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As states transition in economic heft, power, and influence, so do their relationships. Most starkly, this is visible in the changing nature of their ties with great powers. On the contrary, the recalibrations by great powers themselves have implicit success stories about growing powers, not just one of accommodation but increasingly, compulsion. While the United States (US) has remained a constant paradigm of growth, influence, and both soft and hard power for over three-quarters of the last century, China and India have presented two very contrasting pictures of the kind of relationship rising states have with the preeminent power of the world. China’s growth in the last three decades, in many ways, was facilitated by the US’s role as the global security guarantor. Now, China and the US are fundamentally locked in a great power competition, with almost every aspect of the contest speeding towards a downward spiral. Three factors have intensified this trend. First, rapid shifts in American social and political choices and patterns domestically have altered how America thinks of its security and role in the world. Second, the US wants to retain its numero uno position even as China is hurtling from behind in the most critical of domains that underscore this great power competition. China’s transformation of its naval power brings unprecedented pressure onto the Indo-Pacific countries and in the tacit spread of its economic tentacles throughout the world, compelling a reassessment of the metrics of the global power dynamic. Finally, a new tech race, which is beginning to unravel and will likely shape the course of great power competition in the next few decades, has enforced an order of multilateral accommodation of rising powers upon the US. Together, these have led to a new utilitarian view of security, power and influence in Washington. India is at the helm in that reassessment of Washington.
China and the US are fundamentally locked in a great power competition, with almost every aspect of the contest speeding towards a downward spiral.
When the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, visited the US to meet with his counterpart, President Donald Trump, on 13-14 February 2025, camaraderie, nostalgia, optics, and pragmatism seemed to roll into one. Keen observers of the India-US relationship were expecting Trump to give a new imprint to the bilateral relationship and not simply conform to the existing paradigms of continuity in bilateral ties. The barely 40-hour trip saw a new US-India COMPACT (Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce & Technology) agreement, which aims to serve as the new broad framework for combining cooperation in defence, trade, energy security, technology and innovation, people-to-people ties, and multilateral cooperation.
For the last two decades, the India-US defence ties based itself on the continued momentum provided by the 2005 Framework for the US-India Defence Relationship which promised “setting the US and India on a path to increasingly broad, complex, and strategic cooperation” and the subsequent 10-year framework signed in June 2015 which provided “avenues for high-level strategic discussions, continued exchanges between armed forces of both countries, and strengthening of defence capabilities.” The latest extension of the framework is reflective of the expansive nature of defence ties between the US and India, especially in its increasing importance for cooperation in the transfer of sensitive technologies and strategic trust. India and the US announced the signing of a new ten-year framework this year for the US-India Major Defence Partnership in the 21st Century, as the one signed in 2015 nears its culmination. Importantly, the new framework weaves in India’s Major Defence Partner (MDP) status to ensure that new technology access and supply guarantees in the area of defence and security can be part of a sustained process over the next decade.
A path that was set for the India-US defence cooperation in 2005 has required a new thrust every 10 years to accommodate new priorities. The latest iteration has placed the expansion of defence industrial cooperation, coproduction, and interoperability at the heart of bilateral defence ties. Among key plans to speed up supplies for India’s defence requirements, India and the US have announced that they will pursue new procurements and co-production arrangements for ‘Javelin’ Anti-Tank Guided Missiles and ‘Stryker’ Infantry Combat Vehicles in India this year. Besides, the procurement of six additional P-8I Maritime Patrol aircraft is likely to boost India’s Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in the expanse of the Indo-Pacific region.
Among key plans to speed up supplies for India’s defence requirements, India and the US have announced that they will pursue new procurements and co-production arrangements for ‘Javelin’ Anti-Tank Guided Missiles and ‘Stryker’ Infantry Combat Vehicles in India this year.
The second Trump administration has clearly taken a long view of the security ties with India, wherein the focus of the planned steps is to further integrate bilateral security ties by making them deeply structural. A wider leveraging of India’s MDP status through the Strategic Trade Authorisation-1 (STA‑1) authorisation; initiating negotiations for a Reciprocal Defence Procurement (RDP) agreement to enhance bilateral procurement channels and establish well-oiled reciprocal supply lines for defence goods and services; and reviewing arms transfer regulations, including the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), are all geared towards fostering deeper integration, interoperability, and co-production.
Given the lessons learnt over the past five years—both on and off the battlefield—it was rather incumbent upon Modi and Trump to outline a roadmap for the next decade. The importance of autonomous systems to the future of warfare and security is one such domain. India and the US announced the Autonomous Systems Industry Alliance (ASIA), a new initiative seeking to augment industry partnerships and production in the Indo-Pacific region. Partnerships between Indian and US companies for coproducing maritime systems and AI-enabled counter Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) could be useful for both countering and establishing deterrence.
Perhaps most importantly, India and the US have broken ‘new ground’ by announcing their intention to “support and sustain the overseas deployments of the US and Indian militaries in the Indo-Pacific”—a significant joint security commitment to the region. These deployments could reshape how India and the US approach regional security in the Indo-Pacific by enhancing cooperation in logistics, intelligence sharing, force mobility for joint humanitarian and disaster relief operations, and, most importantly, for countering common threats from the Gulf to the Far East.
There were several other announcements in the field of technology, innovation, energy security, space and people-to-people ties, which all feed into the new security compact between the two countries. However, three trends in the India-US bilateral as well as their multilateral cooperation framework stood out in the joint statement. The Indian Ocean will be a key domain in the Indo-US cooperation. The launch of the Indian Ocean Strategic Venture—a bilateral initiative to advance coordinated investments in economic connectivity and commerce—along with Meta’s ambitious 50,000-kilometre undersea cable project, underscores a long-term commitment to connect and strengthen global digital infrastructure and regional security. Second, Modi’s visit underscored that the commitment of both India and the US to the importance of the Quad framework in the Indo-Pacific remains resolute. And finally, a key convergence point in this new bilateral compact between India and the US is connectivity projects. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) aims to serve as the next transregional connectivity project which could reroute energy supply chains. However, its success remains contingent on the geopolitical externalities of the Middle East.
The launch of the Indian Ocean Strategic Venture—a bilateral initiative to advance coordinated investments in economic connectivity and commerce—along with Meta’s ambitious 50,000-kilometre undersea cable project, underscores a long-term commitment to connect and strengthen global digital infrastructure and regional security.
Speaking at the Munich Security Conference, US Vice President J.D. Vance emphasised that America expects Europe to take on a greater security role, allowing Washington to focus on other critical regions. The implicit message was clear: Indo-Pacific security and the challenge posed by China remain top priorities for the US. Despite concerns that a second Trump administration might scale back America's global security commitments, its strategic competition with China is set to continue. A confident Trump administration views India as a crucial partner in advancing its strategic objectives while recalibrating America’s role on the global stage.
Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director – Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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