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The ongoing war between Israel and Hamas has brought to the forefront the single biggest challenge that the regional normalisation process was expected to face at some point, that of the issue of Palestine. From reports of United States (US) diplomats raising concerns with Washington D.C. of losing face in the region to a rising body count in Gaza, the conflict has passed many red lines over the last month.
However, the recent emergency session of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) along with the Arab League held in Riyadh to discuss Gaza showcased the lack of an Arab consensus beyond condemnation and the divergent long-term interests of participating states. Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi also attended, meeting his Saudi counterpart after more than a decade following a diplomatic détente achieved earlier this year brokered by China. Tehran has made no bones about its support for Hamas and Hezbollah, marketing them as part of the Palestinian resistance, and not mere proscribed terror groups. In Riyadh, Raisi asked his Muslim counterparts to designate Israel’s armed forces as a terror organisation.
But for the likes of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and others, strategic interests at play are long-term and the current inflection point poses a challenge to their vision. Over the past few years, diplomatic and strategic reorientation within the region highlighted rapidly shifting interests, moving from a history of conflict to a future where functional stability is seen of essence. The Abraham Accords, signed in 2021, launched a new era of cooperation and normalisation not only between the Arab states and Israel but also between the US and the wider region. A direct outcome of this normalisation was the setting up of new initiatives, such as the I2U2, an economic and trade ecosystem between India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the US, which is seen as a pilot to what this “new” Middle East (West Asia) can achieve.
A Saudi normalisation with Israel, the former being home to the Two Holy Mosques, would be a tectonic event. It would also re-draw the lines in the sand geostrategically, with an Arab-Israeli block with American backing standing in unity against Iran, an unpalatable prospect for the Shia state.
In this respect, the UAE’s response to both Hamas’s terror attack against Israel and the latter’s subsequent military operations in Gaza has been both tempered and for many, unexpected. Abu Dhabi’s initial response was to condemn Hamas’s actions against Israel, calling it a “serious and grave escalation”. Since then, the Emiratis have maintained a level of balance, but cracks within the Accords system seemed to be visible. While the UAE reaffirmed their backing for what the Accords stand for, their partners in Bahrain, who had also normalised relations with Israel, paused trade and recalled their ambassador for consultations.
However, despite the ongoing scramble to find a political and diplomatic sweet spot, it is unlikely that these new Arab-Israel mechanisms will collapse given the Gazan conflict or due to a more confrontational posture between Arab states and Iran. “The (Abraham) Accords are our future,” said Ali Rashid Al Nuaimi, Chairman of the Defence, Interior, and Foreign Affairs Committee of the United Arab Emirates Federal National Council at an event organised by the European Jewish Association and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.
And much like the UAE, the Saudis were also moving towards a normalisation process with Israel. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), only days before the Hamas attack, had said in an interview that the Kingdom is inching closer every day towards normalising ties with Israel but added caveats that the success of such an initiative also depended on Israeli deliverables on Palestine. While scholars like F Gregory Gause III recognise that fundamentals of Saudi-Israel normalisation are still available, Gulf monarchies, having lived through the shocks of the Arab Spring, will tread more carefully than some are currently anticipating.
For the likes of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and others, strategic interests at play are long-term and the current inflection point poses a challenge to their vision.
Even if Hamas’s actions were not primarily intended to disrupt the above narratives, doing so would be a big boon. A Saudi normalisation with Israel, the former being home to the Two Holy Mosques, would be a tectonic event. It would also re-draw the lines in the sand geostrategically, with an Arab-Israeli block with American backing standing in unity against Iran, an unpalatable prospect for the Shia state. In response, Iran, over the years, has perhaps mobilised the most utilitarian version of a strategy once envisioned by Pakistan’s erstwhile military dictator Zia-ul-Haq, that of targeting an adversary through a “thousand cuts”. While Zia failed in this endeavour against his adversary India, the Iranians, under the late Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani who was assassinated by the US in 2020, through their construct of a vast concoction of militias across Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon aimed at deterring Israel and if needed, the Arabs, seem to have succeeded.
For the I2U2, the ongoing crisis is a setback, but not an existential one. The minilateral format may lose some steam in the coming months but remains important as an institution. However, the ideation of it as a nimbler diplomacy design with successful delivery mechanisms, a potential alternative to post-WWII international frameworks, is yet to be proven. Perhaps this crisis is an opportune time for such minilaterals to work with pre-existing regional forums to show their worthiness. The US–Israel block within the I2U2 is operating more on a bilateral level with the UAE maintaining both distance and balance. India is also walking a tightrope in the crisis when it comes to balancing its own foreign policy and domestic political compulsions. While New Delhi abstained from a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) call towards demanding a humanitarian truce in Gaza, it voted against Israel a few days later again at the UNGA denouncing Israeli settlements gnawing into Palestinian territories (India has voted in favour of this resolution annually). This fed into New Delhi’s stance for a sovereign Palestinian nation, a two-state solution, and maintained a voting balance between Arab and Israeli interests.
Mechanisms such as the I2U2, and even the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC) announced on sidelines of the G20 summit in September, are here to stay. A collision between the “new” and “old” Middle East was expected, specifically with the issue of Palestine. The Hamas attack has rekindled the centrality of the Palestinian crisis, that any future design of the region, economic or political, cannot ignore Palestinians. Hamas’s message through terror was as much for the Arabs as it was for the Israelis.
Kabir Taneja is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
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Kabir Taneja is a Fellow with Strategic Studies programme. His research focuses on Indias relations with West Asia specifically looking at the domestic political dynamics ...
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