Terror and Escalation: India’s Lessons from Pathankot to Pulwama

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The Pahalgam terror attack in the Union Territory (UT) of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) comes as a major episode since the 2019 Pulwama attack. The environment is fuelled by the need to avenge and redraw India’s red lines in Kashmir against cross-border terrorism that bears a Pakistan connection. The past Uri, Pathankot, and Pulwama terror episodes are examined to understand how India navigated its responses and the consequences and outline the learnings and unlearnings for New Delhi.

Crises, Responses, and Aftermath

Since 2014, there have been three major terror incidents that have shaped India’s response to the menace of terrorism.

Pathankot: On  2 January 2016, several terrorists representing Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked the Pathankot Air Force Station, Punjab. New Delhi shared the convincing dossiers from the incident with Islamabad, but left the matter with no serious follow-up action after the report. The Pathankot attack was an outcome of a major intelligence failure. On the operational front, it was followed by a poor response regarding tempo and coordination.

Uri: On 19 September 2016, a group of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists attacked an Indian Army camp in the Uri sector of the present-day J&K. The government in New Delhi, inspired by the 2015 surgical strike inside the Myanmar border, conducted a military-led ‘hot pursuit’, described as a ‘surgical strike’ by making cross raids across the LoC as a part of an intelligence-based operation. From the operational viewpoint, the response was meant to induce fear and exact revenge. It was followed by a strong signalling through the response’s public announcement, factoring in the element of public sentiment and loud messaging into the response matrix, for the first time.

Indian Air Force (IAF) jets crossed the Line of Control (LoC) to conduct aerial strikes on JeM launch pads in the Balakot region of Pakistan.

Pulwama: On 14 February 2019, a suicide bomber of JeM executed the attack on the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) convoy, resulting in the death of 40 personnel in Pulwama, J&K. The killings generated domestic pressure to frame a suitable response to the terror incident. Indian Air Force (IAF) jets crossed the Line of Control (LoC) to conduct aerial strikes on JeM launch pads in the Balakot region of Pakistan. Pakistan Air Force pursued IAF jets, leading to the crash of an Indian MiG-21, with the pilot getting captured. The events led to responses and escalation from both ends, followed by claims and counter-claims to assert their respective version of victory to claim deterrence.

(Un)Learnings for New Delhi

The rationale for contextualising the (un)learnings from three terror episodes since 2014 lies in the evolution of New Delhi’s response against terrorism under the Modi government. It represents both the political continuity and the rhetoric of counter-terror, alongside a strong, muscular approach to national security.

Nuclear Learning comes with its limitations. India can escalate within the nuclear environment against Pakistan. However, it cannot discount the presence of nuclear weapons. Ashley Tellis describes the India-Pakistan nuclear equation as the ‘ugly stability’, given the grey area of nuclear escalation and its subjective interpretation limits, and not just the possibility of a full-scale war or even a ‘limited’ conventional strike beyond a certain (again subjective) limit. The element of instability limits India’s robust conventional response against the proxy violence from Pakistan. The surgical strikes, in response to the Uri terror attack and later Balakot air strikes, are part of the learning for Indian policymakers. Post-Kargil, these incidents re-emphasised the possibility of a limited kinetic response against the sub-conventional space carved by Pakistan to employ proxy terror groups against India. India can initiate deliberate escalation and manage to keep it limited. In the case of the India-Pakistan nuclear dyad, owing to conventional asymmetry, there exists an anomaly to the proposition that nuclear weapons are meant to deter war/nuclear weapons. In response, Pakistan developed a full-spectrum deterrence blurring the conventional-nuclear boundaries, especially during an escalation, as it may reach the nuclear level either through gradual steps or in a deliberate single act. As part of its learning, India has been developing a more credible and flexible response for escalation dominance through enhancing non-nuclear strategic capabilities to recalibrate its doctrinal thinking on warfighting in a nuclear environment.

The surgical strikes, in response to the Uri terror attack and later Balakot air strikes, are part of the learning for Indian policymakers.

An escalation is a complex and two-way street to manage during a crisis. The arc of escalation is complex as it may or may not follow a linear or gradual pathway(s). India’s response, especially during the Balakot air strike, brought key lessons on the dos and don'ts of managing an escalation. Earlier, New Delhi was left to anticipate Pakistan’s red lines to transition from the conventional to the nuclear realm of escalation. The real-time move helped India overcome the self-imposed psychological limitations and the learning that decision-making cannot be done in isolation, without anticipating the adversary's countermoves. A deliberate escalation move is relatively easier for a first step, but difficult as a follow-up to successfully manage the escalation ladder and emerge victorious. The process involves a trade-off between incentives and capabilities. Pakistan’s past signalling to escalate up the nuclear ladder serves as a reminder for India to carefully manage the complex process of 'escalating without escalation' within the bounds of Pakistan’s nuclear red lines. Owing to the conventional superiority, escalation advantage lies with India, and the response to Uri and Pulwama has set the conventional/traditional deterrence through a punishment regime in motion. However, these incidents are insufficient as conventional deterrence is relatively difficult to establish. It demands a clear projection of denial, capabilities, and high-risk tolerance against a determined adversary such as Pakistan.

The communication channels are quintessential, even if established through the back-door route. They are critical to building and restoring trust, conveying a clear signal of threat to Pakistan, and simultaneously diffusing the escalation matrix, provided the need arises. The post-Balakot signalling of consequences in the form of a conventional missile attack from New Delhi led to the release of the captured IAF pilot and contributed to de-escalation. Despite military hotlines and Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) existing in a nuclear environment, the maturity and escalation management on the part of the respective leadership comes to the final rescue. Thus, channels are critical and need to be reciprocated on both sides to be effective and de-escalatory in function.

Pakistan’s past signalling to escalate up the nuclear ladder serves as a reminder for India to carefully manage the complex process of 'escalating without escalation' within the bounds of Pakistan’s nuclear red lines.

Managing the dilemma of ‘apt response’ against the cost of the domestic audience is an important consideration. The terror episodes of Pathankot, Uri, and Pulwama, though targeted at the armed forces, led to anguish among the domestic audiences as one of the key consequences. Earlier in 2008, India framed strategic restraint with covert measures, seen as relatively less effective, to tone down the public domain. Unlike the past, the Uri episode in 2016, followed by a public announcement of a surgical strike against Pakistan, has intertwined the domestic audience with the policy and response against the cross-border terrorism. International opinion matters, but carries its own set of limits. The Balakot air strike in the aftermath of Pulwama has raised stakes and incentives for New Delhi to consider and manage the trade-offs of the nature of response and its implications for its policy options and its consequences. Later, the credibility of the Balakot response by New Delhi was contested, which could raise incentives for escalation in future. Thus, it becomes imperative to craft a ‘responsible and objective’ response to the crisis, not influenced by public opinion in the domestic sphere.

Conclusion

The choices made and averted in its response to terrorism have brought a set of (un)learnings for New Delhi. Uri, Pathankot, and Pulwama incidents amid India’s growing power profile have come as a test to challenge its will and resolve to manage national security. However, the recent Pahalgam terror incident suggests that these incidents may not be the last target for India. Therefore, the degree and extent to which New Delhi learns and unlearns from its failures and response becomes a crucial part of the matrix to establish an environment for a better readiness and management of the terror challenge and its global ambitions. India faces the dilemma of finding a way to hit military targets in isolation or as part of a wholesome military operation for a credible response without providing Pakistan with the opportunity to escalate it to the nuclear level deliberately.

Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation

• International Affairs
• India
• Pakistan
• 2016 uri attack
• 2019 pulwama attack
• counter terrorism policy india
• counter terrorism strategy
• national counter terrorism policy india
• Pahalgam attack
• Pahalgam terror attack
• surgical strikes india

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