The new Trump administration is likely to shake up both the economic architecture and regional security in the Indo-Pacific
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This article is part of the series, "Reignited agendas: Trump’s return and its global repercussions"
The United States (US) elections have come to a close, with Donald Trump emerging as the winner of the White House race. World-over, speculation is rife about the shifts in global geopolitics that the new Trump administration will likely usher in. Donald Trump’s previous stint in Washington as the 45th President of the United States (between 2017-2021) is helpful for analysts in drawing clues about the priorities and interests of his incoming administration. However, the state of the world has changed dramatically since Trump’s previous term in office and is likely to be reflected in his government’s actions going forward. While it is natural that the incoming administration will change how the US continues to engage with the world, in the Indo-Pacific context, the shifts are likely to be nuanced. On the economic front, the intensification of a contest against China may be on the horizon. In many ways, this will shape Washington’s security outlook in the Indo-Pacific.
In many ways, Donald Trump formalised America’s position on the Indo-Pacific. The previous Trump administration presided over America’s shift from the erstwhile Asia-Pacific towards a broader ‘Indo-Pacific’ focus. Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama, sought to anchor Washington’s defence, economic, and diplomatic ties with maritime Asia through the ‘Pivot’ strategy, later rechristened the ‘Rebalance to Asia’ strategy. Much after, world leaders began to grapple with the need to unify two important oceans—the Indian and Pacific oceans—into a single strategic theatre. In 2018, the Trump administration renamed the erstwhile Hawaii-based US Pacific Command (USPACOM) to the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM).
World leaders began to grapple with the need to unify two important oceans—the Indian and Pacific oceans—into a single strategic theatre.
While much of Trump’s campaign leading up to his previous administration was built on the need to check US spending on its allies and partners, the previous Trump administration had done well in gathering momentum towards building partnerships across the Indo-Pacific. This partly resulted from the imminent threat of China’s rise and the need to contain Beijing’s unilateral actions, which posed significant risks to American strategic interests in the region. Importantly, it was under the Trump administration, in 2017, that the Foreign Ministers of the four Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) countries—Australia, India, Japan and the US—held talks for the first time, which paved the way for the group to emerge as a formidable platform for governance in key domains of the Indo-Pacific.
However, the strategic realities of the Indo-Pacific have undergone significant shifts in the last few years. This has also propelled new American partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. Apart from the Quad, three key partnerships guiding Washington’s outlook towards the Indo-Pacific are: The trilateral security cooperation with South Korea and Japan; Squad comprising US, Japan, Australia, and Philippines; and AUKUS comprising Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US. While the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral seeks to address security challenges posed by North Korea, the Squad took shape recently in response to continued Chinese belligerence in the South China Sea, which often led to physical confrontations between various maritime services of China and the Philippines. Meanwhile, AUKUS emerged as a trilateral to deliver nuclear-powered submarines to Australia to deter potential conflict in an increasingly volatile Indo-Pacific. Given the shifting regional geopolitical landscape, the question of how the new Trump administration recalibrates its security and foreign policy is likely to be tied to the way Washington views the utility of its labyrinth partnerships in its pursuit of national interests.
AUKUS emerged as a trilateral to deliver nuclear-powered submarines to Australia to deter potential conflict in an increasingly volatile Indo-Pacific.
The incoming Trump administration will inherit a robust security “latticework” established by the Joe Biden administration in the Indo-Pacific. It is uncertain if the initiatives seeded and nurtured by Biden's ‘Diplomacy First’ approach will be continued with the same diplomatic rigour in the Trump administration. The answer to this will likely shape the trajectory of the US’s Indo-Pacific approach. The future of minilateral partnerships is likely to remain subject to the merits of Trump’s transactional diplomacy. It is quite evident that US foreign policy will be dominated by Trump’s priorities and interests. However, based on the Trump 2.0 cabinet appointments, a trade war with China appears certain. This will spill over into Washington’s approach towards the Indo-Pacific and the way US alliances and partnerships are sustained, which might play out adversely for the US-led security architecture. Due to the Trump administration’s great emphasis on economic issues related to China, security considerations will likely take a back seat.
The ensuing economic sentiment in Washington is a factor that will heavily influence Trump 2.0 diplomacy. The trade war against China that started during his first tenure will likely resume and sharpen. In this context, the US’s traditional allies in the Indo-Pacific will need to recalibrate their strategies to ensure their security interests remain unhindered. Drawing from their experiences with the previous Trump administration, the election results seem to have spurred concerns about the future of a US-led security architecture in the Indo-Pacific, especially with regards to Washington’s allies’ place in the new American outlook towards the region. Consequently, whether the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will remain the focal point of US Indo-Pacific Strategy is still unclear.
The US’s traditional allies in the Indo-Pacific will need to recalibrate their strategies to ensure their security interests remain unhindered.
Moreover, the incoming of the new Trump administration might lead to the proliferation of more minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific, especially if Washington neglects or discontinues security cooperation, allowing emerging and middle powers to step up and cooperate. For instance, during Trump 1.0, Japan under Shinzo Abe took the initiative to continue engaging and reassuring regional stakeholders like the Southeast Asian countries, keeping initiatives like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) alive, while also managing China’s economic profile in the Indo-Pacific.
The incoming Trump administration is expected to be more hawkish towards China than Trump 1.0, shifting from Biden’s approach of managed competition to more open confrontation. This will lead to an intensified contest between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific, which, going forward, will also shape its Indo-Pacific policy and relations with regional stakeholders. Nonetheless, what remains to be seen is whether the US approach towards China will remain the dominant factor shaping its relations with regional allies in the Indo-Pacific, or whether earlier friction points of the Trump 1.0 era will re-emerge in the US foreign policy agenda. Either of the two scenarios will significantly alter the Indo-Pacific regional security and economic architecture. For instance, the US is expected to revert to its earlier mercantilist position on the economic front, so we will likely see the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) becoming dormant, giving more space to Beijing. However, on the security front, it is expected that Trump will continue to invest in minilateral security groupings like AUKUS and Quad. In the Indo-Pacific, a major concern will be whether the US will continue to seek a leadership role as it did during the Biden administration through a ‘relentless diplomacy’ approach, or whether it will be content with pursuing its ‘America First’ agenda in the Indo-Pacific.
Abhishek Sharma and Sayantan Haldar are Research Assistants at the Observer Research Foundation’s Strategic Studies Programme.
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Abhishek Sharma is a Research Assistant with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the Indo-Pacific regional security and geopolitical developments with a special ...
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Sayantan Haldar is a Research Assistant at ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. At ORF, Sayantan’s research focuses on Maritime Studies. He is interested in questions of ...
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