Author : Kabir Taneja

Expert Speak Raisina Debates
Published on Oct 16, 2021
The victory of Taliban in Afghanistan is altering the Islamist jihad landscape, making it more complex as various actors engage in regional and strategic tussle
Under the Taliban bonnet: Al Qaeda—ISKP rivalry and its security implications for India

More than two months after the Taliban took over control, Afghanistan has only spiralled deeper into crisis. Over this period, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) attacks against Afghan civilians and the Taliban have increased many fold, presenting the group with an immediate security challenge.

Taking a step back, the Taliban, an insurgency itself, is now tasked with running a state, and by association, a counterterrorism programme against the likes of ISKP. This role reversal for the Taliban is easier said than done; today, the group and its interim regime are responsible for the well-being of millions of suffering Afghans, a shattered economy, a humanitarian crisis, and a deteriorating security situation. Unsurprisingly, some of the challenges being faced by the Taliban are the same ones that the Taliban itself chastised both the governments of former Presidents, Hamid Karzai and President Ashraf Ghani for. The Taliban—an insurgency of 20 years—coming into power on the back of a militant takeover, is now bound by a nation state, as it desired, and is required to act as an internationally acceptable political actor. Much of the current situation in Afghanistan is reminiscent of Iraq and Syria beginning in the years after 2010, as towns and villages in 2013 accepted “security” and “governance” offered by the so-called Islamic State—also known as IS, ISIS or Daesh in Arabic—due to lack of options, weaponisation of ethnic fault lines, threats, intimidation, and, up to a certain extent, as part of efforts by local populations to end the never-ending cycles of violence.

The Taliban, an insurgency itself, is now tasked with running a state, and by association, a counterterrorism programme against the likes of ISKP.

Since the massive terror strike by ISKP on Kabul Airport in August, the group has claimed dozens of terror attacks. The history of the ISKP itself is not detached to that of the Taliban, and while the so-called Islamic State is often seen from the lens of the group’s juggernauts between 2013 and 2018 in Syria and Iraq, the ISKP branch is very much the product of the Af-Pak region. This means that this region’s Islamist and jihadist dynamics are what fuel the ISKP machinery, from finance to manpower. There is in fact little known correlation as of today between the Islamic State’s leadership, which is not very well-defined anymore to begin with, and its Afghanistan chapter. As scholar Abdul Basit highlights, in 2015, Taliban leader Akhtar Muhammad Mansoor wrote to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to try and dissuade him from launching or supporting an IS wilayat in Afghanistan, fearing intra-militant divisions hampering the larger aim of fighting against the US. Arguably, this, indeed, has been the result—and, perhaps, what Baghdadi wanted.

An extended battle between the Taliban and ISKP has regional implications for South Asia ranging from Pakistan’s multiple proxy-projects designed against India to transnational jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda, who fought in the trenches with the Taliban against the US and relate to the new power centre in Kabul through a shared history of sacrifice, ideology, and theology. Despite the Taliban’s claims, Al-Qaeda remains a strong and omnipresent force in Afghanistan and Pakistan alike. Both the IS and Al-Qaeda have a significant history that goes much beyond Afghanistan, and the groups being at loggerheads with each other can become cause for concern in South Asia on two main fronts, on narratives, and on operations.

 AQ vs ISKP in narratives 

Over the past week, Al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) released two near 20-minute-long propaganda videos specifically targeting India. While this is not new for the AQ affiliate, the videos this time were more pointed and detailed than what has been released previously. The first video, released by As-Sahab Media and titled ‘Don’t Sit Idly Grieving’, is a collection of shorter videos trawled from social media showing persecution of Muslims in India and asking for Indian Muslims to rise against these events. The theme of the video is not new and is in fact similar to the kind of write-ups pro-IS publications like Sawt-al-Hind aimed towards India. It has a taunt-like narrative and a hint of frustration with the fact that Muslims in India have not reacted to such communal discrepancies. While this release also mentioned Kashmir, it has a broader narrative of trying to insert itself into societal fissures, hoping to piggyback on often divisional debates around majoritarian and minority politics in the country.

Both the IS and Al-Qaeda have a significant history that goes much beyond Afghanistan, and the groups being at loggerheads with each other can become cause for concern in South Asia on two main fronts, on narratives, and on operations.

The second video, which was released only a few hours after the first, was titled ‘Kashmir is ours’. This release was much more nuanced from the usual affairs released by AQIS. The masked Kashmiri man leading the monologue detailed a much more strategic take rather than just an ideological or theological one, placing AQIS as an alternative to both a ‘normal’ life in Kashmir and to aa life under Pakistan’s ISI patronage, marketing AQIS to local Kashmiri groups as an alternative umbrella to operate under—a translation of this ‘offer’ could be availability of money and weapons via AQIS. Interestingly, the video asks Kashmiri militants to join jihad independent from Pakistan and ISI patronage. AQIS’s narratives on Kashmir are consistent with AQ’s narrative on the issue in the past.

Meanwhile, the ISKP in its last issue of Sawt-al-Hind surprisingly took a much broader route than the more targeted narratives of AQIS on Kashmir. Much of the previous issue published by the ISKP was dedicated to a larger ideological battle the group subscribes to and highlighted in its writings a developing collaboration between Shia Muslims and right-wing politics and political parties in India as a threat to both a larger Islamic narrative ISKP has for Kashmir and an extended South Asia. Much of what pro-IS media aimed at South Asia propagates is an extension of ISKP’s operations and ideological vision being played out in Afghanistan. The recent bombing of a Shia Mosque in Afghanistan’s Kunduz province that killed dozens of people offers a kinetic example of ISKP’s larger narrative that stand at odds with the Taliban.

AQ vs ISKP in operations 

Amidst an increase in terror attacks in Kashmir, Islamic State Hind Province (ISHP), an unorganised offshoot of the ISKP, claimed an attack against a non-Kashmiri street hawker in Srinagar earlier this month. The group also released a video via its online intermediaries showcasing the killing. The reasons behind this claim by ISHP could be two-fold: First, to highlight their presence on the ground, however small it may be; and second, to showcase that they are willing to work with local groups to support their causes. Co-opting of existing terror groups and extremist environments by larger entities is a tried and tested mechanism of gaining agency in any conflict theatre at a nominal price. For Al-Qaeda, which had lost significant ground to IS over the years, victory of the Taliban has brought in an opportunity for the group to reinvigorate itself. Offshoots such as AQIS in South Asia are better placed to operate in a more aggressive manner than Al-Qaeda’s central leadership, which could remain in the background of the developing landscape in Afghanistan to aid Taliban’s efforts for international legitimacy. However, an extended Al-Qaeda–IS tussle remains an under-researched issue around the takeover of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Much of the previous issue published by the ISKP was dedicated to a larger ideological battle the group subscribes to and highlighted in its writings a developing collaboration between Shia Muslims and right-wing politics and political parties in India as a threat to both a larger Islamic narrative ISKP has for Kashmir and an extended South Asia.

Even amongst terror groups operating in and around the Kashmir issue, strategic plays often outweigh ideological weight. Kashmiri militant groups are wary of transnational jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda or IS/ISKP becoming minders of their struggle and taking over local narratives around which both violence and recruitment is designed. This includes Pakistan-backed groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, who, ideally, would like to maintain Rawalpindi’s monopoly in this space and could push back against the likes of AQIS.

To put this in further perspective, the group The Resistance Front (TRF), which claimed the assassination of reputed Kashmiri Pandit pharmacist, Makhan Lal Bindroo, in a statement said, “We only target those who are involved in anti-Kashmir cause. We don’t use religious card in carrying out our operations against stooges and collaborators”. The attempt here is to segregate Kashmiri cause into nationalist and ideologist binaries. In older propaganda about Kashmir by pro-ISIS entities released in 2014-15, the group’s supporters suggested that Kashmir was not on the top of their list as it was a fight for land between ‘nationalists and patriots’ (Pakistan’s proxies) and the non-believers (Indian state and armed forces), and not Islam. This, in fact, has been a deterrence for both AQIS and IS to setup a larger presence within the fissures of the Kashmir discourse, even as Pakistan’s intelligence is known to have broken into the ISKP framework in Afghanistan back in 2015.

Threat perception for India

The Islamist jihad landscape around the victory of the Taliban is expected to become more intertwined and complex, and the effects of ideological and strategic tussles amidst various actors and groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan alike will, by association, have implications for India’s security and counterterror preparedness. While upscaling of both IS and Al-Qaeda narratives on India, ranging from Kashmir to Assam, does not automatically mean higher influence or operational range for either, both having struggled to make any major impact on India. The potential of the Afghan landscape descending into chaos in a similar manner such as Syria remains a regional concern. For Delhi, the single biggest deterrent policy lies in a strengthened domestic political narrative and environment, which disallows space for such narratives and operators that have already failed, both ideologically and strategically, in India, for decades.

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Author

Kabir Taneja

Kabir Taneja

Kabir Taneja is a Deputy Director and Fellow, Middle East, with the Strategic Studies programme. His research focuses on India’s relations with the Middle East ...

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