Image Source: Getty
This article is part of the series, "Reignited agendas: Trump’s return and its global repercussions"
Donald Trump’s decisive victory in the 2024 American presidential elections is being seen as good news by many in the Middle East. The war in Gaza has continued unabated, and its spillover into Lebanon along with increased Israeli military actions in Syria and also as far as Yemen, have expanded fears of a region-wide conflagration. The expectation is that Trump will push various parties to cease hostilities while simultaneously taking a harder stance against Iran.
It was a different Middle East during Trump’s first term. Under his administration, the historic Abraham Accords were signed, normalising ties between a group of Arab states and Israel in 2020. While the Accords still stand in light of the crisis in Gaza, as civilian casualties rise with little to no end of hostilities in sight, the Arab-Israeli friction is palpable, and the region Trump left behind has drastically changed. Resolving the current challenges will be a herculean task as Trump will be expected to bring all parties to agree on a quick ceasefire. To do so, the President-elect will need to reign in Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has largely ignored calls from the now outgoing administration of Joe Biden. Instead, Netanyahu has managed to make the United States (US)-Israel power dynamic look lopsided, where Israel acted like a superpower and US the middle power.
Resolving the current challenges will be a herculean task as Trump will be expected to bring all parties to agree on a quick ceasefire.
However, tactically, Trump’s return to the White House will put some of the core security architectures in the Middle East under a spotlight at a time when regional conflict and reorientation is already underway. For example, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman called upon Israel, and by association the US, to not threaten Iranian sovereignty. Despite fundamental differences between Riyadh and Tehran, who remain arch regional rivals, the Saudis are adamant to not get embroiled in a broader Iran-Israel war. Furthermore, the Arab world has its own conundrums to take care of—the biggest one being striking a balance between taking the correct moral stance on the Palestinian crisis, while simultaneously protecting economic gains made over the years.
Trump is expected to take a hard stance against Iran, as he did during his first term. However, the rules of engagement in 2025 will be quite different from those in 2016. US facilities in places like Iraq have been targeted by militias aligned with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).While Washington has responded, it has not taken on Iran directly. Trump was also in favour of removing the residual US presence of about 900 soldiers in Syria, only to be dissuaded by his previous advisers. These 900 soldiers are nothing but a moral aide to the Syrian Democratic Alliance, a Kurdish-led military union responsible for fighting the so-called Islamic State (also called ISIS or Daesh in Arabic) and maintaining makeshift prisons that house pro-ISIS militants. Despite Iran hawks preparing to populate Trump’s national security apparatus once again, it is useful to remember that the most significant of such personalities, John Bolton, previously served Trump as his National Security Advisor and found the president too erratic to deal with.
Trump was also in favour of removing the residual US presence of about 900 soldiers in Syria, only to be dissuaded by his previous advisers.
This leaves the region with many unknowns. Trump’s history with Iran means that there will be continued personal interest. It simultaneously also opens up the possibility of Tehran’s proxies being more active against US interests or facilities, which could in turn garner an American military response against the Shia state. The US Justice Department has alleged that an Iran-backed plot to assassinate Trump was afoot. While Iran has denied the existence of any such plot, it shows the high-stakes confrontational posture between Trump and Iran at a personal level. This will significantly raise the possibilities of direct American action on Iranian soil, despite Trump’s own narrative of ending wars. Iran would also be making similar calculations, wanting to avoid direct conflict, something that was largely guaranteed under Biden. “If our interests are secured, we will negotiate with America,” Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has said.
On the other side, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is banking on Trump’s anti-Iran posture to waive the political pressure against him coming from Biden and the Democrats as civilian casualties mount in both Gaza and Lebanon. While both Netanyahu and Trump see eye-to-eye on Iran, and more clandestinely, the Arab powers also seem to share their views, Trump is not expected to roll over and allow Israel to continue its extended military campaign without moving towards a ceasefire or hostage negotiation. While for Netanyahu, this will be a challenge that he will have to navigate by accepting concessions, for Trump, marketable victories, photo-ops, and delivering on his ‘ending wars’ narrative is going to be a core aim, based more on personality than policy.
While both Netanyahu and Trump see eye-to-eye on Iran, and more clandestinely, the Arab powers also seem to share their views, Trump is not expected to roll over and allow Israel to continue its extended military campaign without moving towards a ceasefire or hostage negotiation.
Much before the US elections were to take place, it was clear that neither Hamas nor Israel were willing to cede space and cut a deal. With Israel’s assassination of two core Hamas leaders, Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar, the former taking place in the heart of Tehran, the power balance between the Israel and Hamas seems to have survived leadership decapitation and international outrage alike, with both continuing to remain fundamentally unmoved on the issues of hostages and a pause in the military campaign.
Finally, Trump’s appointees who will help him run the White House this time will not entirely be traditional conservatives that are familiar to Republicans and Capitol Hill. Rather, they come from his own support base and not necessarily from the party he represents. This adds to the unpredictability for all stakeholders in the Middle East. For now, the question of what Trump brings to the region can be answered only with guesswork at best, but the US’s projection of power and influence will be dependent on the battle between Trump’s policies and his personality.
Kabir Taneja is a Deputy Director and Fellow, Middle East, with the Strategic Studies programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.