Special ReportsPublished on Mar 02, 2006 PDF Download
ballistic missiles,Defense,Doctrine,North Korea,Nuclear,PLA,SLBM,Submarines

A Deal too Far?

On the eve of President George W. Bush's visit to India and Pakistan, both sides are racing to complete the nuclear agreement announced in the July, 18, 2005 communiqué between Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh the time he reaches

The idea of a nuclear bargain, or “half-way house,” involving India’s civil and nuclear weapons programs is at least twenty years old. It was for many years dismissed out of hand by policymakers and strategists in both the US and India. For India’s nuclearestablishment, such an arrangement was characterized as the thin edge of a wedge allowing the Americans to first cap, then roll-back, and finally eliminate the Indian weapons program. On the American side such a compromise has usually been viewed seen as unacceptable in terms of larger American non-proliferation goals, as it would “reward” India for its covert weapons program and serve as a bad example for other states. Here, too, there was a wedge: in this case, the Indians would be undercutting the entire non-proliferation regime, centered on the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

On the eve of President George W. Bush’s visit to India and Pakistan, both sides are racing to complete the nuclear agreement announced in the July, 18, 2005 communiqué between Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh the time he reaches New Delhi on March 1, and there is a good chance that, as Stephen Hadley, Bush’s National Security Advisor noted in a press briefing, negotiations will continue. Informed observers on both sides claim that agreement can be reached before the end of 2006, and implemented over the next few years.

The history and fate of this agreement will preoccupy journalists and scholars for months, if not years, to come. This note examines three of its aspects:

(i) How did the two countries reach this point, and what are the politics of “the deal” in both countries?;

(ii) What consequences might flow from its consummation or collapse?;

(iii) Finally, “how much is enough?” Even though this is purportedly an agreement to allow India to acquire civilian nuclear technology, most attention has been focused upon its military and strategic implications. 

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