The Indian navy recently commissioned to open a third naval base (INS Kohassa) in the Andaman and Nicobar island to
counter the Chinese expansion into the Indian ocean region which is a manifestation of the security dilemma, which has been at play in Sino-Indian relations since the middle of the last century. Accordingly, both countries have resorted to certain policy measures that have only accentuated security concerns on both sides. This article aims to look at the increasing competition between the two adversaries and further explores confidence-building measures to alleviate the impact of the security dilemma.
The border disputes, Sino-Pakistani cooperation, including its possible assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear program and delivery systems and China’s broader influence in South Asia have perpetuated a situation similar to that theorized by Robert Jervis as the “
security dilemma. ” Security Dilemma arises out of the anarchic nature of the international system, where states take actions to make themselves secure but end up making other states insecure. In the Sino-Indian context, a security dilemma has emerged as an effect of the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict which was caused due to a number of factors such as the growing Chinese assertiveness in Tibet
the failure of the border talks and China’s recurrent armed intrusion into the eastern border on India. As a consequence, both
material and psychological factors have led to the quest to secure borders, develop missiles capabilities, and enter strategic and
economic alliances (especially the Sino-Pakistani alliance) which have pushed the rivalry beyond their borders.
This security dilemma, in turn, feeds into certain regional political dynamics which are evident in China’s unique and strategic relationship with countries in South Asia, specifically with India’s neighbors such as
Nepal, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Pakistan
.
China has been quite active in providing economic and infrastructural support to
Nepal. Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli who visited President Xi Jinping in Beijing in June 2018 signed deals worth USD $2.4 billion and further deliberated on building Chinese inroads and
cross-border railway lines in Nepal. In addition, Beijing has been deepening its defense cooperation with Kathmandu, which includes an arms supplies and intelligence
exchange. The economic and military incentives offered by China have become a
cause of concern for India, as Nepal has become another gateway for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) expansion into the Indian neighborhood.
In Myanmar, China has made steady progress by increasing affiliations with the military establishment.
China’s Central Military Commission has been consistent in promoting defense cooperation between both countries which includes training of troops and technical exchanges along their shared border, this adds up to India’s anxiety as it also shares its border with Myanmar which further makes it skeptical of Chinese activities on the shared border.
China’s transnational infrastructural developments in Sri Lanka, particularly the Hambantota Port, which has been handed over to China Merchant Ports Holdings Ltd on a 99-year lease, has heightened India’s fears as it is a probable sign of creation of a
Chinese naval outpost in the neighborhood.
The growing alliance between China and Pakistan has generated deep anxieties in New Delhi. Not only has Beijing been facilitating Islamabad to develop its short range and medium range ballistic missiles, but it has also decided to invest
USD 46 billion in Pakistan which is way more than the US annual aid budget to the entire world. India believes that such bonhomie is indicative of China’s future support to Pakistan over the contested status of Jammu and Kashmir.
On the other hand
, the sources of Chinese insecurity vis-a-vis India are the latter’s border infrastructure developments, increase in the border security on the India-China border, and the testing of the long-range ballistic missile like the Agni V that threaten Beijing. India's plan to set up 35 new posts on the India-China border and dispatch more border police on the India-China border has been claimed to be
provocative by Chinese media outlets such as the
Global Times. Furthermore, Chinese strategic circles have also believed that the testing of the long-range ballistic missile Agni V was intended towards warning China which has further added on to Beijing’s concerns. Du Welong, a researcher at the China’s PLA Academy of Military Sciences has said that the Indian government
has deliberately downplayed the range of the ballistic missile from
8,000 kms to 5,000 kms to put China under the radar.
Moving beyond the Security Dilemma and exploring confidence building measures
Given that there is a trust-deficit between the two nations due the baggage of history, increasing competition in the neighborhood and border disputes, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping decided to meet at Wuhan in April 2018 for an informal summit to restart the process of trust-building between India and China.
The bigger challenge for New Delhi is to maintain a stable relationship with Beijing as China is predicted to be the next superpower. During the cold war, India could fairly maintain a neutral stand, since the two poles (United States of America and Russia) were far apart from India. However, due to geographical proximity, when the new emerging pole (China) is placed next to India, the way New Delhi handles its affairs becomes crucial.
Till the disruption on the global stage settles down and a new order finally emerges, it is important for India to invest in its relation with China. It needs to work on trust and confidence building measures alike Wuhan to safeguard its future position around a powerful neighbor.
The Wuhan Summit yielded concrete results as possible areas of cooperation were identified such as counterterrorism, trade and India-China plus one cooperation, which is to cooperate on common grounds in third-party countries for mutual benefits. However, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which was held a month later after the Wuhan Summit, showed India’s staunch rejection of the Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI) as PM Modi was the only member to oppose China’s Belt and Road Initiative at the Forum.
As a start, the India-China plus one cooperation has been extended to Afghanistan. The Afghan diplomats are being given
joint training by both India and China, and both the sides are further contemplating future projects. Amidst the increasing competition in the Indian Ocean Region, between India and China, the India-China plus one cooperation should be extended to Indian Ocean littoral states such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives particularly in their maritime sectors, as both India and China are skeptical of each other’s naval movements in the region.
Both India and China have held the maritime security dialogue which needs to be expanded by incorporating multilateral cooperation with other nations and further augment it with naval confidence building measures as China’s increasing civilian and maritime activity in the Indian Ocean region has added up to India’s anxieties and concerns.
While developing such a communication dynamic might not be a panacea, it can be a helpful prospect to improve and deepen the Sino-Indian relations that will further help to deal with the issues of misplaced suspicion, trust and hence decrease the probability of the security dilemma to spiral out of control.
The author is a Research Intern at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi
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