The many meanings of Pokhran II

This piece is part of the series, 25 Years Since Pokhran II: Reviewing India’s Nuclear Odyssey

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Seldom are decisions made that drive a profound change in the trajectory—both internal and external—of a nation’s history. India’s contemporary history too witnessed such a decision a quarter of a century ago. In a very short, abrupt, and, indeed, dramatic announcement on 11 May 1998, that India had conducted three nuclear tests at the Pokhran test range, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee surprised most Indians to begin with, and the global capitals, big and small, by proverbially “crossing the Rubicon”—an irrevocable step to become a self-declared Nuclear Weapon State (NWS). These three tests were followed by two more tests two days later. Called the Shakti series of tests, they came to be popularly known as the Pokhran II tests, as they came after the 1974 single nuclear test, also in Pokhran. Speaking a couple of weeks later in Parliament, Vajpayee declared that, “India is now a Nuclear Weapon State. This is a reality that cannot be denied. It is not a conferment that we seek; nor is it a status for others to grant.” These tests expectedly resulted in a round of global condemnations and multi-layered sanctions led by the United States (US). However, the May 1998 tests triggered a transformational moment as India made clear strategic choices, which, thereafter, successfully culminated in the Indo-US nuclear deal in 2008 and its entry into the global nuclear non-proliferation regime in the following decade. Dr. S. Jaishankar, India’s current External Affairs Minister, rightly identified the 1998 tests as one of the “exercises in strategic retrieval” in India’s contemporary history.

Indian tests grandly broke this nuclear consensus by making the Indian nuclear tests a statement, in Jaswant Singh’s eloquent words, “against nuclear apartheid” and for “equal and legitimate security” for India.

Whilst many analyses have pertinently focused on the post-test challenges vis-à-vis the US, India’s regional nuclear rivals China and Pakistan, and the extant nuclear non-proliferation regime over the last 25 years and India’s multi-pronged response to it, the Pokhran II tests in themselves need to be looked afresh in their import. These tests could be seen as embodying multiple meanings—externally as well as internally—that are clearer in hindsight than were obvious at the time. First and foremost, the tests signalled India’s open defiance of the then emerging global nuclear consensus—the end of the atomic age. The post-1945 Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) world had suddenly collapsed with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1990-91. Consequently, in the 1990s, a unipolar moment emerged, marking the US-driven bilateral and multilateral efforts to control the nuclear genie by securing an indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 and a stronger pitch to conclude the negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). In fact, many would recall the Entry into Force clause in the CTBT that necessitated the signatures of India amongst 44 states to bring the treaty into effect. The Indian tests grandly broke this nuclear consensus by making the Indian nuclear tests a statement, in Jaswant Singh’s eloquent words, “against nuclear apartheid” and for “equal and legitimate security” for India. Secondly, the tests challenged another emerging global consensus—that the traditional route to becoming a great power since 1945, i.e., by acquiring nuclear weapons, was history, and what mattered most now was sheer economic might. Examples of Japan and the emerging tiger economies in East Asia were touted as exemplars of the rise of new powers that held regional and global influence. The Indian tests proclaimed loudly, and correctly, that India would not be taken seriously at the global high table unless it acquires the traditional trappings of a great power, viz., nuclear weapons. Dr. S Jaishankar rightly observed that, “the nuclear tests of 1998 and the declaration of weaponisation… also provided the attributes later on of a leading power.” Thirdly, the tests represented, in a significant way, the ideas and interests of what Itty Abraham calls the ‘strategic enclave.’ This enclave, according to Abraham, could be defined as, “a subset of the Indian military-security complex—specifically the set of research establishments and production facilities…” referring to the Atomic Energy Commission and its associated establishments. Top leaders of this enclave strongly and repeatedly pushed for testing of their indigenously developed nuclear technologies to publicly showcase the technological success of their establishments. In recognition of the spectacular achievements of these leading scientists, Vajpayee, immediately after the tests, appended "Jai Vigyan” to the “Jai Jawan Jai Kisan” slogan. Now, May 11 is annually celebrated as “National Technology Day”.

Top leaders of this enclave strongly and repeatedly pushed for testing of their indigenously developed nuclear technologies to publicly showcase the technological success of their establishments.

Fourthly, within the country, the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), through the tests, sought to dominate the domestic nationalist space. The tests indeed were a part of the BJP manifesto that declared “ re-evaluate the country’s nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons.” The tests effectively challenged the then prevailing strategic consensus. Doing this, especially in India’s 50^th year of independence in 1998 and after almost a decade of minority and weak coalition governments, served the BJP’s cause of projecting itself as another pole in the national political arena and a discrete force of nationalism with a clear-eyed approach on national security. Lastly, the Pokhran II tests sought to project Prime Minister Vajpayee, a non-Congress leader, as embodying a new, strong political leadership that ended decades of Indian nuclear indecision. Prime Minister Modi, in his 11 May 2020 Mann ki Baat, testified to this by asserting that, “The tests in Pokhran in 1998 also showed the difference a strong political leadership can make.” Despite the 1974 ‘Peaceful Nuclear Test,’ various Indian governments seemed to be vacillating on the ‘ambiguous’ nuclear status-quo, and didn’t show the political will to cross the nuclear threshold by testing. The growing China threat, beginning with 1962 and the Chinese nuclear test in 1964, saw only political noise as a reaction but no strategic response. As a Rajya Sabha member, Vajpayee had asserted that “the answer to an atom bomb is an atom bomb, nothing else,” after the Chinese nuclear tests in 1964. Explaining his decision to test, he pointed out that the tests should be seen as a step towards Atmanirbharta (self-reliance) in defence, and that a minimum, credible deterrent in the form of nuclear weapons were a necessity to prevent a war. Also, Vajpayee, since his early political days, had always espoused India’s manifest destiny as a great power due to its rich civilisational history ning several millennia. The nuclear tests singularly pushed Vajpayee’s ideas into effect and secured his place in India’s political history as a leader who brought India out of the nuclear closet.

The Pokhran II tests sought to project Prime Minister Vajpayee, a non-Congress leader, as embodying a new, strong political leadership that ended decades of Indian nuclear indecision.

The Pokhran II tests, thus, carried many meanings, externally and internally. Externally, it saw India re-imagining itself in the emerging global strategic landscape, pursuing an ambitious great power goal. Internally, it saw the rise of the BJP as challenging the strategic, ideological consensus of yester years, establishing a new political template for an aspirational India seeking its own space in the geopolitical order.

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Manish Dabhade teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University and is the Founder of The Indian Futures, a New Delhi-based think tank.

• International Affairs
• Nuclear Security
• China
• India
• BJP
• CTBT
• FMCT
• Indo-US Nuclear Deal
• national security
• nuclear tests
• Nuclear Weapon State
• NWS
• Pokhran test range

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