With the Sri Lankan economy having fallen into crisis, the time is ripe to rethink economic policy to reimagine how the country can function. At present, the country faces high inflation for essential commodities such as food and fuel, shortages of commodities and essential services like utilities and transportation, and an ever-increasing poverty rate. These economic challenges operate within a political climate of weak citizen-state relations, short-sighted policy decisions, and a polarised partisan atmosphere between the most influential political parties. The three key subjects of debate at the elite and citizen levels are those concerning trust in the state, a long-term economic philosophy true to Sri Lanka’s circumstances, and effective political leadership in handling foreign relations and domestic politics. There are significant differences on these subjects within Sri Lankan political discourse that are shaping political alliances and public legitimacy on the road to the 2024 elections. This article illustrates how Sri Lankan democracy struggles to find a balance between an elite-driven free market approach within a contrasting left-leaning political zeitgeist. It does so with an analysis of the three aforementioned subjects of debate.
Trust and legitimacy
The Ranil Wickremesinghe regime has a conflicted reputation in terms of public legitimacy and trust, which has defined partisan politics in Sri Lanka. Given that
he rose to the presidency not through elections, but instead through the Rajapaksas’ support, his regime does not enjoy the citizens’ approval. This is further highlighted given that his party
, the United National Party (UNP), secured a single Parliament seat in the previous elections, through the national reserve rather than being voted in. However, given the circumstance of the economic crisis, Wickremesinghe gained public favour as a veteran politician tasked with bringing an end to the crisis. This perception was cemented as his regime secured
the US$2.9-billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout, which was presented as a historic success. Hence, Ranil Wickremesinghe has a curious persona, one that inspires public support while being perceived as illegitimate.
The three key subjects of debate at the elite and citizen levels are those concerning trust in the state, a long-term economic philosophy true to Sri Lanka’s circumstances, and effective political leadership in handling foreign relations and domestic politics.
This contrasting image has been called into question by the two main Opposition parties in the country—the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) led by Sajith Premadasa and the leftist National People’s Power (NPP) alliance led by A.K. Dissanayake, leader of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).
The SJB has opposed Wickremesinghe’s implementation of the IMF deal and refused to vote during the parliamentary debate on the subject, staging a walkout in distrust. They have
opposed the authoritarian functioning of the government with respect to the Anti-Terrorism Act and the lack of parliamentary consultation in making economic decisions. The NPP has further polarised the sphere. Identifying Wickremesinghe as the focal point of the
75- year domination of the Sri Lankan people by the elites, the NPP has created a binary between themselves (the popular voice) and the elites represented by other political parties. The NPP was centre stage in filling up Galle Face Green, the site of the 2022
Aragalaya that ousted Gotabaya Rajapaksa from office and has since gained public support and legitimacy. Aware of this reality, the NPP has been calling for immediate elections, striking at Wickremesinghe’s perceived illegitimacy.
Differing economic philosophies
The battle for public legitimacy and trust must be based on concrete economic policy frameworks, if Sri Lanka stands a chance of recovering sustainably. The Wickremesinghe regime, the SJB, and the NPP differ greatly on the subject. Wickremesinghe has been described as a
‘savage capitalist’ by commentators, given his proclivity towards attracting
large investments for infrastructure development projects to kickstart industry, build up foreign reserves, and subsequently cut back on foreign debt. His free-market approach centres upon the IMF bailout, and his government has imposed unpopular measures in order to keep in line with the austerity requirements of the IMF—the selling of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and a hike in income tax and utility rates. These measures have inspired widespread
unionised protests across industries including essential workers like doctors, bankers, and air traffic controllers. Wickremesinghe, however, has retaliated with a modified terror bill—the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA). This bill has been
criticised as draconian and purposefully vague on the definition of terrorism, perfect for co-opting dissent into the national project of economic recovery.
The NPP was centre stage in filling up Galle Face Green, the site of the 2022 Aragalaya that ousted Gotabaya Rajapaksa from office and has since gained public support and legitimacy.
The SJB has attacked this approach as lacking foresight and sensitivity,
criticising the focus on fiscal consolidation through taxation and the neglect of cutting expenditures. They lament inequitable taxation rates and the inability to bring a greater segment of people, including the rich, into the taxation regime. They have also criticised the domestic debt restructuring policy, anticipating a destabilisation of the financial sector and an illegitimate shift of burden on employee funds. In general, the SJB has been advocating for a greater safety net for the fallout from IMF austerity. They believe in a focus on increasing domestic production and balancing infrastructural initiatives and foreign investment. Their approach has been considered
truer to the Sri Lankan welfare state paradigm, and better attuned to the Sri Lankan circumstance.
The
NPP has remained guarded on the IMF subject, with spokesperson Harini Amarasuriya making no comments on Wickremesinghe’s economic regime during the parliamentary debate on IMF austerity. The NPP’s focus remains democratic rights and public legitimacy, bringing into question their economic plans. Their Marxist roots indicate a nationalisation and closing up of the economy, however, the leadership seems to have compromised in favour of the IMF deal. In summation, the SJB’s centre-left approach has been acknowledged as the lesser evil amidst the two extremes.
Emerging political leadership
Sri Lankan Opposition parties have called into question Wickremesinghe’s legitimacy, and political/economic decision-making regime, and have also seen public support swing in their favour. According to the
Sri Lanka Opinion Tracker Survey (SLOTS), both SJB (37 percent) and NPP (48 percent) fare better than Wickremesinghe’s UNP (11 percent). However, coalition formation has seen a great deal of back-and-forth between SJB and UNP. Premadasa, anxious about members defecting to the UNP, has set up a
disciplinary committee to keep them in line. His worries are warranted, as a lot of SJB members were previously in the UNP. Moreover, SJB stalwarts have been pushing for a coalition between SJB and the UNP, accepting Wickremesinghe’s open offer for opposition members to join the government. However, Premadasa has rejected this prospect, in favour of a purer vision. The JVP-led NPP has also secured the greatest proportion of public approval, projected to rise given the expected fallout from the austerity measures. There has been an idea floated of a prospective SJB and NPP
‘co-habitation’ government, with Premadasa as President and Dissanayake as Prime Minister.
The SJB has attacked this approach as lacking foresight and sensitivity, criticising the focus on fiscal consolidation through taxation and the neglect of cutting expenditures.
This would ensure social democratism, which would gain traction with the presence of the popular NPP in government. SJB has been placed in the midst of all possible alliances and has come to represent the ideological centre of the country, providing a practical, tempering effect on the UNP’s free-market regime and the NPP’s leftist inclinations. However, Premadasa’s leadership has no place for internal democracy in the SJB, which might prove
detrimental to party cohesion, especially given Wickremesinghe’s invitation for defection. The dissolution of the SJB might prove detrimental to Sri Lankan political prospects, causing greater polarisation in politics and authoritarianism in government. Effective leadership must involve the SJB on some front to maintain a social-democratic benchmark.
Conclusion
The Sri Lankan political environment is ripe for transformations in power structures, economic policy, and citizen involvement. The
Aragalaya protest last year, which led to the ousting of Gotabaya Rajapaksa and the rising popularity of the NPP signals two crucial elements: The increasing involvement of citizens in a democratising country and the left-leaning inclinations of a population struck with the worst ailments of an economic crisis. With the recovery process projected to take two-three years for
mere stabilisation, and
inflation rates still rising (albeit at a lower rate), this trend of left-leaning democratisation is likely to continue. The current elite-driven polity can no longer subsist in this political zeitgeist, and a transformation is necessary. At the same time, a left-leaning regime blind to the debt crisis and competitiveness in the financial market cannot survive, no matter how democratic its welfare state functioning may be. A balance needs to be found in the political manoeuvring of the next many months, one that guarantees long-term solutions that create a sustainable developing economy.
Parag Dass is an intern with the Forums team at the Observer Research Foundation
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