The
Arab League Summit hosted by Saudi Arabia in Jeddah, on the coast of the Red Sea, was a substantive geopolitical event, both from a regional and international standpoint—a departure from a mostly stoic meet over the past years. The Summit showcased Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MbS) viewpoint of what Saudi foreign policy will look like going forward, i.e., cooperation and dialogue with all and subservient alliances with none.
The showstopper events were the attendance of two embattled political personalities. First, the President of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, leader of a founding member of the Arab League, but one that was shunned regionally since 2011 as Damascus initiated a brutal crackdown during the Arab Spring protests. Second, an unexpected visit by Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who stopped to attend the Summit while on his way to the G7 meeting in Hiroshima, Japan.
Managing both Zelenskyy and Assad at the same summit was easier said than done, with Assad previously having praised Moscow for invading Ukraine and justifying it as a ‘correction of history’.
The weekend of the Summit made Jeddah an epicentre of sorts for both the West’s interests, where pressures on the Arab states to condemn Russia have been consistent over the past year; and interests of the likes of Russia and China, the former being instrumental in Assad’s survival over the past decade, and, by association, maintaining a critical influence zone for Russia in the Middle East. Managing both Zelenskyy and Assad at the same summit was easier said than done, with Assad previously having praised Moscow for invading Ukraine and justifying it as a ‘
correction of history’.
A Syrian return
If a week is a long time in politics, a decade is an eternity—more than enough time for fundamental shifts in policies. For Assad, the return to the Arab League was a significant shift in approach from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and others. During the peak of the Arab Spring, many regional states were more than keen to see the back of the Assad clique, expecting a more palatable regime to take his place. The subliminal pretext of these efforts was both ethnic and strategic in nature, with the country’s population being majority Sunni, and, over the past decade, becoming a battleground between the Arab states and Iran. The Arab Spring and its fallout also gave birth and space to the so-called Islamic State (ISIS or
Daesh in Arabic), which wreaked havoc across both Syria and Iraq.
Assad’s return to the mainstream and back into the League is a hat tip to the realities of today. He survived the worst challenges with the help of Moscow and Tehran, though grave accusations of orchestrating violence against his own people remain. Normalising Assad is also seen as critical considering Syria’s size, population, and
regional influence on the back of Türkiye, Russia, and Iran’s influence in the country. For example, Syrian refugees today are a major factor in how the
Turkish electorate votes in their elections.
States like the UAE, amongst others, had restarted diplomatic outreach with Syria at a steady pace in the recent past. The February earthquake, which devastated parts of both Syria and Türkiye, provided new opportunity for regional and international states to loosen sanctions and Syria’s political isolation to send aid. Many,
including India, obliged, and the disaster relief was turned into an exercise to bring Syria back to a state of normalcy. In short, despite all the barbarities Assad has been accused of, the realpolitik of the day secured his return, which was further aided by a new China-brokered initiative to normalise ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Syria’s neighbour, Iraq, has long feared becoming a proxy battleground between Saudi Arabia, the United States (US), Israel, and Iran as tensions over Tehran’s nuclear programme remain unabated. Baghdad’s success in trying to not allow Iraq to suffer the same fate arguably also
rests on its neighbour Syria having that level of acceptable, albeit a status-quoist, stability.
Despite all the barbarities Assad has been accused of, the realpolitik of the day secured his return, which was further aided by a new China-brokered initiative to normalise ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Assad’s doggedness in not looking for a safe passage out of Syria even when his rule was most threatened pushed both Iran and Russia to double down. While it gave Tehran a home for its proxy groups, Moscow got a strong and permanent military presence in Syria’s Latakia province, giving it critical strategic access to the Mediterranean Sea.
The Ukrainian ace of spades
The other trick that was pulled in Jeddah was
Zelenskyy’s arrival at the Summit, placing MbS and his leadership as a central and strong diplomatic power that is capable of hosting multiple interests, foremost of which is the Saudi interest.
Hosting the Ukrainian leader also has a level of course correction for Riyadh, which was increasingly being portrayed as siding more towards Russia and China as its relations with the US dampened due to the tensions between MbS and President Joe Biden. This trend was not surprising, considering the Crown Prince benefited from his relationship with the Republicans and Donald Trump’s presidency, whereas Biden chided Saudi Arabia during his presidential campaign. While Washington has, over the months, attempted to repair these ruptures, MbS seems keener towards an overhaul of Saudi foreign policy.
Hosting the Ukrainian leader also has a level of course correction for Riyadh, which was increasingly being portrayed as siding more towards Russia and China as its relations with the US dampened due to the tensions between MbS and President Joe Biden.
Zelenskyy’s visit to the Arab League gave weight to a Summit that usually is anchored in regional affairs with a limited international dimension to it. And while Riyadh has worked closely with Russia as part of the
OPEC+ initiative aimed at influencing global oil production, and by association with global energy prices, hosting Ukraine also allowed MbS to try and position Saudi as a power pushing towards responsible adherence to international law, norms, sovereignty, and diplomacy. This loosely translates to a position against the conflict without explicitly saying so while anchoring itself as a state practising strategic autonomy. Saudi’s attempt to normalise ties with Iran and end the Yemen War feed into this narrative.
The regional dimension
While the attention was on Syria’s return and Zelenskyy’s visit, some palpable regional issues between the member states were difficult to ignore. The UAE and its leader, President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ), touted as the most powerful figure in the region, is slowly but surely realising that there is an upcoming challenge from MbS for regional influence. This is supported by
increasing economic competition between the two, as Riyadh opens up to the world, wooing investments and challenging the ‘financial capital’ crowns of the region such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi. MbZ was a notable absentee from the Summit, choosing, instead, to send a delegation led by Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Vice President of the UAE and Minister of the Presidential Court.
Another aspirational regional power, Qatar, also diverged from Saudi Arabia’s invitation to Assad. Doha itself exited the three-and-a-half-year-long economic blockade orchestrated
by Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 2021. Tensions between the countries came from Qatar’s rapidly rising influence in regional politics, backed by its immense bank balance, thanks to its natural gas reserves. Doha’s influence in flashpoints, such as Palestine and Libya, along with pan-regional support for Islamist groups and their ideological fulcrums, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, was seen as disruptive by both MbS and MbZ, with the small island nation being seen as
punching above its weight.
Tensions between the countries came from Qatar’s rapidly rising influence in regional politics, backed by its immense bank balance, thanks to its natural gas reserves.
The Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani,
reportedly left the Summit before Assad’s speech as a show of protest. Qatar, having openly supported anti-Assad protests, had pushed back, along with some others, against the Arab League readmitting Syria. This showcased
undercurrents amongst Arab states where disagreements over several regional issues persist. Perhaps, scholar Samuel Ramani put it best in his article
published in January 2021, “The Qatar blockade is over, but the Gulf crisis lives on”.
Conclusion
The Summit still largely succeeded in its newer, grander aims. How Syria’s normalisation moves forward is yet to be seen, considering that the US remains vehemently against such actions. Nonetheless, the aspirations of many states in the region are looking beyond the historical unresolved baggage that has bogged them down over decades. While issues such as Iran remain a core concern, the attempts are to continue with the economic revitalisation of the region, especially a post-oil Saudi Arabia, without getting embroiled in any new conflicts.
Kabir Taneja is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies programme at the Observer Research Foundation
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
PREV
