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Putin’s Beijing trip highlights a Russia–China partnership at its strongest yet, with energy, trade, and geopolitics binding them closer against US pressure.
The results of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to China signalled a further strengthening of the Russia-China partnership. The Russian President was in Tianjin to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit and the military parade at Tiananmen Square to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the victory against the Japanese forces. The visit occurred at a time of heightened pressure from the United States (US) amid discussions within Washington to strengthen secondary sanctions and tariffs against countries that continue to trade with Russia.
This shift underscored the SCO’s growing significance as a non-Western regional grouping. Putin’s presence at the military parade, although not unprecedented, carried symbolic weight, suggesting a greater proclivity toward Beijing. The optics surrounding the parade reflected Russia granting more agency to Beijing’s interests in the international system. During this visit, 22 agreements were concluded across sectors, including energy, science, and healthcare. A trilateral memorandum of understanding (MoU) among Russia, China, and Mongolia was also reached to construct the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline. The breakthrough—long delayed due to disagreements over key terms—indicates an important step in furthering the trajectory of the Moscow-Beijing nexus.
Since the 1990s, Russia and China have steadily fortified their partnership across political, military, and economic realms. The resolution of protracted border disputes and the gradual ironing out of differences provided their relations with stable grounds to accelerate. Both countries have articulated their visions for strengthening cooperation in Eurasia and collaborating in various regional and multilateral forums such as the SCO and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). The two countries have also expressed complementary interests in the international system and advocate for reform in the Western-led order, sharing analogous views on bolstering connectivity links and engaging with the Global South.
Although the recent MOU fails to shed light on the specifics—including pricing and other technicalities—the POS-2 is a key variable in sensing the general direction of the relations between Russia and China.
The 2000s marked the consolidation of a military-technical partnership, with Moscow emerging as Beijing’s primary supplier of arms. In the 2010s, as their mutual contestation with the West intensified, China purchased S-400 missile defence systems and Su-35 fighter jets from Russia. The two countries also considerably scaled up their joint military drills. Subsequently, bilateral trade and investments expanded as well. Following the sanctions on Russia in 2014, Moscow became increasingly receptive to Chinese investments in strategic areas such as the Arctic and the Russian Far East—especially in domains including energy, metallurgy, and connectivity. Since the war in Ukraine and the introduction of debilitating sanctions against Moscow since 2022, China overtook the European Union (EU) in 2023 as the largest trading partner of Moscow. Beijing did not join the sanctions regime. In fact, it played a key role in exporting critical technologies to Moscow in the early stages of the war. Before the war, Russia’s trade with China was US$146 billion; three years later, bilateral trade increased to US$245 billion in 2024 (see table 1.1).
Table 1.1: Russia-China bilateral trade 2014-2024 (in US$)
Source: Compilation of data from Rosstat, United Nations (UN) Comtrade, and the Chinese customs database
Against this backdrop, Putin’s 2025 visit to China has arrived at a pivotal juncture. While the relations are at their apogee, new questions loom, particularly regarding the future trajectory of their ties in the aftermath of the Ukraine war or in the event of a possible rapprochement between Washington and Moscow. Putin’s rather long visit to Beijing yielded agreements on integrating Russia’s lunar dust monitoring device into Beijing’s Chang’e 7 spacecraft, and a roadmap for developing the Bolshoy Ussurisky Island. However, the MoU on constructing the pipeline marked an important development. With energy relations being a critical variable in bilateral relations, talks on building new energy linkages reflect the deepening of bilateral relations and are indicative of the relations being insulated from the post-Ukraine war developments.
A key component of Russia’s exports to China consists of hydrocarbons. In the backdrop of Russia’s plans to pivot eastwards, its energy strategy has undergone a shift, prioritising the markets in Asia - specifically China- with plans to extend the network of gas pipelines connecting China with Russia further. This could be reflected in the construction of the Power of Siberia 1 pipeline, which transits piped natural gas from Yakutia in Eastern Siberia to Shanghai. After POS-1 was operationalised, piped natural gas exports from Russia to China increased. The POS-1 has a maximum capacity of 38 billion cubic meters (bcm); the POS-2 pipeline further augments this capacity by an additional 50 bcm, transporting gas from Western Siberia via Mongolia.
Table 1.2: Volumes of China’s Gas Imports from Russia (in billion cubic meters)
| Year | Piped natural gas | LNG |
| 2018 | NA | 1.6 |
| 2019 | 0.328 | 5.9 |
| 2020 | 4.1 | 6.8 |
| 2021 | 10.4 | 6.2 |
| 2022 | 15.4 | 8.9 |
| 2023 | 22.7 | 10.95 |
| 2024 | 31 | 11.37 |
Source: Compilation of Gazprom Annual Reports
It merits attention that this megaproject had been in a deadlock for several years. Experts had opined that both countries were unable to agree on the terms of pricing and that Beijing was concerned about becoming increasingly dependent on one market for a particular commodity (gas), suggesting that the economic impetus of the project for China was not high enough.
Although the recent MOU fails to shed light on the specifics—including pricing and other technicalities—the POS-2 is a key variable in sensing the general direction of the relations between Russia and China.
The Trumpian rhetoric of engineering a reverse-Kissinger by adopting a conciliatory posture towards Moscow stems from a strand of thought that draws parallels with the Cold War dynamics of Soviet Union-China relations. The Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s created a vacuum for Washington to manoeuvre and establish relations with China in the following decade. This analogy falls short, as it disregards the absence of ideological rivalry today and overlooks the globalisation of world politics, which has amplified the element of transactionalism in the dyad. Thus, the modern-day Russia-China relations are less about a junior-partner/senior-partner relationship, but are driven by convergences promulgated by geopolitical shifts.
The rationale for Moscow to improve relations with the US is to bring a degree of equilibrium in its economic partnership with China.
Russia acknowledges China’s vitality in Eurasia, further reflected in various foreign policy documents, such as the 2023 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Even in light of the structural asymmetries, it is unlikely that Moscow will undermine its relations with China to improve its standing with Washington, especially in the backdrop of an erratic Trump administration.
Nonetheless, Moscow is interested in improving relations with the US. A thaw could open avenues for cooperation, as seen in recent US-Russia talks. Additionally, Russia welcomed American investment in its minerals and energy sectors. Apart from the prospect of seeking sanctions relief, the rationale for Moscow to improve relations with the US is to bring a degree of equilibrium in its economic partnership with China.
Building on the thaw initiated with China at Kazan last October, the deepening Russia–China cooperation under the banner of cementing global multipolarity carries implications that are broadly welcome for India. New Delhi shares similar yet contrasting grievances in the international system, such as advocating reform in the UN and strengthening trade through the use of non-Western national currencies.
However, with no resolution on the border question with China, India is concerned about a potential deepening of the Russia-China partnership, particularly in the strategic realm.
The recent tariffs imposed against India, embroidered with the intent to stall the India-Russia relations, have instead strengthened the bilateral ties further. New Delhi has become more receptive towards collaborating with Moscow and Beijing in organisations such as the SCO, which was previously losing prominence in New Delhi’s calculus. However, with no resolution on the border question with China, India is concerned about a potential deepening of the Russia-China partnership, particularly in the strategic realm. China’s growing prominence in Moscow’s calculations could give Beijing leverage over India, especially in the delivery of defence systems and platforms. And even with Moscow’s assurances to expedite deliveries and reiterating its commitments to increasing engagement with India, the latter watches the development of the Russia-China partnership with a degree of caution.
Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow with the ORF Strategic Studies programme, focusing on Russia’s foreign policy and economy, and India-Russia relations. Siddharth is a ...
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