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Washington’s renewed outreach to Islamabad offers short-term gains, but Pakistan’s loyalties—and strategic dependencies—remain firmly anchored in Beijing.
The thaw in the United States (US)-Pakistan relations has accelerated in the past few months, marked by recent high-level visits from Pakistani officials to Washington, new economic promises, agreements on rare earth minerals, reported Pasni port development plans and energy resources, and cooperation in the Middle East. These developments could indicate that Pakistan is retreating into the US orbit after years of tension and neglect from Washington. However, a closer look suggests that this rapprochement is tactical and temporary, offering short-term benefits for both countries, with limited prospects for any long-term strategic cooperation. Pakistan’s loyalties stay with China, its ‘all-weather’ strategic partner and a tested external support in dealing with India.
For Pakistan, the benefits of its renewed ties with the US include quick gains such as increased global visibility, investments, and lower tariff rates. In return, the Trump administration seeks Pakistan’s support on its policies in the Middle East, the Israel-Gaza situation, and Iran, alongside tangible returns on its investments, such as critical minerals, crypto, and cooperation on counterterrorism. However, these gains are likely to be short-lived, and Pakistan’s tendency to play both sides, along with its heavy reliance on China, makes lasting cooperation with the US implausible.
Is tactical and temporary, offering short-term benefits for both countries, with limited prospects for any long-term strategic cooperation.
As the US-Pakistan relationship improves under the Trump administration, the leadership in Islamabad feels increasingly compelled to demonstrate its loyalty towards Beijing. In a recent interview, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif described the country’s relationship with the US as “transactional or flirtatious”, suggesting it was never built on reliability. Furthermore, he emphasised that China has been, and will continue to be, Pakistan’s reliable partner, as Beijing has consistently provided Islamabad with what it needs, especially in the defence sector. Prime Minister (PM) Shehbaz Sharif seconded/confirmed this approach, stating that while Pakistan wants better relations with the US, it would never come at the cost of its ties with China. Similarly, Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir has also called Pakistan’s relation with China “unique, time-tested and exceptionally resilient.”
The evidence of this deep Sino-Pakistani partnership is most visible in the defence cooperation between the two nations. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2020 and 2024, Pakistan was the world’s fifth-largest arms importer, with over 80 percent of those imports from China. By comparison, the US supplied almost nothing of significance in this period. China has provided Pakistan with advanced fighter jets, including the J-10C, as well as co-production of the JF-17s, armed drones, warships, submarines, and tanks. As a result, Pakistan’s military is now heavily dependent on Chinese spare parts, software, and training.
This reliance gives China significant leverage, as Pakistan cannot maintain its military readiness without Beijing’s support. Asif claimed in the interview that Pakistan turned to China for its defence needs because the US had proven “unreliable” in the past, cutting off aid and arms supplies whenever political disagreements arose between the two sides. On the other hand, China has been more reliable in this respect because it shares a common adversary with Pakistan, which is India. During ‘Operation Sindoor’, China provided crucial operational support to the Pakistan military. A similar close-knit defence and security bilateral arrangement between Washington and Islamabad now seems difficult, given the growing strategic rivalry between China and the US. Moreover, such cooperation could raise doubts in Beijing about Islamabad’s intentions and may also threaten the US-India partnership. Setting aside the defence aspect, China would not mind sharing Pakistan’s economic burden with the US and might accept some of the bilateral agreements recently signed between Washington and Islamabad.
China is frustrated with the progress on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a project valued at over US$60 billion, which was deemed a game-changer for both countries when it was officially inaugurated in 2015. Most of the CPEC projects are running behind schedule, and the second phase, which was commenced in 2024, has not progressed as planned. Pakistan’s internal political, economic, and security turmoil, along with its poor corruption track record and other technical shortcomings, are among the key reasons behind the slowdown of CPEC. Despite financial losses, delays in project completion, and non-payment of debts on time, China continues to rely on Pakistan. For Beijing, Islamabad remains a reliable partner in providing direct access to the Indian Ocean, pressures India on the western front through both conventional and unconventional means, and is a major importer of Chinese defence and military equipment. Furthermore, it could also be useful in countering the rising US influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
Pakistan’s military, economic, and foreign policy structures are too closely linked with China to permit any strategic realignment with the US.
In contrast, the US’s economic involvement in Pakistan has been much smaller. The recent deal with the US Strategic Metals (USSM) to invest US$500 million in mining rare earth minerals in Pakistan is puny in comparison to China’s total investments. More importantly, Pakistan’s supposed mineral wealth has repeatedly failed to yield results in the past and has not contributed to improving its economy. For example, an offshore oil drilling exercise in 2019 (involving the US firm ExxonMobil) raised hopes of a major discovery, only to turn out to be dry. Additionally, China is already deeply involved in Pakistan’s mineral extraction industries, operating the Saindak Copper-Gold Mine in Balochistan and trying to secure a stake in the Reko Diq copper and gold reserves. With approximately 30,000 Chinese nationals working on different projects in Pakistan, Beijing has a direct stake in these areas. It is unlikely Pakistan will completely hand over its most critical mineral deposits to American companies, as China would not allow it.
Even Asif acknowledged that Beijing was not concerned about Islamabad’s recent outreach to Washington, because the China-Pakistan relationship was “time-tested” and could not be replaced. If anything, the proposed US investments in Pakistan would indirectly benefit China, since financial support makes it easier for Pakistan to service its Chinese debts and safeguard CPEC projects from civilian unrest in places such as Balochistan. There is already a deep-seated resentment among locals against China over CPEC projects and the presence of Chinese nationals in the province. Some local representatives in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have already cautioned the US regarding Pakistan’s exaggerated claims of critical minerals and energy reserves in these provinces. As a result, US companies may struggle to generate profits from these deals, and any economic benefits could accrue to China.
Furthermore, Pakistan has a poor track record of being an unreliable partner, which says something, but fails to align with its actions. After PM Sharif and Field Marshal Munir’s meeting with President Trump in Washington on 25 September 2025, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, attended a quadripartite meeting with his counterparts from China, Russia, and Iran on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The four countries issued a joint statement on the present situation in Afghanistan, in which they firmly opposed the re-establishment of any military bases in or around the country. This was likely in response to reports that the Trump administration might seek to regain access to the Bagram airbase. It was a clear duplicity from the Pakistani side, as on the one hand, it welcomed promises of investment from the US, yet at the same time, it joined China and Russia to oppose America’s security plans in the region.
For the US, it is better to think long-term in enhancing ties with a strategic partner rather than seeking short-term gains from an unreliable one.
Another recent example of Pakistani contradiction was its initial praise for President Trump’s 20-point plan to end the war in Gaza. However, within two days of officially endorsing the plan, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar issued a clarification saying that Trump’s plan was “not our document,” and they do not support it. This type of diplomatic ‘double game’ behaviour is not unusual for Islamabad, and these examples indicate that the US-Pakistan rapprochement may face hurdles and trust issues in the months to come.
Pakistan’s military, economic, and foreign policy structures are too closely linked with China to permit any strategic realignment with the US. The defence dependence on Chinese arms, CPEC projects, regular financial bailouts from Beijing, and frequent statements of affirmation from Pakistani leadership confirm Chinese primacy in Islamabad. The reset in the US-Pakistan ties may provide Islamabad with temporary relief, fresh investments and financial aid, and create temporary fissures in India-US ties. However, it cannot compete with the depth and scale of China’s involvement in Pakistan.
For Washington, this presents a tricky situation. The idea that Pakistan could once again be a loyal major non-NATO ally (MNNA) is largely misguided. Pakistan will continue to hedge, pretending to cooperate with the US while aligning with China and its partners on strategic issues. Therefore, the renewed US engagement with Pakistan could risk the much more vital strategic partnership with India. Over the past 25 years, the US and India have carefully built a relationship based on shared democratic values, extensive defence and security cooperation, bipartisan political support, and a common vision for stability in the Indo-Pacific region. This relationship is crucial for deterring China’s growing influence in the region. For the US, it is better to think long-term in enhancing ties with a strategic partner rather than seeking short-term gains from an unreliable one.
Sarral Sharma is a Doctoral Candidate at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has previously served in the National Security Council Secretariat.
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Sarral Sharma is a Doctoral Candidate at Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi. He has previously served in the National Security Council Secretariat. He was a ...
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