Almost a week after the UN Security Council expressed ‘deep concern’ at the events in Myanmar, Russia and China ‘disassociated’ themselves from a United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) resolution on 12th February that called for release of detained people including State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi. The development came as no surprise, as Moscow reiterated that the imposition of state of emergency by the military was a domestic affair, which has been purportedly blamed on widespread fraud in the November 2020 elections in which Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) had emerged victorious.
The Russian position on Myanmar has precedence, having used its veto alongside China in 2007 and 2017. While the former was to prevent UN censure over human rights violations in Myanmar, the latter was over a resolution condemning the ruling government for its treatment of Rohingya Muslims. The invoking of non-interference in matters of a sovereign state in its position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council has made Moscow an important partner for Myanmar. The latter also became the first Southeast Asian country to approve the Sputnik V vaccine when it gave the emergency approval earlier this month.
Strengthening of defence relationship
The two countries have also witnessed a marked improvement in their defence cooperation. Barely a week ahead of the emergency declaration, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu was in Myanmar for an official visit. During this period, deals were signed for supply of the Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile system, surveillance drones, and radar equipment. This sale of drones is the first time Russia has entered the ‘drone export space.’
Media reports suggest that General Min Aung Hlaing—the military leader behind the coup— considers Shoigu a friend. He has visited Moscow six times, the latest being in 2020 to participate in the 75th anniversary of the Victory Day parade. Hlaing has also been reported to be behind the decision to approve Sputnik V vaccine for emergency use earlier this month.
Shoigu has visited Myanmar at regular intervals since his first visit in 2013, resulting in some important decisions to advance the defence engagement. The timing of this visit for improving the relationship was ripe, as Myanmar was looking to reform and modernise its armed forces after 2011. The most notable bilateral agreement has been on military cooperation in 2016 that opened the door for ‘intelligence sharing, more frequent ship visits, and collaboration in peacekeeping’. The 2018 visit saw agreements regarding simplified procedure for entry of Russian warships to Myanmar’s ports and a deal to supply six Su-30 planes.
Shoigu has visited Myanmar at regular intervals since his first visit in 2013, resulting in some important decisions to advance the defence engagement. The timing of this visit for improving the relationship was ripe, as Myanmar was looking to reform and modernise its armed forces after 2011
Arms sales remain the high point of the Russia–Myanmar bilateral relationship. It is the second largest seller of weapons to Myanmar, behind China. SIPRI estimates suggest that between 2015 and 2019, Myanmar imported 49 percent of its arms from China while the share of Russia and India stood at 16 percent and 14 percent respectively. A joint centre in Myanmar allows for maintenance and modernisation of these equipments. Russia has trained thousands of technicians and military officers from Myanmar over the years. The armed forces of Myanmar were part of the Kavkaz-2020 military exercises and have also participated in military events in the past.
The key question here is whether this enhanced defence cooperation will aid Russia’s efforts to become a key partner of Myanmar given the current situation? Certain factors work in its favour, including the fact that Myanmar is seeking to diversify relations with different powers to avoid overdependence on China.
Moscow, with no direct involvement in local issues, would be perceived as a neutral power, which can prove to be advantageous. As Myanmar looks to expand ties, Russia would be a welcome addition to the current mix of powers, which also includes India, Thailand, and Japan. The apprehension regarding western sanctions due to ongoing events also makes Russia attractive to Myanmar, with which it has compatibility on issues like non-interference and sovereignty. This would also bolster Moscow’s efforts to improve ties with ASEAN states, which forms part of its broader pivot to the East. This idea has gained renewed importance since the breakdown of its relations with the West after 2014. It is vital for a multi-vector foreign policy which seeks to enhance Russian influence in the Asia-Pacific. The aim is to establish itself as an important player in a region which is becoming the centre of global geopolitics and geoeconomics.
However, this is not going to be an easy undertaking for Russia.
Limited bilateral engagement
Overall, while Russia-Myanmar relations have remained friendly and defence ties are improving, it has been noted that the ‘closeness’ of this relationship must not be ‘exaggerated’. While there is ongoing cooperation in the field of education and potential exists for furthering ties in the energy sector, overall economic, trade, and investment linkages remain very weak.
Moscow does not have a long history of engagement with the Southeast Asian country and despite cordial ties during the Soviet period, the relations remained limited. It was only in 2013 that Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Myanmar. This was followed by PM Dmitry Medvedev who attended the East Asia Summit in 2014 in Myanmar, while also meeting the leadership on the sidelines of the event in 2015. The 2016 Russia-ASEAN summit in Sochi led to a meeting at the presidential level. The two sides set up an intergovernmental commission for trade and economic cooperation in 2014. However, bilateral trade remains at a low level, reaching US $387 million in 2019. In contrast, China’s trade with Myanmar touched US $17.1 billion in 2019, making it the leading partner, followed by Thailand, Japan, and India. Efforts have been made to improve engagement in the energy sector. Russia’s Bashneft operates the EP-4 oil field, and has recently sought to expand cooperation in oil and gas exploration. However, the field remains crowded with the presence of Chinese, Indian, French, British, and American companies in the sector.
Beijing is the largest investor in the country, focusing on sectors of power, oil, gas, and mining. With the involvement of Myanmar into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the investments are expected to register an increase. Russia does not figure in the list of top 10 investors in Myanmar.
Beijing is the largest investor in the country, focusing on sectors of power, oil, gas, and mining. With the involvement of Myanmar into the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the investments are expected to register an increase. Russia does not figure in the list of top 10 investors in Myanmar.
For Russia, this is not a problem restricted to Myanmar; its limited resources have plagued its broader relations with Southeast Asia (SEA), an issue that will only become more acute given the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia is the leading arms supplier to SEA but that has not translated into it becoming the leading partner for the region. This is because the region has maintained a diversified portfolio of suppliers, to avoid overdependence on one power. In addition, other weapons suppliers have also built extensive economic, diplomatic, and investment linkages in the region over a long period of time. In the absence of a similar engagement, Russia’s presence is still considered to be too weak to be a balancer against other major powers in the region, despite its arms supplies and UNSC permanent membership.
Its other traditional focus on oil and gas exports to improve bilateral ties has also suffered from a lack of clarity when it comes to SEA. Most of its exports are focused on Northeast Asia—China, Japan, and South Korea—and its presence in SEA market remains low. In the case of multilateral engagement with the region, Russia again has had ‘limited cooperation’ owing to the above-mentioned weaknesses.
In other words, while SEA has an important place in Russia’s ‘global strategy,’ it has not become the top priority in its foreign policy. This broader shortcoming also impacts ties with individual ASEAN members, including Myanmar. It also impedes the exploitation of advantages that Russia does have when it comes to improving relations with Myanmar.
In this regard, a perception of being too close to China also carries the danger of alienating Myanmar as the latter seeks to build a diversified portfolio of ties. While China remains the Myanmar’s leading partner, it might be helpful for Russia to maintain neutrality or follow ASEAN’s lead. This is because if it is seen to be overdependent on China, it will make at least some countries in SEA cautious, including Myanmar.
Conclusion
It is clear that while Russia has friendly relations with Myanmar and has the potential to further improve ties, at present its role remains limited. This needs to be addressed through improvement in economic, trade, and investment ties, apart from defence engagement.
Moscow is aware of the strategic and economic importance of Myanmar, given its vital strategic location for key land and maritime connectivity routes. It is rich in natural resources like oil and gas, minerals, and precious gems.
If Russia can become a key partner for Myanmar, it will also be an important addition to its SEA policy given the latter’s geostrategic importance. This will also help address, to some extent, the shortcoming of Russia in not being a key player in broader SEA yet.
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