This article is a chapter in the journal — Raisina Files 2023.
East Asia, Where China’s ‘good neighbour’ policy and charm offensive was first launched, has perhaps faced the most heat from the rise of Chinese power and the geopolitical tussles it has wrought. Various security concepts advanced by Xi Jinping, such as “a community with a shared future for humanity”
<1> and “common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security,”
<2> appear to address neighbouring regions, particularly East Asia. Yet, as has been seen over time, China is unable to maintain a balance between its rise and its relations in East Asia.
The region has witnessed China’s persistent bids to mould it in its own image, as well as Chinese diplomatic pressure on countries to embrace concepts such as “Asia for Asians,” which is anachronistic in today's globalised and integrated world and has a chauvinistic undertone aimed at the ‘outsider’ United States. The region is also witnessing China’s unilateral and aggressive actions to change the status quo on the ground. A military infrastructure push in the South China Sea (SCS), discarding the maritime claims of other countries, is such an example. Countries such as South Korea,
<3> the Philippines,
<4> Vietnam,
<5> Malaysia
<6> and Indonesia
<7> have had to grapple with China’s belligerence.
In East Asia, contestations between the region’s states and China revolve around issues of sovereignty, security, and strategic order. China has often defied its own normative, universalist espousals in its foreign and security policies in the region. Its aggressive infrastructure building in the SCS has displayed a sharply distinct unilateral approach unmindful of others’ claims, while presenting itself as a votary of peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue and consultation. Its preference for bilateral negotiations and reluctance to a multilateral approach to resolving the multiparty maritime dispute in the SCS contradicts its claim of being an upholder of multilateralism.
<8> China sending a ship to “warn” Vietnam not to move an international court, when Vietnam “cited arbitration and litigation as two possible measures against China,” raised a serious question as to what type of international multilateralism it envisages in which it is not willing to abide by decisions of international judicial institutions.
<9> Further, it has not shied away from employing economic instruments in coercive diplomacy, even though it formally champions the cause of a free and unhindered globalised economy.
<10> Apprehensions about its hegemonic intentions or the implications of its rise override its grand pronouncements. The “benign” China during the 1997 Asian financial crisis has become a distant memory. At present, for China, East Asia appears to be the region that undergirds its projection of global leadership.
Tempest in the Taiwan Strait
Although China-Taiwan or Cross-Strait relations are not strictly “ordinary” state-to-state ties, they remain among the most complicated examples of how issues of sovereignty, security, and strategic order can be critically intertwined.
<11> Taiwan has the distinction of serving as the most consequential reference point for highlighting the consequences of China’s rise—a crucial test for the geopolitical competition between China and the United States, and a test case of the US’s dependability for its allies and friends. The Taiwan issue reminds the US—Taiwan’s ‘security guarantor’ since its Taiwan Relations Act of 1979—of the reputational cost if it were to fail in supporting Taiwan.
It was in 2016 when the Taiwan Strait yet again became a strategic flash point. During that period, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which does not recognise the One-China principle, came to power; and Donald Trump, under whose watch the US reset its China policy and recognised China as a strategic competitor, assumed the presidency. Although the Russia-US face-off in Ukraine has somewhat overshadowed the geopolitical standoff between China and the US, the latter remains the primary strategic contestation in the world. Perhaps the most prominent point of reference in their strategic argument is the fragile, multilayered security-strategic situation in the Taiwan Strait.
Cross-Strait relations nosedived after the present ruling party, the DPP, much to China’s disappointment, came to power in Taipei in 2016 and won another term in 2020. Cross-Strait ties had earlier enjoyed unprecedented stability, from 2008 to 2016 when the KMT—which shares the One-China principle albeit under its own interpretation, was in power in Taipei. China’s displeasure with the ruling DPP not unequivocally upholding the One-China principle led to the breakdown of Cross-Strait dialogue in June 2016.
<12> The dialogue had previously succeeded in establishing institutionalised Cross-Strait cooperation mechanisms across the economic and cultural spectrum between 2008 and 2016. China’s displeasure also caused the collapse of their tacit diplomatic truce, reducing Taiwan’s diplomatic allies from 23 in 2016 to 14 at present.
<13>
China has used various methods to arm-twist Taiwan in the international arena and directly toward it in order to enforce its One-China policy. The World Health Assembly’s (WHA) and International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) doors have been closed to Taiwan due to Chinese objections. Taiwan attended WHA annual meetings as an observer from 2009 to 2016,
<14> and the ICAO’s triennial assembly in 2013 as a guest of its president with no objections from China.
,<15> It is now unlikely that Taiwan will be able to join any international organisations in the face of Chinese objections. Taiwanese citizens accused of wrongdoing—whether proven or not—have been deported to China from various countries as varied as Kenya, Cambodia, Armenia, and Spain. These countries treat Taiwan as Chinese citizens under their respective extradition treaties with China or because they do not recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state but as a province of China.
<16> China has frequently extended its One-China policy to commercial companies
<17> and non-government organisations, and it may do so even to private individuals. It has occasionally punished Taiwan with low-grade economic sanctions.
<18>
China’s threatening military posturing by way of an ever-increasing number of violations of Taiwan’s ADIZ has been unabated.
<19> It has been intensifying ‘grey zone’ warfare
<20> and cyber warfare
<21> against Taiwan, and has created a new normal in the Taiwan Strait by nullifying the hitherto respected informal median line.
<22> In August 2022, US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan provoked China to respond with military drills, escalating Cross-Strait tensions.
<23>
The DPP government in Taipei has stayed its course, not yielding to Chinese pressure on the core questions of Cross-Strait relations—i.e., the identity of Taiwan and the future of Taiwan. Its long-held position that the future of Taiwan will be decided by the Taiwanese people and that no option is off the table remains unchanged. The latter implies that
de jure independence is also a possibility if the Taiwanese desire it, which is anathema to China. While the Taiwanese people may differ about the DPP government’s handling of relations with China, the party’s position on cross-Strait relations has increasingly become a mainstream position
<24>—a societal development that should worry China. The fate of Hong Kong under the 2020 National Security Law for Hong Kong validated the Taiwanese scepticism about China’s offer of “One Country, Two Systems” and increased their resolve not to accept it.
Beijing-Taipei-Washington Triangle Redux
Amidst the fragility of cross-Strait relations, the US has not only politically and diplomatically supported Taiwan, but its relations with Taiwan have also been further reinforced in their own right, which in turn enhances the US’s support for Taiwan against Chinese threats. It has increased arms supplies to Taiwan in volume and frequency. Since 2017, it has approved more than US$20 billion in weapons sales to Taiwan and joint weapons production with Taiwan is reported to be under consideration.
<25> Its military links with Taiwan in other forms, such as the presence of US military officials in Taiwan, have also been acknowledged.
<26> US national security and defence strategic documents, as well as high-level officials, make frequent mention of Taiwan.
Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken’s articulation on Taiwan was perhaps the most comprehensive yet from the US in recent decades.
<27> President Joe Biden has repeatedly said that the US will defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack, though his administration has more recently given those statements more nuance.
<28> The visits of US congressional members to Taiwan have become more frequent, with 28 members of Congress travelling to Taiwan from January to early September 2022.
<29> On the whole, the US measures, such as the Taiwan Travel Act of 2018, the TAIPEI Act of 2019, and the inclusion of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA) in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) making provisions for grants and loans to Taiwan,
<30> have irreversible effects. Thus, while China is trying to create a new military normal in the Taiwan Strait, the US may have already achieved its own new normal for Taiwan.
Some may argue that the Taiwan issue is as much between China and the US as it is between China and Taiwan themselves, and it will be resolved first between China and the US. The current strategic standoff between China and the United States is certainly not solely caused by Taiwan. Nonetheless, it is difficult to dismiss the reactivation of the historic but long-dormant strategic triangle of Beijing-Taipei-Washington. The Chinese see “the US black hand” as complicit with the DPP government in challenging the One-China principle. In their view, the US “instigates” Taiwan, “foments” trouble in Hong Kong, and “defames” China on the issue of human rights in Xinjiang—and these are all part of one story that is about the US “containing” China. In short, the Taiwan issue is central to any China-US talks, as it was recently in Bali for Biden and Xi, when the latter reminded the US that Taiwan is “at the very core of China’s core interests.”
<31>
Bracing for Headwinds
The Taiwan contingency is not a strategic and security issue only between China and the US; it has implications for the region as well. There is a growing call for increased dialogue and cooperation between the United States and its allies, Japan and Australia, in the event of a Taiwan contingency.
<32>
In the regional context, Japan has had its own history of relations with Taiwan. After 1972, when it switched recognition to the PRC from the ROC, it remained reticent on the Taiwan issue for many decades, though it was in Japan’s security thinking all along— the phrase “situations in areas surrounding Japan” in the Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation was considered couching a reference to Taiwan, too.
<33> Over the last decade or so, Japan has experienced internal churn regarding its assessment of Chinese power and its implications for its security. This period has coincided with the China-US relationship entering a strategic stalemate, the Taiwan Strait becoming turbulent, and the US reaffirming its support for Taiwan in the face of Chinese aggression. It has gradually veered towards recognising China as a challenge to its security.
It is against this backdrop that, in recent years, there has been a flurry of statements expressing concern for Taiwan and the potential implications of deteriorating security-strategic situation in the Taiwan Strait for Japan’s security. After nearly four decades, Taiwan was included in a joint US-Japan statement that “underscore
the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encouraged peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues” during Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s visit to the US in April 2021.<34> Japan, in its Diplomatic Bluebook published in 2021 by its MOFA, described Taiwan as “an extremely crucial partner and an important friend, with which shares fundamental values”.<35> Japan unhesitatingly supports Taiwan’s bid for entry into the WHA.<36>
In early July 2021, the deputy prime minister at that time, Tara Aso attracted attention when he said: “If a major incident happened (over Taiwan), it’s safe to say it would be related to a situation threatening the survival (of Japan). If that is the case, Japan and the U.S. must defend Taiwan together.”<37> The 2022 Japanese national security strategy clearly identifies the situation in the Taiwan Strait as an immediate security concern for Japan and the international community. It states, “Regarding peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, concerns are mounting rapidly, not only in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan, but also in the entire international community.”<38> The Taiwan issue has triggered a new acrimony in China-Japan relations, and China perceives Japan as being behind the G-7 issuing a statement on Taiwan.<39>
Australia, another US ally, has also become notably vocal on the Taiwan issue as its own relations with China have gone downhill. Australia's understanding of China, like Japan’s, has also shifted. China’s moves in the South Pacific, where Taiwan maintains diplomatic relations, pose a strategic challenge to Australia.<40>
South Korea is widely regarded as deferential and accommodating toward China and it came as a surprise to many analysts when it broke its silence on the Taiwan issue in early 2021. Taiwan was mentioned for the first time in a US-ROK joint statement in the U.S.-ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement in May 2021, after the summit meeting between President Biden and President Moon Jae-in in Washington.<41> Since then, South Korea has been reaffirming “the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.”<42>
This whole situation, where the Taiwanese are drifting away from ‘the mainland’ and important sections of the international community are increasingly vocal for Taiwan, is not favourable to China with respect to its One-China claim. The increased international interest in and articulation on Taiwan might be a transient reaction to China’s aggressive foreign policy and strategic push. It could, however, also be the result of a realisation, particularly among the United States and its allies, that expectations that China’s close integration with the democratic world would facilitate its political opening up are unfounded. The interest in and support for Taiwan may be more durable and lasting, as the countries concerned may not only be seeing Taiwan as a strategic lever against China but also appreciating its value as a democracy that needs support against authoritarianism.
If China is pushed back on the Taiwan issue and its reunification cause is rendered redundant and defunct, the “Chinese dream” will be over. China is not unaware of this. Yet, it would be a miscalculation to expect China to learn from Russia’s setbacks in the ongoing war in Ukraine due to Western support for Ukraine and back down on its commitment to reunifying Taiwan. While a military invasion of Taiwan by China is still highly unlikely, its commitment to “reunify” Taiwan is unflinching. Russia’s setbacks in Ukraine may have only taught it lessons about the importance of better preparation and training, as well as waiting for strategically advantageous moments. Incidentally, it is not only the US allies and partners that are expressing solidarity with Taiwan. Russia, China’s “no limits” partner, has become active in the waters near Taiwan, too.<43> Finally, the US and its allies’ support for Taiwan, in the event of a war, cannot be taken for granted. Their support will depend on strategic calculations, an understanding of national interests, and the personalities of the incumbent decision-makers. Thus, the long-term security-strategic scenario in the Taiwan Strait is likely to remain fragile and uncertain.
The challenge is to find a lighthouse in the midst of a storm in East Asia, in general, and the Taiwan Strait in particular. Finding one is a challenge, but not impossible. Mending fences with China has its own powerful commercial and geopolitical logic for the US, which is at loggerheads with Russia in Ukraine. Salvaging relations with the US remains a priority for China. The same holds true for China’s relations with other US allies in the region. Any notions about a fundamental rewriting of relations with China with reference to the One-China policy are merely wishful thinking.
Yet, stabilising Cross-Strait relations is not impossible, either. The present deterioration in Cross-Strait ties basically emanates from the Chinese response to the ascendance of a particular kind of domestic politics in Taiwan and their sense of vulnerability in the face of geopolitical involvement in the Taiwan issue at this crucial point in Cross-Strait relations. This situation might very well change. Furthermore—and this is critical—there is no conclusive evidence that reunifying Taiwan is on Xi’s timetable and is currently more important than repairing relations with the US.
What is certain is that provocations are always deliberate, and maximalist positions are unwise and shunning them helps mitigate uncertainties. East Asia needs to reaffirm faith in bilateral as well as multilateral dialogue. Inclusive multilateral initiatives in diplomacy and geo-economics with a commitment to rules-based order are indeed the way forward.
Endnotes
Taiwan can become a member of only those organisations in which sovereignty is not a requirement for membership, such as the WTO and APEC.
<1> The thirteenth principle in the fourteen fundamental principles of Xi Jinping Thought: Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era refers to “a community with a shared future for humanity.” See, “Backgrounder: Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” Xinhua, March 17, 2018.
<2> Zhang Ming’ai, “Security Stressed at CICA Summit,” China.org.cn, May 23, 2014.
<3> Robert E. Kelly, “South Korea Eyes China with Growing Concern,” The Japan Times, June 2, 2022.
<4> Neil Jerome Morales, “Philippines Complains of Chinese Fishing Ban and ‘Harassment’ at Sea,” Reuters, May 31, 2022.
<5> Ralph Jennings, “China Sends Ship as Warning to Vietnam: No Court Case, No Oil Drilling,” VOA News, June 22, 2020.
<6> “Report: China Harasses Malaysian Oil and Gas Vessels on a ‘Daily’ Basis, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative Says,” Malaysiakini, October 26, 2021.
<7> “China’s Tensions with Indonesia May Spike Over Natuna Islands Issue,” Business Standard, August 24, 2022.
<8> Nian Peng and Chow Bing Ngeow, “Managing the South China Sea Dispute: Multilateral and Bilateral Approaches,” Ocean Development & International Law 53, no. 1 (2022): 37–59.
<9> Ralph Jennings, “China Sends Ship as Warning to Vietnam: No Court Case, No Oil Drilling,” VOA News, June 22, 2022.
<10> Cliff Venzon, “China Uses Banana Diplomacy in Philippines to Edge Out Japan,” Nikkei Asia, July 26, 2019.; Andrew Higgins, “In Philippines, Banana Growers Feel Effect of South China Sea Dispute,” The Washington Post, June 10, 2012.; Victoria Kim, “When China and U.S. Spar, It’s South Korea that Gets Punched,” Los Angeles Times, November 19, 2020.
<11> Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2005).
<12> Shannon Tiezzi, “Did China Just Kill Cross-Strait Relations?,” The Diplomat, June 26, 2016.
<13> “Who Are Taiwan’s Diplomatic Allies?,” Al Jazeera, December 10, 2021.
<14> Brian Hioe, “Taiwan’s Quest to Attend the World Health Assembly,” The Diplomat, May 18, 2022.
<15> Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Taiwan Only ‘Guest’ Due to China: ICAO,” Taipei Times, September 26, 2013.
<16> “China ‘Hunts’ Taiwan Nationals Through Forced Deportation: Report,” Al Jazeera, December 1, 2021.
<17> “U.S. Airlines Are Editing Their Websites to Remove Taiwan’s Name at China’s Request,” Time, July 25, 2018.
<18> Christina Thornell, “How China Uses Fruit to Punish Taiwan,” Vox, April 1, 2022.
<19> “Taiwan Incursion Updates,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, December 2022.
<20> Momma Rira, “Taiwan Under Siege: Behind China’s Gray Zone Operations,” Nippon, March 24, 2022.
<21> Lin Tsuei-yi and William Hetherington, “China Intensifying Cyberattacks Against Taiwan: Report,” Taipei Times, November 29, 2022.
<22> “Taiwan Strait Crossings Have ‘Destroyed’ Tacit Agreement on Median Line,” The South China Morning Post, October 5, 2022.
<23> Tiffany May and Mike Ives, “China’s Military Drills and Other Tensions With Taiwan, Explained,” The New York Times, August 8, 2022.
<24> Election Study Centre, “Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland (1994/12~2022/06),” National Chengchi University, December 12, 2022.
<25> “U.S. Considering Joint Weapons Production with Taiwan,” The Economic Times, October 20, 2022.
<26> Christian Shepherd and Pei Lin Wu, “Taiwan Confirms U.S. Military Presence, Says Defending Island Is Vital for Democracy,” The Washington Post, October 28, 2021.
<27> Antony J. Blinken, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China” (speech, The George Washington University, Washington, DC, May 26, 2022), US Department of State, .
<28> “Biden Says U.S. Forces Would Defend Taiwan in the Event of ‘an Unprecedented Attack’ from China,” The Hindu, September 19, 2022.
<29> Sarah Zheng and Kari Soo Lindberg, “US Lawmaker Visits to Taiwan Hit Decade High, Irking China,” Bloomberg, September 8, 2022.
<30> Bochen Han, “Pentagon Bill Includes Up to US$10 Billion in Grants and Loans to Taiwan for Arms Sales,” South China Morning Post, December 8, 2022.
<31> Eduardo Baptista, “China’s Xi Tells Biden: Taiwan Issue Is ‘First Red Line’ That Must Not Be Crossed,” Reuters, November 14, 2022.
<32> Abraham Mahshie, “Pacific Allies Worry About Taiwan Invasion, Call for Closer US Cooperation,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, June 9, 2022.
<33> Qingxin Ken Wang, “Japan’s Balancing Act in the Taiwan Strait,” Security Dialogue 31, no. 3 (September 2000): 337–342.
<34> “U.S.- Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement: “U.S. – Japan Global Partnership for A New Era,” The White House, April 16, 2021.
<35> “Japan’s Foreign Policy by Region,” in Diplomatic Bluebook 2021 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2021).
<36> “Japan Supports Taiwan’s Bid to Attend World Health Assembly in Move That Could Anger China,” The Japan Times, May 9, 2019.
<37> Jesse Johnson, “Deputy PM Says Japan Must Defend Taiwan With U.S.,” The Japan Times, July 6, 2021.
<38> “National Security Strategy of Japan,” Cabinet Secretariat, December 2022.
<39> Xu Keyue and Wan Hengyi, “China-Japan FM Talks Cancelled After G7 Unjustly Criticizes China Over Taiwan Question,” The Global Times, August 4, 2022.
<40> Hal Brands, “Why Australia Is Gearing Up for Possible War With China,” Bloomberg, November 10, 2020.
<41> Sungmin Cho, “South Korea’s Taiwan Conundrum,” War on the Rocks, December 31, 2021.
<42> The Government of the Republic of Korea, Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, 2022.
<43> Minnie Chan, “China, Russia Begin Naval Drills in Waters Near Taiwan, Japan,” South China Morning Post, December 21, 2022.
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