Will Trump’s TRIPP Trip or Triumph? A New Playbook in the Caucasus

The ongoing conflicts around the world in recent years, especially in Europe and the Middle East, have overshadowed some of the more enduring regional ones. Donald Trump seems to be actively looking for conflict resolution opportunities in a bid to secure a Nobel Peace Prize. The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, which since the 1990s has fragmented the Southern Caucasus, presented one such opportunity.

The joint declaration between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and US President Donald Trump has ostensibly charted a new trajectory in the South Caucasus, bringing an end to hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the sovereignty of the disputed Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. More importantly, the declaration called for establishing the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) in the region of Syunik, also known as the Zangezour corridor, connecting Azerbaijan to its exclave in Nakhchivan through Armenia. Expectedly, the American presence in the South Caucasus region has irked Russia and Iran, both for different reasons. While it remains to be seen if Trump’s latest bet can secure peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the long term, the recent agreement ushering the US into the sub-region, which is awfully close to Iran and is considered Russia’s traditional backyard, underlines new realities in the South Caucasus.

US President Donald Trump has ostensibly charted a new trajectory in the South Caucasus, bringing an end to hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the sovereignty of the disputed Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan.

The 7-point declaration called for the normalisation of bilateral relations, not bound by conflicts of the past, consistent with the United Nations Charter and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1991. The agreement called for the dissolution of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk Group, which was established for the resolution of the conflict. The United States’ growing interest in the South Caucasus is reflected in entries 3 and 4 of the joint declaration, which call for the strengthening of connectivity linkages between the two countries, and more importantly, emphasise that Armenia would work with the United States to develop a framework to establish the TRIPP. Earlier, the Trump corridor idea was floated by the American Ambassador to Turkey, Thomas Barrack, who referred in July to the possibility of Armenia leasing a part of the Syunik province to the US for a period of 99 years, under which Washington would have exclusive development rights over the corridor, solidifying its position in the South Caucasus.

Both Iran and Russia, while welcoming the peaceful resolution of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, are opposed to Washington’s control over the corridor. Tehran, sanctioned by Washington, perceives the creation of such a corridor near the Iranian border as a potential threat to its sovereignty. Moscow continues to wield considerable influence in Armenia, with a base in Gyumri, near the Armenia-Turkey border, and a central role in the operation of Armenia’s only nuclear plant at Metsamor.

Yerevan, a member of the Moscow-backed Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), could face questions about the agreement’s compatibility with the rules of the Union, particularly its cornerstone legislation regarding the free movement of goods and services. The US presence and control over the corridor could influence the movement of goods and services across the border. Furthermore, considering Iran has a free trade agreement with the EAEU, any hindrance to Tehran’s access would violate the common customs agreement. Russia’s own game in the Southern Caucasus is shifting rapidly. For instance, Armenia has, in recent years, taken control of manning its borders with Iran and Turkey—a task earlier carried out by the Russian military. Perhaps, the bigger questions looming over the unfolding geopolitics in the South Caucasus concern how Russia will deal with an Armenia that is inching away from its orbit, and what will happen after the Russia-Ukraine war ends.

In the aftermath of the TRIPP understanding, positions have significantly shifted, with Armenia agreeing in principle to grant Azerbaijan transit access through its territory.

Russia’s position on the resolution of the conflict and connectivity remains consistent and is most aptly captured in the 2020 joint agreement between Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, which called for the construction of a corridor linking Nakhchivan to Baku. Notably, Armenia and Iran have traditionally opposed the construction of the Zangezur corridor, citing security concerns over granting Azerbaijan access through Armenian territory. However, in the aftermath of the TRIPP understanding, positions have significantly shifted, with Armenia agreeing in principle to grant Azerbaijan transit access through its territory.

This shift appears to have been triggered by both internal factors and externalities. National elections in Armenia next year, together with a rapidly escalating political feud that has sparked fears of a coup, have forced Pashinyan’s hand. On the other hand, Azerbaijan’s successful military operations against Armenia in 2020 and 2023 have allowed Baku to insist on maximalist demands from Yerevan as part of its domestic posturing. The 2023 conflict saw Baku gaining total military control over Nagorno-Karabakh. Amidst all this, Moscow, traditionally the balancer in the region and Armenia’s key ally, remained embroiled in the Ukraine conflict and, as such, was unable to influence the balance of power in the region or intervene to protect Armenia’s interests. Additionally, Turkey’s footprint in the South Caucasus has also increased; Ankara is a close ally of Baku, and its role in Azerbaijan’s military modernisation was instrumental in the country’s recent military successes. These shifts, and the absence of a regional stabiliser, have resulted in Armenian foreign policy undergoing a soft recalibration, pivoting away from Moscow. Pashinyan aims to normalise Armenia’s relations with Azerbaijan, and even improve relations with Türkiye, reflecting both domestic and international constraints. In June, in a historic visit, Pashinyan met Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Istanbul and called for diplomatic solutions to resolve hostilities. Domestically, these shifts have not been perceived favourably, leading to protests across the country and weakening Pashinyan’s political standing.

This shift appears to have been triggered by both internal factors and externalities.

Despite the obvious apprehensions voiced by Iran and Russia, Baku and Yerevan seem intent on coming to terms with external mediation through US presence in the South Caucasus. In August 2025, Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian visited Armenia to meet Pashinyan, and both leaders concluded 10 agreements and agreed to elevate ties to a strategic partnership. Pashinyan convinced Iran that the proposed corridor will remain under the control of the Armenian authorities, and agreed to build a second bridge across the border to strengthen trade. Days later,  Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk visited Armenia and supported the peace process in the South Caucasus, while stating that Russia would study the details of the corridor between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While Yerevan’s delicate balance may have pacified Tehran and Moscow for now, much will depend on how the US role develops. A lot depends on how the guarantees from the US take shape during and after the Trump administration. If Washington’s transactional approach shifts under the next presidency and Russia is able to refocus on the South Caucasus, a new geopolitical gambit awaits. Finally, a new power axis has emerged in the South Caucasus through the strengthening Turkey-Azerbaijan partnership, ushering in dynamics that may not align entirely with either the US or the Iran-Russia camp. These complications pose tremendous challenges for Trump’s new stratagem.

Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director – Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

 Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

• International Affairs
• US Foreign Policy
• India
• USA and Canada
• armenia azerbaijan conflict
• armenia azerbaijan peace agreement
• conflicts in south caucasus
• middle east crisis
• organisation for security and cooperation in europe
• russia ukraine war
• south causcus region
• trump route for international peace and prosperity
• Zangezur corridor

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