South Asia’s Youth Uprisings: Trends, Causes, and Implications

Sri Lanka’s Aragalaya of 2022, Bangladesh’s “second liberation” of 2024, and the recent Gen-Z protests in Nepal all underscore a broader trend in South Asia—that the spring is here. The protests demonstrate a phenomenon where the younger generation is challenging the existing political culture and toppling governments to promote constitutional and political reforms, embrace a better life, and address economic grievances. It highlights a broader dissatisfaction with the old elites and hollowed-out political and economic institutions. However, the implications of this ‘spring’/wave could be more severe than anticipated. With uncertainty looming large, instability could haunt the region.

Old Political Culture and New Generational Takeover

Since their independence, South Asian countries have largely been dominated by the same traditional elites. For instance, two parties - the United National Party (UNP) and Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) dominated Sri Lanka’s politics until the 2000s, when they were eventually replaced by Mahinda Rajapaksa and his family for another 15 years. In Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, both daughters of former presidents, have dominated the political sphere.  On its part, Nepal over the past decade alone has seen more than seven governments fluctuating between Nepali Congress’s SB Deuba, Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist Leninist)’s KP Oli, and  Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)’s Prachanda.

In Nepal, a “game of musical chairs” persisted where parties and leaders, unable to gain a majority in the government, formed loose coalitions to form new governments and topple existing governments.

Governments of the day had their own strategies to stay in power. Racist politics and broadening ethnic divisions often helped Sri Lankan governments gain support from the Sinhala nationalist voter base and retain power. In Bangladesh, elections were often violent and rigged. In Nepal, a “game of musical chairs” persisted where parties and leaders, unable to gain a majority in the government, formed loose coalitions to form new governments and topple existing governments. This grip over power left little room for new parties and active citizen participation, especially among the youth.

South Asia is one of the youngest regions in the world. It has a median age of 28 and accounts for 30 percent of the world’s total adolescents. The youth bulge is a critical asset to the region. Their participation in politics, job markets, the economy, and development opportunities will have significant benefits for the countries of the region. As of 2023 (see Table 1), over 29 percent of Sri Lanka’s population and 36 percent of Bangladesh and Nepal’s population were young adults (between the ages of 15 and 35). They also form a significant proportion of the total workforce in these countries, ranging from 39 percent in Sri Lanka to 45 percent in Bangladesh and 47 percent in Nepal.   Graph 1 below shows a detailed breakdown of the demographics of these countries.

Table 1. Demographics of Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal

Source:  World Health Organization (WHO) ; Authors’ compilation from World Bank

Graph 1. Demographics of Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal (in millions)

Source: WHO

Economic Grievances

Nonetheless, the potential of this younger populace remains untapped. Subsequent governments have failed to generate employment and match the youth’s aspirations and interests. In fact, Table 2 below demonstrates how youth unemployment significantly outweighs overall unemployment in these three countries.  This crisis of youth unemployment is further expected to exacerbate, with over 8.6 million people from Nepal, 5.1 million from Sri Lanka, and 48.8 million from Bangladesh (between ages 0-14) seeking jobs and economic opportunities in the near future (refer to Graph 1)

Table 2.  Unemployment in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal

Source:  Authors’ compilation from the World Bank

Corruption and patronage have also added significantly to this dissatisfaction. Graph 2 below demonstrates the corruption perception rankings of Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal since 2018. Despite some fluctuations in recent years, all three countries rank above 100 out of 180 countries, demonstrating the persistent nature of corruption. Patronage has also deterred people from effectively tapping into the existing opportunities—especially in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh—where government jobs and social welfare schemes were offered to ruling parties’ families, supporters, and voter base before the respective unrests. Both countries also witnessed misappropriation and diversion of funds, as well as large-scale opaque tendering and procurement processes. In Bangladesh, capitalists affiliated with the government continued to borrow from the banks, eventually leading to a collapse of the banking system.

Graph 2. Corruption Perception of Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal

Source: Authors' compilation using Transparency Corruption Index (2018-2024)

Furthermore, all three nations have been unable to tackle social bias towards government jobs. There is also a significant gap between the private sector and the education system. Education has undergone little to no reforms, and the gap between required and acquired skills—as well as youth expectations and ambitions—continues to widen. Nationalist and populist policies—including limited economic diversification in all three countries,  resistance to foreign investment in Sri Lanka, and instability in Nepal—have largely failed to attract investments and generate employment. These factors have contributed to a mass exodus, with over 7 million Nepali citizens migrating elsewhere for work (excluding India) in the past three decades. Furthermore, nearly 1 million Sri Lankans have migrated for work purposes just between 2022 (here) and the first half of 2025.

The Rupture and the Aftermath

With the younger generation feeling increasingly overlooked in the political ecosystem and job opportunities, these nations were one small incident away from a rupture. External shocks triggered by COVID-19, the Russia-Ukraine war, and the disruption of supply chains made the ground even more fertile for unrest with economic challenges. Rajapaksas’ consistent mismanagement of Sri Lanka’s economy, the increase in job quota for freedom fighters (read: Awami League) in Bangladesh, and the ban on social media apps in Nepal finally proved to be the final nail in the coffin.

The primary objective was to demand structural changes, hold the elites and governments accountable, and create conditions for a better life.

These three protests demonstrated similar trends. Decentralised and leaderless protests mobilised by civil society, students, activists, and trade unions. Underscoring their discontent with the political system as a whole,  the protesters kept a distance from political parties. The primary objective was to demand structural changes, hold the elites and governments accountable, and create conditions for a better life. Yet they offered little clarity on the means to enhance reforms and the country’s future direction. Social media was instrumentalised/weaponised to mobilise crowds and disseminate anti-government and anti-elite narratives. As paranoid governments exercised violence, protestors gained more sympathy, and angry crowds burned down state institutions and party offices, attacked leaders of political parties, and forced the government to resign.

As governments weakened and a vacuum emerged, opportunists and political parties infiltrated the protests, hijacked narratives, and sought legitimacy for their otherwise non-mainstream (sometimes fringe) politics and ideology. In Sri Lanka, leftist elements, including the now ruling and once Marxist militant outfit—Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)—were believed to be involved in the Aragalaya. Similar infiltrations were visible in Bangladesh from the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), as well as pro-monarch elements in Nepal.

In fact, Sri Lanka saw President Anura Dissanayake of the JVP-led left coalition win elections by portraying himself as an outsider to the elite-dominated political structure. While he enjoys the mandate of the people to usher in reforms, concerns regarding revenge politics persist at large. Bangladesh has seen a more disturbing outcome. With the parliament dissolved, political parties have continued to discuss reforms with little consensus and legitimacy. Attacks have increased against Awami League supporters and leaders, and minorities. The recent victory of a JeI-backed organisation in a university election has also underscored a worrying trend where hardliners are filling the political vacuum. Finally, in Nepal, an interim Prime Minister, Sushila Karki, is tasked to promote reforms as the parliament stands dissolved.

With the parliament dissolved, political parties have continued to discuss reforms with little consensus and legitimacy.

Furthermore, the military in all three countries has played a crucial role in the transition process. They exercised great restraint when cracking down on protestors and also avoided bloodshed by convincing leaders to resign and taking them to safe spaces. The good news remains their scant interest in interfering in domestic affairs; yet the institution remains relatively empowered than before, especially in Bangladesh and Nepal, where parliaments are dissolved.

Overall, the new governments in the region now have a significant responsibility to promote reforms and offer a better life and governance. While the protests have challenged the old guard politicians and their decadent political institutions to enrich democracy and quality of life, the political vacuum is being filled by non-elected leaders and non-mainstream parties and ideologies. In essence, uncertainty looms large in the region. The South Asian spring could thus leap in any direction – it could either blossom democracy and prosperity, or spiral into new waves of uncertainty, instability, violence, and erosion of democracy.

Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.

• International Affairs
• India
• Neighbourhood
• Bangladesh
• Sri Lanka
• south Asia
• 2025 nepalese gen z protests
• crisis in Bangladesh
• government overthrown in nepal
• nepal protest
• youth movements in asia
• youth uprising in asia

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