India has had an active space programme for several decades. Use of space technology for socio-economic development has been Iemphasised from the time of its inception. Addressing this aspect in the goals and motivations of India’s space programme, Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, one of India’s space pioneers, had said decades ago, “There are some who question the relevance of space activities in a developing nation. To us, there is no ambiguity of purpose…. We are convinced that if we are to play a meaningful role nationally and in the community of nations, we must be second to none in the application of advanced technologies to the real problems of man and society.” Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, also made a similar pitch while outlining India’s science policy in 1958.

While space has remained critical for India’s developmental mission, New Delhi has not shied away from pursuing advances in space technology; especially when it saw the relevance of such technology in the national security context. Pursuing space technology was also driven by a sense of building technological power.

Even as the importance of space in national security is understood and acknowledged, India continues to maintain a policy of nonweaponisation of outer space. It has persistently argued against the militarisation of outer space, both in domestic and international settings. Instead, India has consistently advocated the idea that space should be open for all nations to exploit for peaceful purposes only. This policy direction as well as an interest in establishing international frameworks to regulate outer space affairs has been repeatedly articulated by India in the relevant multilateral fora.

However, while the potential use of space assets for enhancing national security, including technology dominance, was always understood by the leadership, this objective was not given any prominence. While remote sensing satellites in the past have provided outputs for the military, India has by and large adhered to the principle of non-weaponisation and maintained a civil space programme. This policy is undergoing change, as witnessed by the launch of the GSAT-7 satellite, India’s first dedicated military satellite. Regional and global realities are compelling India to change tack. Despite a slow start, India is progressing towards developing the necessary military characteristics in its space programme. Indeed, the balance may be shifting in favour of national security arguments, more so today than ever in the past. India’s political masters have recognised that as space faring nations across the world are assigning an increasingly militaristic role to their space assets, India’s inaction will not only leave it unprotected, but will also leave it lagging behind in terms of critical capabilities.

Given the new dynamism in the debate, this paper makes the case for a military space programme for India. The first part of the paper examines the initial phases of the Indian space programme and policy. The second part looks at the indications of fluctuation in India’s traditional outlook towards space and the third section details the logic of a military space programme, operational framework for military utilisation, and the current and planned usage of space. The last section looks at five key contextualising factors that should help India make a case for a military space programme, which would reflect in better infrastructure, greater resources and, more importantly, clarity in India’s space policy. These are: the growing debates between militarisation and weaponisation, growing trends in weaponisation, the role of private sector in enhancing India’s military space profile, global mechanisms, and global debates in international rule-making that might constrain India’s options in the future should India decide not to act now. Such an articulation will also have significant value as a message to both friends and foes alike.