In 2016 when Donald Trump was sworn in as the 45th president of the United States, the international community faced a watershed moment: What now, for the old global order? At the Raisina Dialogue 2019, three leaders representing India, the US, and Europe agreed that President Trump might have already ushered in a “global disorder”.
Along with the election of Trump to the US presidency, there are other defining issues of our time. Gen. (Retd.) David Petraeus pointed to the US- China relationship as one of them. There is also the rise of populism in Europe; the United Kingdom’s massive experiment, Brexit; and the lows of trans-Atlantic relationships between European powers and Washington D.C., specifically visible in the affairs of NATO. These issues are shaking the Western-liberal-globalist pillar on which economic and security arguments were perched in the post-WWII era.
“There is a risk of de-globalisation,” highlighted the former Prime Minister of Italy, Paolo Gentiloni. Indeed, his country is one of the prime examples of what the new global disorder has forced some major economic powers in Europe to do. They are struggling with growth and are buried under a mountain of debt. Moreover, they are trying to find a balance between the traditional allies across the ‘pond’ in the West and the emergence of the new superpower on the block, China, with its generous offers of capital and opportunities in return for long-term regional and political influence to be leveraged mostly against the US. Italy today stands at this cusp: its economy is in tatters, and it is seriously considering joining China’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In that event, it will be the only European country to link itself to the BRI, and will pose a stark challenge to the intra-Western status quo in both strategy and alliance, considering it was a founding member of NATO.
The three main elements of gloablisation that are under stress: global markets, global supply chains, and the challenges being presented to global skills mobility
Gentiloni’s remarks reminded the audience of a basic tenet of politics and how it drives political decision-making even if means questioning age-old relationships: “It’s the economy, stupid.” Used widely by former US President Bill Clinton during his 1992 election campaign, the expression means that whether a country is a vibrant democracy or an autocracy, what is imperative for political stability is economic delivery that benefits your people. This resonates equally on the domestic policies of both the US and China, and their various allies and partners. The prospect of a divergence between Rome and Beijing for better economic prospects is not the only case of serious strife within NATO. The Trump administration demands European powers to pay more attention to the NATO cause, and even perhaps give a premium to the US for sending its troops to provide military cover in states such those in eastern Europe, on the Russian border.
Other than Italy, Turkey, too—a critical ally of the US, a former model state for moderate Islam from a Western perspective—is now looking to purchase advanced defence systems from Moscow, throwing another ner in the already strained Atlantic alliance. This argument, magnified by Italy, comes under the umbrella of the fact that the European Union used to be agnostic about Asia beyond business. This is not so anymore.
“It’s the economy, stupid.” Used widely by former US President Bill Clinton during his 1992 election campaign, the expression means that whether a country is a vibrant democracy or an autocracy, what is imperative for political stability is economic delivery that benefits your people.
Amongst all this, the Indian stance stands as “Indian” as it ever has. Former Indian Foreign Secretary and current President, Global Corporate Affairs, Tata Group highlighted three main elements of gloablisation that are under stress. First, that of global markets; second, that of global supply chains; and finally, the challenges being presented to global skills mobility. All these, of course, can also be seen as by-products of the general rise in popularity of nationalistic politics and a pushback against globalisation.
While much of the world, including Petreaus who was the former Director of the CIA, for long have been pushing India to pick “sides”, New Delhi’s resolve to work within the framework of “strategic autonomy” has only become stronger. “Will our relationship with China help us get leverage with the US, and vice versa?” asked Jaishankar. “You can get this wonderfully right, or badly wrong.”
India, of course, has taken a side—India’s, as the former foreign secretary said. Ultimately, New Delhi will deal with all countries that are good for its own interests and strategic aims, from China to Iran, from the US to Venezuela. “For India, there is no one answer that fits all problems on international affairs,” Jaishankar said. New Delhi’s idea of strategic autonomy is in itself going to be a challenging theory to be practiced in a changing global order, where institutions are undermined, trade wars are initiated and “deal making” is finding precedence over diplomacy. As India goes into its general elections, the new government to be appointed in May will have its hands full as far as foreign policy is concerned.
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Kabir Taneja is a Fellow with Strategic Studies programme. His research focuses on Indias relations with West Asia specifically looking at the domestic political dynamics ...
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