The European Union’s (EU) new international infrastructural connectivity programme, the Global Gateway, meets all the requirements of a foreign policy initiative that is bound to be torn apart by commentators all over the continent. In fact, the days following its official unveiling on the 1
st of December saw a ricochet of
criticism for what has been largely perceived as a little more than a rebranding campaign for the European Commission. Scepticism has mostly been articulated as variations on
two main themes. First, the 300 billion euros allocated to the initiative are simply a repackaging of existing financial commitments from the 2021-2027 budget. Second, the ‘Team Europe’ governance structure of the Global Gateway is loose to the point of undermining the coherence and efficacy of its developmental ambitions.
There is some truth to both lines of critique. According to the Commission’s own
financial breakdown of the Global Gateway, 135 billion euros will be coming from the existing ‘European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus’ (EFSD+), 145 billion euros will consist of “planned investment volumes by European financial and development finance institutions”, and an additional 18 billion euros will be made available in the form of grants from EU external assistance programmes. In other words, no fresh cash. When it comes to the
‘Team Europe’ structure, it is accurate to say that this multi-level and decentralised approach was developed as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic because of initial coordination problems and frictions in Brussels. Furthermore, from an operational standpoint, Team Europe initiatives have been
poorly integrated within the EU’s long-term strategy and overwhelmingly reliant on Member State buying into each specific proposal. The implementation of Global Gateway connectivity projects is likely to experience similar obstacles.
From an operational standpoint, Team Europe initiatives have been poorly integrated within the EU’s long-term strategy and overwhelmingly reliant on Member State buying into each specific proposal.
That being said, the criticism needs to be situated in the larger process of European foreign policy integration. Indeed, if the Global Gateway is understood as the product of post-Lisbon Treaty institutional and political realities, its shortcomings will be easier to forgive, and its role in the evolution of the EU’s global strategy will be allowed to emerge more clearly.
The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 can certainly be
lauded for having created the institutional conditions for a truly European foreign policy at the executive level, primarily through the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS). However, it has also left intact the prerogative of each member state to essentially veto any foreign policy, because the EU Foreign Affairs Council still operates under unanimity rule. Therefore, over the last decade, European foreign policymaking has not only been a compromise between the priorities of the Commission and those of the Council, but it has also been propelled by their respective and distinct logics of power. To understand the Global Gateway is to understand the forces that drive
foreign policy integration at the EU level.
Intergovernmentalism and the Council
Integration at the Council of the European Union is better understood as obeying the paradigm of intergovernmentalism, which essentially sees nations as interest-maximising actors that negotiate the preservation and advancement of their own priorities into the different stages of the process. In the institutional context of the Lisbon Treaty, intergovernmentalism has manifested both as a cooperative phenomenon—based on shared norms, trust, and reciprocity—and as a competitive one—operating as a zero-sum game. Examples of the former variety are more easily drawn from the EU domestic policy integration process, chief amongst them is the historical adoption of the
Recovery Fund earlier this year, which was the outcome of a positive compromise along the North-South divide.
A striking instance of ‘hostage-taking’ has occurred in September 2020, when the Council was unable to adopt sanctions against Belarus following Lukashenko’s illegitimate election and consequent crackdown on protesters.
Instead, on the foreign policy front, competitive ‘hostage-taking’ is becoming more and more common, and it occurs when a member state halts progress on all other decisions until their own, sometimes unrelated, policy priorities are resolved. A striking instance of ‘hostage-taking’ has occurred in September 2020, when the Council was unable to adopt
sanctions against Belarus following Lukashenko’s illegitimate election and consequent crackdown on protesters. The decision, in principle shared by all member states, was vetoed by Cyprus, which refused to greenlight any action against Belarus before its own concerns about Turkey’s expansionism in the Eastern Mediterranean had been addressed. This example illustrates the likely policy outcome of competitive bargaining: Deadlock.
Intergovernmentalism has not only determined the outcomes of foreign policy integration—i.e., the decisions adopted by the Council—but also its structures, i.e., the institutional framework within which integration occurs. Specifically, the definition of the mandate, budget, and prerogatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS) was a negotiated outcome between the diverging priorities of Member States. Because of that, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was never given
institutional independence, and instead its missions have always been designed on an ad-hoc basis by the member states willing to provide resources for them. Effectively, intergovernmentalism has been built into the European foreign policy integration process. It is not hard to imagine what fate the Global Gateway would have suffered if put in front of the Council.
Institutionalism and the Commission
Reliant on the Council for budgetary and structural changes, the European Commission and the EEAS have advanced the integration of European foreign policy through alternative means. Institutionalist explanations, which emphasise the constructive power of rules and norm in the integration process, are best suited to understand the behaviour of the EU’s executive bodies. When it came to the COVID-19
vaccine procurement strategy, the Commission was successful in lobbying for centralising the process and assuming responsibility for it, and it did so by relying on a normative argument. Indeed, the Commission leveraged the member states’ commitment to European solidarity to convince the wealthiest countries to agree to a common purchasing scheme, based on proportionate allocation. This is an example of normative suasion, which sees integration as progressed by the diffusion of normative justifications for the renouncement of particular national interests or policy preferences.
The Commission leveraged the member states’ commitment to European solidarity to convince the wealthiest countries to agree to a common purchasing scheme, based on proportionate allocation.
When these norms are crystallised into institutional realities, integration is said to be progressed by normative entrapment. Policymaking by the Commission has definitely proceeded via the logic of entrapment, founded on the desire for policy cohesion and normative consistency. For instance, the norm of environmental sustainability has been integrated into all major domestic and foreign policy initiatives spearheaded by the Commission, through the
institutionalisation of the EU Green Deal and of a dedicated Commissioner. As a result, the Commission disposes of the bureaucratic muscles necessary to bend the EU decision-making process, and of a value-driven source of legitimacy to justify it. Since 2019, a similar attempt can be observed in the Commission’s approach to external action, via the formulation of a new
‘geopolitical identity’ for the EU executive. That has been sustained by the discourse around ‘European strategic autonomy’, a normative concept that has been weaved by the Commission and the EEAS into their international engagement strategies, including and most notably into their most recent Indo-Pacific Strategy. Connectivity, as a common foreign policy priority, is going through a similar process.
Agenda-setting and the Global Gateway
The Global Gateway sits, perhaps uncomfortably, at the crossroads of the two trajectories of European foreign policy integration: The worsening paralysis of the Council and the growing activism of the Commission in external relations. Therefore, the initiative has been deliberately designed to appear like a sunken cost, rather than a new contentious programme, and to be administered in a fluid and decentralised manner, removed from the bureaucratic power struggles of the Brussels-sphere. However, the Global Gateway should not only be seen as a structural outcome but also as an exercise of agency on the part of the Commission. In fact, an important aspect of the Global Gateway that has virtually gone unnoticed by its many critics is the initiative’s
agenda-setting potential. The Commission and the EEAS, through the public (re)branding of ongoing and upcoming development projects, are actively promoting their own priorities—specifically economic, environmental, health, and infrastructural connectivity.
An important aspect of the Global Gateway that has virtually gone unnoticed by its many critics is the initiative’s agenda-setting potential.
Policy integration is being advanced, firstly, by drawing attention to the issue of connectivity and to its strategic importance. These concepts have been increasingly permeating the Commission’s official communication, featuring on a cross-section of different briefs and documents, including major ones, like the ‘Fit for 55’, the EU Eastern Partnership, the Digital Compass, and the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Most notably, connectivity and the Global Gateway were reserved a prime spot on President Von der Leyen’s
State of the Union address, in September 2021. All of these actions contribute towards creating interest around the issue of connectivity and lay the ground for future mobilisation of support and resources. A second key effect of the Global Gateway is that it represents a way for the Commission and the EEAS to build credibility and legitimacy on the issue of connectivity. By repurposing resources and personnel, the EU’s executive bodies can acquire capacities,
expertise, and authority that are going to endure beyond the lifetime of the Global Gateway and can be relied upon by the EU as whole in implementing future global development programmes.
The political consequences of the Global Gateway are a somewhat underrated, but equally important, measure of its success, alongside its financial size and the material impact that the initiative is going to have on the developing world. It should, therefore, not be so easily dismissed, but rather understood as a step on the Commission’s path, and consequently the EU’s, towards a more active role in global affairs. A narrow path that stretches in between relevance and invisibility.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
PREV
