the post-Cold War period, the spectrum of threats at sea has undergone a major transformation. Non-state actors, terrorist groups and insurgents/militants are challenging national security forces. These groups have modified their strategy from low intensity conventional terrorism to total destruction. The intensity and lethality of attacks have also reached extreme proportions. Besides, the numbers of such groups and networks have increased exponentially and mushroomed all over the world. Three attacks on warships in the space of a month in the year 2000 have exposed the vulnerability of naval vessels too. These incidents have forced naval forces to seriously reexamine the changing nature of unconventional threats as also the tactics and the modus operandi of its actors.

This paper examines the concept of asymmetric warfare and Low Intensity Maritime Operations (LIMO). It identifies the actors as also the changing nature of their tactics. The paper argues for restructuring of naval forces as response and deterrence to asymmetric and LIMO actors that the Indian Navy will encounter in the coming years.