Tech collaboration between democracies

Technology cooperation between democratic states has emerged as a new trend in international politics. This is reflected in suggested new groupings such as the ‘T-12’ (a group of techno-democracies with top technology sectors and advanced economies) and ‘D-10’ (a coalition of 10 democracies to create an alternative supply chain of 5G and other emerging technologies), which underline the importance of this emerging trend. The uncertain global situation following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the need to diversify supply chains away from China may have crystalised this development.

The burgeoning cooperation between authoritarian regimes continues to provide a direct contrast.  Their tech quest is organised and demonstrates long-term strategic thinking. Indeed, in recent years, China and Russia, for instance, have strengthened their collaboration on emerging technologies with a focus on Artificial Intelligence (AI), biotechnology, and neuroscience. Symbolic of this bilateral cooperation, both sides marked 2021 as the ‘Year of Scientific, Technical, and Innovation Cooperation’. The coming together of authoritarian states presents a necessary imperative for cooperation between democracies.

The uncertain global situation following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the need to diversify supply chains away from China may have crystalised this development.

Moreover, China is also utilising its tech lead, global reach, and influence over multilateral bodies to set standards favourable to its domestic technology sector. For instance, in 2019, Chinese telecom companies Huawei and China Mobile proposed a New Internet Protocol, seeking to replace the existing Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol, better known as TCP/IP. However, many tech analysts have criticised this new protocol over privacy and free speech concerns. Besides, China and other authoritarian regimes are leveraging their tech expertise to engage in ‘digital authoritarianism’ to repress their citizens and pry on foreign citizens.

Even as this happens, democracies worldwide, appreciating the need to collaborate, have dithered in their response, cautious of every step, doubting the effectiveness of their cooperation, and calling out one of their own who may differ in approach. Besides, for a long time, some democratic states such as  Germany believed that a ‘change through trade’ is possible—that a policy of economic engagement with authoritarian regimes will alter their behaviour and orient them toward democratic values. However, the last decade’s turn of events has disproved this notion. Instead, authoritarian regimes have marched ahead, reinforced their presence in the tech sphere, and engaged in confrontationist behaviour, as is evident from China’s repeated face-offs with its neighbours over territorial disputes.

This dithering response of democracies towards cooperation is combined with the breakneck speed of technological advancements, which no democracy can cope with on its own. A solo national effort in researching and developing emerging technologies is not going to fetch optimal results.

China is also utilising its tech lead, global reach, and influence over multilateral bodies to set standards favourable to its domestic technology sector.

These dynamics confirm that the path to the democratic world’s tech leadership will be better shaped by collaboration rather than quibbling over differences.

The COVID-19 pandemic has provided the necessary context and urgency for such an effort as it has created economic pressures for many countries. Consequently, as they re-emerge from the pandemic’s shadow, many democracies face the challenge of resource mobilisation to pursue strategic technological goals. By joining hands, they can share the costs of innovation and optimally use their finite fiscal resources.

Against this backdrop, many democracies have explored minilaterals to pursue the path of technology cooperation. The Quadrilateral Security Initiative and AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are two such groupings that are taking steps to foster collaboration on critical and emerging technologies. In this context, the concept of ‘techno-democracies’ has emerged as a foundation for tech policy collaboration between democracies to augment their efforts to advance their shared tech goals. Their robust innovation ecosystems—enabled in no less measure than the democratic way of living—lend them an unparalleled advantage.

Four key areas can provide the initial thrust for such cooperation:

• Actionable coordination on countering disinformation: With democracies becoming persistent targets of authoritarian regimes’ disinformation campaigns, and tackling propaganda content and its spread has become a significant challenge. Many have taken steps to counter foreign state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, but these steps are fundamentally solo and national. A more effective countering can happen only by joining hands and comprehending the threat’s gravity. To begin with, democracies can work together to identify sources and perpetrators, their modus operandi, and share possible solutions in tackling such disinformation campaigns.

• Research on quantum computing: Quantum computing technology is still in the nascent stages, but it has broader implications for encrypted communications and cryptography, as well as many defence applications like radar, simulation, and navigation. Since the R&D in quantum computing needs heavy investments, it can be an arena for democracies to collaborate.

• Achieving cyber resilience: Authoritarian regimes have engaged in persistent cyberattacks against democracies targeting their critical infrastructure, national computer networks, and electoral machinery. Whilst the Western governments (within ‘Five Eyes’ and outside) have taken multiple steps to counter these malicious cyber activities, they can also explore platforms like the Quad for intelligence sharing, working on attribution claims, and collaborative measures to respond to cyber incidents.

• Setting international standards: As mentioned earlier, China is using its tech lead and global reach to set tech standards. This began with 5G network standards and is likely to extend to AI and the Internet of Things. Therefore, it becomes imperative for democracies to take the lead in developing new international rules and standards for emerging technologies, as standard-setting is no longer just a technical exercise but also about demonstrating geo-technological heft.

The Quadrilateral Security Initiative and AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are two such groupings that are taking steps to foster collaboration on critical and emerging technologies.

As the world observes the ‘International Day of Democracy’ on 15 September, democracies must explore means to engage more with each other to promote collective technology leadership. Surely, there are challenges to this kind of cooperation, like differing threat perceptions of China and Russia, variations in domestic legal and regulatory frameworks, and differences in tech priorities. However, the key to this cooperation will be finding divergences and acting accordingly. After all, technology today is a crucial dimension of national power, and its pursuit is at the heart of global statecraft.

• International Affairs
• Cyber Security
• Cyber and Technology
• China
• India
• USA and Canada
• The Pacific, East and Southeast Asia
• 5G
• AI
• AUKUS
• cyber
• democracies
• Digital
• economies
• Technology

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