While the Russia-India defence ties remain vital, the Ukraine war and shifting geopolitics are prompting a re-evaluation of the partnership
The recent India-Russia summit, held on 8-9 July in Moscow, did not result in any significant agreements. The outcome documents lack sufficient detail on key areas of cooperation, including in defence, which has traditionally been the main pillar of the India-Russia partnership. Notably, there were no full-fledged delegation-level talks at the ummit and the defence ministers were not present among other officials. Despite the energy sector currently driving the relations, bilateral defence cooperation, which is undergoing transformation, merits examination.
In light of the absence of major defence deals, New Delhi’s primary objective is to ensure the fulfilment of existing contracts with Moscow. There have been several delays in the delivery of Russian-produced defence equipment over the past few years, due to a variety of factors including the impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, as well as payment-related and technical issues. For example, the delivery of the remaining two regiments of S-400 air defence systems has been reportedly postponed to March and October 2026. Another project that has experienced delays is the construction of the 11356R project frigates at the Yantar shipyard in the Kaliningrad region. The deal has made headway recently, with the ‘Tushil’ frigate now ready for acceptance and scheduled for delivery in September 2024, and the second warship ‘Tamal’ expected for commissioning next year.
The uninterrupted supply of spare parts for the Soviet/Russian-origin equipment represents another critical issue for India. One potential solution is the establishment of production facilities on Indian soil, which the two parties are expected to pursue in the near future. India and Russia have already established manufacturing units for the AK-203 Kalashnikov rifles, the 125 mm ‘Mango’ rounds for T-72 and T-90 tanks, and RD-33 engines for the MiG-29 jets fleet. The same approach could be extended to cover the maintenance and repair of the S-400 systems.
The uninterrupted supply of spare parts to the Soviet/Russian-origin equipment represents another critical issue for India.
It is important to note that all the functioning facilities were agreed upon by New Delhi and Moscow before the outbreak of the Ukraine war. It is currently unclear whether any comparable projects can be realised in the near term. Thus far, India has been prudent in its approach to the red lines set forth by the United States (US) regarding the advancement of substantial defence initiatives with Russia. Despite the prevailing stagnation in the broader context of Moscow-New Delhi relations, it is evident that Washington will be monitoring the transfer of arms and technologies from Russia to India.
The discussions surrounding the Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Agreement (RELOS) have taken an intriguing turn following the release of the draft document by the Russian government The text delineates the modalities of logistical support for military formations, warships, and military aircraft during joint exercises and training operations, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. New Delhi has already entered into similar agreements with many countries, including all Quad partners—Japan, the US, Australia—France, Singapore, South Korea, Vietnam, and the United Kingdom (UK).
Discussions between Moscow and New Delhi regarding the RELOS have been ongoing on an intermittent basis since 2018. In the run-up to the previous summit in 2021 in New Delhi, it was reported that the two parties were close to signing the agreement. Even as they “recognised the requirement of an institutional arrangement for reciprocal provision of logistic support and services for the Armed Forces” , the agreement was “put off due to technical issues”, or what some sources described as “differences about translation versions.”
Discussions between Moscow and New Delhi regarding the RELOS have been ongoing on an intermittent basis since 2018. In the run-up to the previous summit in 2021 in New Delhi, it was reported that the two parties were close to signing the agreement.
It is unlikely that the remaining differences in wording can be the sole explanation for the continued delay in the finalisation of the RELOS. It is plausible that New Delhi is disinclined to enter into a logistics exchange agreement with Russia so long as the latter is engaged in war. There have been a number of indications that the level of military-to-military engagement between India and Russia has declined over the last two years. Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has not visited Russia since 2020 and has not had any interaction with his counterpart Andrey Belousov since the latter was appointed as the head of the Russian Ministry of Defence in May 2024. Furthermore, the level of interoperability between the Indian and Russian armed forces has reached an all-time low. Both 2022 and 2023 saw postponement of the Indra exercise. There has been only one bilateral exercise, namely naval drills in the Bay of Bengal in November 2023, and two instances of engagement at multilateral exercises—‘Vostok 2022’ and ‘MILAN 2024’.
In the context of limited military exchanges, the rationale of the two parties resuming negotiations on the RELOS remains unclear. It appears that providing a detailed account of the logistics support provisions between the two states’ armed forces is untimely and unnecessary.
The reduction in military interactions between New Delhi and Moscow cannot be attributed solely to the Ukraine conflict. It seems probable that this is part of an increasing divergence in their geopolitical outlooks. A comparison with Russia’s interactions with China is particularly illuminating in this context.
Despite the Ukraine war, Russia and China have maintained high-level military-to-military engagements and regular joint air and naval patrols in the Pacific. On 25 July, the Russian and Chinese strategic bombers TU-95MS and Xian H-6K respectively patrolled near Alaska and for the first time were intercepted by the US and Canadian fighter jets while operating together. Their latest naval patrol was conducted in early July in the Western and Northern Pacific, while the separate naval live-fire drills, ‘Maritime Cooperation-2024’, focused on joint manoeuvres in the South China Sea.
Despite the Ukraine war, Russia and China have maintained high-level military-to-military engagements and regular joint air and naval patrols in the Pacific.
It is not yet clear to what extent these drills are leading to greater interoperability between the Russian and Chinese navies. Nevertheless, a growing frequency and complexity of bilateral exercises suggests a shift towards deeper coordination between the two powers. Additionally, the locations of these exercises and joint patrols indicate that Moscow and Beijing intend to act together in the Indo-Pacific against the USand its allies. Despite mutual suspicions at the military level, the convergence of their Indo-Pacific outlooks is driven by what the Russian and Chinese officialdom view as the common threat posed by so-called “closed military-political alliances”. Conversely, a lack of such alignment between Moscow and New Delhi stems from diverging perceptions of regional developments and varying perspectives on the roles of groupings like Quad and AUKUS.
While the defence connection with Russia remains a priority for New Delhi, mainly to ensure the necessary maintenance of legacy equipment, the ongoing war in Ukraine is prompting a re-evaluation of this partnership. Given the absence of major deals and with an eye toward the post-war era, Russia is exploring the transfer of technological expertise as a crucial strategy to maintain its presence in the Indian defence market. From a macro perspective, however, the growing alignment of Moscow’s and Beijing’s strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific may constrain the scope for military ties between India and Russia and potentially impact the overall relationship.
Aleksei Zakharov is a Research Fellow at the International Laboratory on World Order Studies and the New Regionalism Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Russia
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Aleksei Zakharov is a Research Fellow at the International Laboratory on World Order Studies and the New Regionalism Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs ...
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