The situation in Ukraine: a view from Moscow

This brief is a part of The Ukraine Crisis: Cause and Course of the Conflict.

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The first week of the operation in Ukraine, launched by the Russian armed forces on 24 February, has ended, and the first results can be drawn. The Ukrainian conflict itself is only a part of a global confrontation between Russia, on the one hand, and the United States (US) and other NATO countries, on the other. This round of the confrontation began in the early winter of 2021, when the Russian leadership demanded that the US and its NATO allies stop their advance to the east, which would mean refusing to accept Ukraine and Georgia into the bloc; not to establish military bases on the territory of these countries; mutually demilitarise the border between Russia and NATO and refrain from sending heavy bombers and warships in areas where they could hit targets on the territory of the other side; renounce intermediate- and short-range missiles and nuclear weapons outside the national territory. In fact, it was a plan for a complete revision of relations between Russia and NATO, aimed at defusing the situation and creating a completely new security system in Europe. This would allow all participants to reduce military spending and shift efforts to other areas, for example, to the Indo-Pacific, and focus on developing their economies.

It was a plan for a complete revision of relations between Russia and NATO, aimed at defusing the situation and creating a completely new security system in Europe.

Russia's proposals were rejected by the US, assuming it to be a part of Russia’s tactics. In response, Russia declared its readiness for “military-technical measures” and began to accumulate troops and military equipment on the border, demonstrating its capabilities. The US and its NATO partners, instead of accepting demands backed up by a show of force, began defiantly supplying weapons to Ukraine. President Volodymyr Zelensky was convinced that the western countries would support him. Top Ukrainian officials defiantly announced that they refused to comply with the Minsk agreements of 2014-15, signed after the military defeat and designed to end the conflict in the Donbass. At the same time, Vladimir Putin’s stake on European leaders did not materialise. Despite making several trips to Kyiv and Moscow, they were unable convince either Putin to withdraw troops or Zelensky to comply with the terms of the Minsk agreements. In this situation, the Russian leadership decided to launch a special operation with the “denazification and demilitarisation” declared as its main goals. Thus, the Ukrainian issue, which at the beginning of the negotiations was one of the secondary ones, a part of the overall package of Russian demands, turned into a key one. Russia decided to use force to ensure the fulfillment of some of its demands at a time when the West, according to the Kremlin, artificially dragged out negotiations by arming Ukraine. In official Russian discourse, Ukraine is not currently a fully sovereign power: Its leadership is under the control of Western countries, receiving benefits from this. The aim of the operation, therefore, was to be the elimination of this external control.

The US and its NATO partners, instead of accepting demands backed up by a show of force, began defiantly supplying weapons to Ukraine.

It seems that the Kremlin until the last moment considered Russian troops on the borders of Ukraine as a means of political pressure, so the operation plan was developed very quickly, and there were no opportunities to properly ensure its logistics. The Russian staffs based the operation on rapid advance. At the same time, apparently, the calculation was made that the Ukrainian military would not put up serious resistance, and officials would willingly cooperate with the Russian military. The Ukrainian side, in turn, counted on massive popular resistance and high combat readiness of the prepared reserves. Both sides were mistaken to a certain extent. Counting on the friendliness and passivity of the Ukrainian military did not materialise, which led to unnecessary losses amongst the Russian troops, who tried to avoid bloodshed in the early days. At the same time, the high pace of the offensive and the daring raids of the reconnaissance groups made it possible to disorganise the defense of the Ukrainian forces in several directions. On the other hand, the Ukrainian leadership's expectation of an all-out war did not materialise: The majority of the population prefers to wait passively. But now the war has come close to the cities, primarily Kharkov and Kyiv, which Ukrainian troops are trying to turn into fortified areas. Weapons are distributed to all who wish. In the long term, this could lead to numerous civilian casualties if the Russian army decides to storm these cities. Both sides still consider themselves winners, counting on the success of their strategy.

The high pace of the offensive and the daring raids of the reconnaissance groups made it possible to disorganise the defense of the Ukrainian forces in several directions.

To halt Russia's advance, the western countries have unleashed several waves of sanctions on it. These turned out to be ineffective: The West threatened Russia with sanctions for a long time, so Moscow managed to prepare itself. In addition, the very idea of ​​reflexively imposing sanctions after the beginning of the advance, although understandable emotionally, could hardly bring success: The operation cannot end earlier until it achieves a successful result or runs out of steam.

What will happen next?

This depends on whose strategy is winning. It is possible that neither side will be able to achieve a decisive victory, and they will start negotiations. In this case, the advantage will be with those who have achieved greater success. Neither side voices its final demands, waiting to see which line the front will stabilise on. But if we bank on the words of Vladimir Putin, Russia will be satisfied with a neutral, demilitarised Ukraine, in which ultra-right parties will be banned. Perhaps, the Kremlin sees Ukraine federalised or confederalised. But the sanctions are a problem. An endless stream of restrictions, taken irrationally, without taking into account long-term interests, will lead in the foreseeable future only to the mutual weakening of the EU and Russia, breaking their long-standing economic ties. For the EU, this means a painful reorientation of entire sectors of the economy and difficulties that ordinary citizens will have to endure for years (rising food prices, problems with electricity) due to the unwillingness of politicians to compromise principles. This can be avoided if Europe is included in the process of settling the Ukrainian conflict and becomes one of the guarantors of the final agreement.

An endless stream of restrictions, taken irrationally, without taking into account long-term interests, will lead in the foreseeable future only to the mutual weakening of the EU and Russia, breaking their long-standing economic ties.

It is already clear that the crisis will lead to a build-up of military power in Europe, which is turning from an economic giant into a military one. NATO's European flank is also getting stronger: Sweden and Finland, which until recently cooperated so closely with the alliance that they were de facto members, are now ready to become de jure ones. From the Kremlin's point of view, this is an acceptable price for Ukraine's neutrality. So far, the main winners are China and the US. The latter can finally weaken its European flank: If European countries begin to actively arm themselves, the US will be able to transfer part of its forces from Europe and the North Atlantic to the Pacific theatre of operations. China, the Russian strategic partner, may become even closer to Russia, compensating its losses from breaking off relations with the West. In any case, Russia will increase its presence in Asia, as it remains the only direction of development. India can play a unique role in this situation. As the only great power that maintains good relations with both the West and Russia, even if sanctions remain, it can play the role of a transit hub for goods and technologies, thereby, contributing to the growth of its economy and helping both warring parties gradually restore broken ties. In addition, India will be able to act as a counterbalance to China in the Asian policy of Russia, which is not interested in becoming dependent on the PRC. To do this, India needs to maintain its neutral position, not succumb to emotional and economic pressure from outside, and be guided primarily by the strategic considerations of its own development.

• International Affairs
• European Union
• Russia and Eurasia
• USA and Canada
• The Pacific, East and Southeast Asia
• Indo-Pacific
• Kremlin
• Military
• Moscow
• NATO
• Russian
• Ukraine

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